9911796707
TMI Blog2002 (1) TMI 1212X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to eliminate any allegation of bias against such an appellate authority. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the rule against bias is not available in the present case in the view of the ‘doctrine of necessity’. We are, therefore, of the view that reliance of the doctrine of necessity in the present case is totally misplaced. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ound defect in the proceedings, set aside the order of removal passed against the appellant. The company filed a letters patent appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench found the order and judgment of the learned Single Judge as erroneous and, in that view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant stood dismissed. It is against the said judgment and the order of the High Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 4. This Court, while entertaining the special leave petition out of which the present appeal arises, passed the following order : "Issue notice confined to the question as to why the case may not be remanded to the Appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kind and form. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter, etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid form a bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of disciplinary authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation) Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh [1996] 9 SCC 281, it was held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to sit over the order passed by him as an appellate authority. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority was in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irector of the company [and] was required to preside over the meeting of the Board and, therefore, the then Chairman-cum-managing director of the company was not disqualified to preside over and participate in the meeting of the Board which dismissed the appeal of the appellant. We find no merit in the argument. Rule 3(d) of the company's Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules ('CDAR') defines 'Board' in the following terms : "Board means the proprietors of the company and includes, in relation to exercise of powers, any Committee of the Board/management or any officer of the company to whom the Board delegates any of its powers." 8. In view of the aforesaid definition of the expression 'Board', the Board could have constituted a Committee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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