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TMI Blog2001 (10) TMI 1103X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l No.568 of 1981. They are inam lands. The appellants were initially the tenants of the lands in dispute under the Inamdar. The case of the appellants is that the first respondent, being their close relative, was permitted to cultivate the lands in dispute. He, however, claimed to be the tenant of the lands in dispute. He died during the pendency of the case before the High Court and his heirs and legal representatives, respondent Nos.1A to 1J, were brought on record (hereinafter referred to as, the first respondent). The second respondent, namely, M/s. Estate Investment Company (hereinafter referred to as, the Investment Company) is said to be the purchaser of the lands in dispute from the Inamdar. The Act came into force in December 1948. The State Government assumed the management of the lands in dispute and announced this fact in R.D. Notification No.4603/45-III (B) dated December 19, 1949. However, by Notification No. MGT/2356/20023/M dated October 1, 1957, issued under Section 61 of the Act, the management of the Government was terminated. It is a common ground that the lands in dispute were in possession of the first respondent even when they were under the management of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... civil applications in the High Court. Holding that all the foregoing provisions (Sections 2 to 87-A) of the Act applied to the lands in dispute on release from the management of the Government; that the first respondent was the tenant and it was not necessary for him to give an intimation with regard to the exercise of the right to purchase the lands in dispute under clause (b) of the first proviso to clause (d) of Section 88(1) of the Act, either to the landlord or to the Tribunal, within the period specified therein, the High Court dismissed both the applications by a common order of March 17, 1979. That order is brought under challenge by the appellants in these appeals. Mr. Anil B. Diwan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, contended that mere declaration that the first respondent was the tenant would not make him a deemed purchaser of the lands in dispute and that the High Court had gone beyond the scope of the lis in the application in creating the rights of a deemed purchaser in the first respondent. Section 88(1)(d) of the Act, submitted Mr. Diwan, was not properly construed by the High Court and therefore the order, under challenge, was liable to be s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... view of the matter, it would unsettle the legal position in the State of Maharashtra. Mr. D.M. Nargolkar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in the connected appeal, while supporting the stand taken by Mr. Mohta, submitted that Section 88 of the Act was not referred to in Section 32-P and that after the Act came into force the tenant could not remain a mere tenant of the land for all times to come; he must either become a purchaser under the scheme of the Act or would cease to be a tenant of the land. At the outset we make it clear that the parties have proceeded on the assumption that the management of the land in dispute by the Government stood terminated on October 1, 1957 -the date of notification under Section 61 of the Act. On the above contentions of the learned counsel, the interesting and important question that arises for our consideration is : Whether by not indicating his intention to avail the right to purchase the lands in dispute under section 32, conferred on the first under clause (b) of the proviso to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Act, within the specified period, will he lose the right? Since the resolution of the qu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so far as may be applicable, apply to the right of the permanent tenant to purchase the land. (2) If any land held on lease from Government or any part thereof - (i) and (ii) *** *** *** A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 88 discloses that except in cases covered by sub-section (2), which is not relevant here, the provisions of Sections 2 to 87-A shall have no application to cases falling under clauses (a) to (d) thereof. Here, we are concerned with clause (d) which contains an exclusionary clause pertaining to any estate or land taken under management by the State Government under Chapter IV or Section 65 except as provided in the said Chapter IV or Section 65, as the case may be, and in Sections 66, 80-A, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 and 87. The proviso to clause (d) says that from the date on which the land is released from the management, all the foregoing provisions (Sections 2 to 87-A) shall apply to such land but subject to the modification which applies if a tenancy, not being a permanent tenancy, on that date, subsists in the land. The modification embodies two options - one incorporated in clause (a) of the proviso in favour of the landlord and the other in favour of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovisions, is to give effect to the policy land for the tiller by clothing all the tenants with the right of ownership of the lands cultivated by them personally. A two-fold strategy is adopted in the Act first, by making every tenant a deemed purchaser of the land personally cultivated by him under Section 32 of the Act and secondly, by conferring on the tenant, in specified cases, the right to purchase the land from the landlord, under Section 32 of the Act, held by him under personal cultivation. The cases