9911796707
TMI Blog2007 (9) TMI 399X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the respondents. Chinmoy Khaladkar and Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Advocates, for the appellant. -------------------------------------------------- The judgment of the court was delivered by C.K. THAKKER J. All these criminal appeals are filed by the Municipal Corporation of the City of Thane ("the Corporation", for short) against M/s. Vidyut Metallics Ltd. respondent No. 1 aggrieved by the order dated June 14, 2001, passed by a single judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petitions Nos. 593, 594, 595 and 596 of 1996. By the said order, the learned single judge dismissed the writ petitions filed by the Corporation and confirmed the order passed by the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thane, holding that respondent No. 1 herein was not liable to pay octroi at the rate of 1 per cent, but only at the rate of 0.5 per cent. The short facts giving rise to the present appeals are that respondent No. 1 is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having its registered office and factory at Bombay-Agra Road, Wagle Estate, Thane. The company is engaged in the process of manufacturing safety razor blades of va ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , Senior Division, Thane, which were registered as Municipal Appeals Nos. 3 to 6 of 1979. The learned judge, by an order dated January 29, 1988, dismissed the appeals filed by the company holding that item No. 77 expressly referred to "stainless steel" which was applicable and item No. 71 could not be attracted to the goods brought by the appellant-company within the Municipal limits and the company was liable to pay octroi at the rate of 1 per cent. The company challenged the order passed by the learned III Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division by filing revision petitions. The VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thane, allowed those revisions, set aside the order passed by the trial court and held on the merits that the contention raised by the company was well founded. It also held that at an earlier occasion, a similar question had arisen and a competent court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thane, held that the company could be charged only under item No. 71 and not under item No. 77 of the Schedule. The said order was confirmed by the revisional court and also by the High Court of Bombay vide its order dated July 16, 1990, in Writ Petition No. 2987 of 1990. It was, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The company, therefore, corrected its mistake and started paying octroi at the rate of 0.5 per cent under item No. 71. Learned counsel also submitted that the same question came up for consideration before a competent court of law and the matter was decided in earlier litigation in favour of the company. In Writ Petition No. 2987 of 1990, the High Court, vide its order dated July 16, 1990, held that the correct item which would apply to the goods brought by the respondent-company was item No. 71. Obviously, therefore, the revisional court as well as the High Court in the present proceedings were right in relying on that decision and no interference is called for. It was also submitted that even on the merits in the present proceedings, the revisional court decided the issue in favour of the company. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the revisional court as also by the High Court cannot be faulted. Learned counsel for the parties drew our attention to both the items, i.e., item No. 71 and item No. 77 of the Schedule to the Octroi Rules. Those items read thus: "Item No. 71: Iron and steel. (i) to (xxx) . . . (x ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... proper. As already referred to above, the revisional court confirmed the order passed by the trial court and even the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. In our opinion, the III Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane, was not right in passing the order in the present proceedings and in observing that the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thane, in the earlier litigation had no binding effect and he could decide the appeal independent of that decision. The revisional court as well as the High Court were, therefore, right in setting aside the said order. Before the High Court as well as before us, it was contended by learned counsel for the Corporation that in the earlier proceedings, the criminal writ petition was dismissed by the High Court in limine without recording reasons and hence, the said decision would not operate as res judicata nor would it debar the Corporation from raising a point of law which arises in the present proceedings. It was also submitted that in the matters relating to recovery of taxes, revenue, octroi, etc., each year is an independent unit and a decision in one year does not deprive the Revenue from claiming the requisite am ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Council observed (page 100 of [1926] AC): "The decision of the High Court related to a valuation and a liability to a tax in a previous year, and no doubt as regards that year the decision could not be disputed. The present case relates to a new question, namely, the valuation for a different year and the liability for that year. It is not eadem questio, and therefore the principle of res judicata cannot apply." (emphasis supplied) In Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1967] 1 SCR 913 See [1967] 63 ITR 416, 423 (SC)., this court stated: "It is true that an assessment year under the Income-tax Act is a self-contained assessment period and a decision in the assessment year does not ordinarily operate as res judicata in respect of the matter decided in any subsequent year, for the Assessing Officer is not a court and he is not precluded from arriving at a conclusion inconsistent with his conclusion in another year. It is open to the Income- tax Officer, therefore, to depart from his decision in subsequent years, since the assessment is final and conclusive between the parties only in relation to the assessment for the particular year for which it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rate as res judicata in respect of the matter decided in any subsequent year, for the Assessing Officer is not a court and he is not precluded from arriving at a conclusion inconsistent with his conclusion in another year. It is open to the Income-tax Officer, therefore, to depart from his decision in subsequent years, since the assessment is final and conclusive between the parties only in relation to the assessment for the particular year for which it is made. A decision reached in one year would be a cogent factor in the determination of a similar question in a following year, but ordinarily there is no bar against the investigation by the Income- tax Officer of the same facts on which a decision in respect of an earlier year was arrived at. But this rule in our judgment, does not apply in dealing with an order under section 25A(1). Income from property of a Hindu undivided family 'hitherto' asserted as undivided may be assessed separately if an order under section 25A(1) had been passed. When such an order is made, the family ceases to be assessed as a Hindu undivided family. Thereafter, that family cannot be assessed in the status of a Hindu undivided family unless the order i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
