9911796707
TMI Blog1974 (4) TMI 89X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he petitioner an opportunity of being heard, and without serving upon him any assessment order, issued a demand notice dated 27th June, 1973, requiring him to pay purchase tax amounting to Rs. 6,787.52 along with interest. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the Assistant Sugar Commissioner, Moradabad, which is still pending consideration. While filing the appeal, the petitioner made a request that the proceedings for realisation of the tax, interest and penalty be stayed but respondent No. 2 rejected that request on the ground that it was not possible to do so. In the circumstances, the petitioner was left with no other alternative but to approach this court under article 226 of the Constitution and to pray for a writ of certiorari for quashing the aforesaid notice of demand. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the validity of the impugned notice of demand, inter alia, on the ground that the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961, under which the aforesaid notice of demand has been issued, is invalid and unconstitutional. A perusal of the writ petition shows that the challenge to the constitutionality of the aforementioned enactment can be classed under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961. In the circumstances, no question of the provision of the U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961, being in derogation of the provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, or of contravening article 14 of the Constitution on this ground arises. This objection raised on behalf of the petitioner to the constitutionality of the Act, therefore, has also to be repelled. According to the petitioner, the provisions contained in the U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961, violate article 14 of the Constitution Inasmuch as it authorises the levy and collection of purchase tax on sugarcane purchased by sugar factories and units situated in the reserved areas, but does not authorise the levy and collection of purchase tax on purchases of sugarcane made by other purchasers in the reserved areas. Essentially there is no difference in the transactions of purchase of sugarcane made by sugar factories and units situated in the reserved areas on the one hand and that made by others. The classification thus made is arbitrary and offends article 14 of the Constitution. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, It is pointed out that in the reserved are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uld be inferred that non-classification of sugarcane in accordance with its quality had, for the purposes of the Act, the effect of placing any person in a more disadvantageous position as compared to any other owner of a factory or unit. We are, accordingly, not satisfied that non-classification of sugarcane in accordance with its quality has resulted in any discrimination which offends article 14 of the Constitution. Relevant portion of section 3 of the U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act (after its amendment by U.P. Act No. 1 of 1971), reads thus: "Section 3. (1)........................................................................... (2) The tax levied under sub-section (2) shall be payable by the owner of the factory or the owner of the unit, as the case may be, and shall be paid on such date, at such place and in such instalments as may be prescribed. (3) Any tax tendered under this Act if not paid by the date prescribed for the payment thereof shall carry interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from such date to the date of payment. (4) Where any tax payable under this Act or interest or both, as the case may be, remains unpaid for a period of fifteen days beyo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned to have his say in the matter. This provision accordingly is unreasonable and is liable to be struck down. In this case we find that running of interest at the rate of 12 per cent, if the tax assessed is not paid by the prescribed date, is automatic. It does not require any adjudication and the amount of interest payable can be worked out by resorting to simple arithmetical calculation. Accordingly, such a provision cannot be branded as unreasonable merely because the assessee is not heard before the amount of interest is quantified and an attempt is made to recover it. We fall to see how such a statutory provision can be said to be invalid. It is not necessary for us to go into the question with regard to the validity of the procedure adopted in levying penalty under sub-section (4) as we do not find that, under the impugned notice dated 27th June, 1973, the respondents are seeking to recover any amount by way of penalty imposed under sub-section (4). It is only when the respondents seek to levy and recover such penalty from the petitioner that an occasion to consider the question regarding the validity of the provisions relating to penalty proceedings may possibly arise. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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