falling under the first category, namely, treating the tenant as a deemed purchaser, are noted hereunder : (1) under sub-section (1) of Section 32, every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant with effect from April 1, 1957 which is referred to as, the Tillers Day; (2) under the first proviso to subsection (1) of Section 32 providing that a tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land with effect from the postponed date; (3) under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 32 making the tenant a deemed purchaser of the land with effect from April 1, 1958; (4) a tenant is treated as a deemed purchaser of the land f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y so also the right to purchase from the landlord the land held by the tenant in the absence of exercise of the right within the specified period by the tenant, will not result in an automatic deemed purchase of the land by the tenant. Further by not exercising the right to terminate the tenancy within one year the landlord forfeits his right and in the same way by not exercising his right to purchase the land from the landlord, the tenant will also lose his right. He cannot by his default acquire a better position of a deemed purchaser. It would, therefore, be incorrect to hold that on the landlord not terminating the tenancy within the prescribed period, the tenant will be deemed to have exercised his right to purchase the land and became a deemed purchaser. It is apposite to note here that clause (c) of the proviso to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 88 lays down, inter alia, that provisions of Sections 32 to 32-R shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to the right to purchase the land under the said clause (b). In our view, it hardly makes any difference whether the provision of clause (c) of the proviso to clause (d) of subsection (1) of Section 88 is incorporated i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (b) of the proviso to clause (d) of Section 88(1) of the Act, is not required to give any intimation. We have already pointed out above that giving of an intimation is a concomitant of the exercise of the right to purchase the land under Section 32 by the tenant -a right which is conferred on the tenant in specified cases under the Act -and it is only thereafter the tenant becomes a deemed purchaser whereas Section 32, without anything more by the tenant, declares every tenant a deemed purchaser. We are unable to agree with the view that the period of limitation of one year prescribed in the said clause (b) of the proviso, within which the tenant is entitled to purchase the land, is for the purpose of initiating proceeding. In our view, the tenant has to exercise the right to purchase the land and intimate that fact to the landlord and the Tribunal within the prescribed period. After the expiry of that period the exercise of that right by the tenant, if any, will be ineffective. It is next contended that after the Act has come into force no person can remain a tenant of the land; he must either become the owner of the land or the land has to be disposed of in the manner provided ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... clause (b) the right to purchase the land from the landlord cannot be construed as a deemed purchase of the land from the landlord under Section 32 in view of the proviso thereto. It will not be out of place to refer to Section 88 of the Gujarat Act which is in pari materia with Section 88 of the Maharashtra Act. By amending proviso to clause (d) of subsection (1) of Section 88 of the Gujarat Act the words shall be deemed to have purchased were substituted for the words shall have the right to purchase. The amended provision will yield the desired result of making the tenant a deemed purchaser of the land from the landlord under Section 32 on the expiry of the period during which the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31 of the Act. The correct way to understand a proviso is to read it in the context and not in isolation. We may with advantage refer to the following observations of Moulton L.J. in R. vs. Dibdin [1910 Probate 57] : The fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to seek. It sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a provi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pecified period of one year and also the relevant provisions of Section 88 of the Act. For the above reasons we cannot endorse the interpretation of the said provision by the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court. The lands in dispute were taken under the management of the Government under Section 44 of the Act on December 19, 1949, so from that date the provisions of Sections 2 to 87-A did not apply to the lands in dispute. However, from October 1, 1957, when the management of the Government of the lands in dispute was terminated, the tenancy of the first respondent which was not a permanent tenancy was subsisting in the said lands. Therefore from that date, the aforesaid provisions applied thereto but subject to the modification that (i) the appellant had the right to terminate the tenancy under Section 31 till September 30, 1958; and (ii) the first respondent had the right to purchase the lands in dispute under Section 32 till October 1, 1959. For working out the rights of the parties the provisions of Sections 31 to 31-D (both inclusive) and Sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive), so far as may be applicable, applied to the termination of tenancy or the right to purchase ..... 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