9911796707
TMI Blog1998 (1) TMI 282X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the appellants factory is considered to have been come into existence from 15-10-1994, i.e. before filing of the declarations. From the dates of receipt of goods in respect of which capital credit has been denied vide Annexure I to the adjudication order, it is seen that the declaration was filed beyond three months from the date of receipt of the goods into the factory. The Central Excise Officers being creatures of the statute, are not empowered to exceeds the time limits specified in the provisions of the Central Excise Act or Rules. 2. The learned Advocate, Shri Prabhakara Sastry, appearing for the appellants, contended that the definition of factory under Section 2(e) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, is to the effect that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . When this was pointed out, the Board purportedly clarified, by letter dated 26-11-1994, that credit of duty is admissible only when the capital goods enter into production and, therefore, it will not be appropriate to allow credit at the stage of initial setting up of the factory (where the factory is not yet in existence) and the manufacturer intending to take credit in such a case shall continue to file declaration as required irrespective of the fact that such a factory has not come into existence and or got registered. The Board also indicated that credit on capital goods received at the time of establishment of the factory can be availed only after the factory commences production and is registered. From the above clarification, it i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ike the appellant. In these peculiar circumstances, we hold this to be a fit case to hold that the declaration must be regarded as filed in time. The jurisdictional officer will pass a consequential order. The appeal thus allowed. 3. Heard the learned JDR. He could not distinguish the decision. 4. I have considered the submissions. The period involved in that decision is April, 1994, so is the period in this case. Following the above said decision of this Bench of the Tribunal, I am of the view that it would be denial of justice if the benefit of Rule 57Q is denied to a person like the appellant. 5. Hence in the facts and circumstances of the case, which is identical to the above said case decided by this Bench of the Tribunal, I hol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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