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TMI Blog1988 (4) TMI 402X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssuing the impugned notices since the goods in question, which were admittedly brought into the local area by the petitioner for sale, use or consumption do not come within the purview of item I in the Schedule to the Act. In the proposition notices, the reasons given by the second respondent for charging the goods in question under the Act are, to quote his own words: "You have made purchase of cotton coated fabrics from Bommasandra Industrial Estate near Hosur and made entry of this item into the local area (corporation limits) of Bangalore City. The commodity dealt in by you is nothing but textiles or cotton fabrics. The Supreme Court in the case of Porritts Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1978] 42 STC 433; AIR 1979 SC 300 has held '.....While in its broadest dictionary sense "textiles" means every woollen fabrics, in the every day parlance of the ordinary merchant and consumer public, it means clothing, furnishing and the like. By clothing is meant cloth used to cover or clean the body such as shirting, suiting, etc ......By furnishing is meant cloth used in connection with covering and decorating walls and furniture such as curtains, carpets, bed spreads, etc .... ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat Act, but not defined, shall have the meaning assigned to them in the KST Act (Act 25 of 1957). It is common ground that the word "textiles" is not defined under the Act or under the KST Act. Before we proceed further, the relevant provisions of the Act which have a bearing on this point should be considered. Under section 3 of the Entry Tax Act, there shall be levied and collected a tax on entry of the scheduled goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein at such rate not exceeding two per cent ad valorem and from such date as may be specified, whether prospectively or retrospectively, by the State Government and different dates and different rates may be specified for different local areas. 6.. Change in the language of item 1 in the Schedule to the Act should be noticed. Earlier, item 1 read as under: "All varieties of textiles, namely, cotton, woollen or artificial silk including rayon or nylon whether manufactured in mills, powerlooms or handlooms and hosiery cloth in lengths." After the amendment by Act No. 38 of 1984 with effect from 1st April, 1983, item I reads us under: "All varieties of textiles, namely, cotton, woollen or artificial silk incl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1987 and S.T.R.P. Nos. 137 and 140 of 1979 and 83 to 85 of 1978 [Bharat Textile and Proofing Industries v. State of Karnataka [1988] 71 STC 10 (Kar)] that under the KST Act "textiles" include tarpaulin and P.V.C. cloth, the same meaning should be assigned to item 1 in the Schedule to the Entry Tax Act. The interpretation of the relevant entry, i.e., 8-A in the Fifth Schedule to the KST Act was controlled by the definition "tariff item 19" in the Central Excise Act and we have interpreted that entry in the light of the amendment made to the tariff item 19 of the Excise Act. But, it is not possible to link item 1 of the Schedule to the Act to the tariff item 19 of the Excise Act since what all the Entry Tax Act says: "Words and expressions used in this Act, but not defined, shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957)." But the word "textiles" is not defined in the KST Act and therefore it is not possible to accede to the contention of the learned Government Advocate that the meaning of this item 1 in the Act must be the same as the amended definition of "tariff item 19" of the Central Excise Act. There is no provision eith ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be textiles. The analogy of cases where the word 'vegetables' was held not to include betel leaves or sugarcane is wholly inappropriate. There, what was disapproved by the court was resort to the botanical meaning of the word 'vegetables' when that word had acquired a popular meaning, which was different. It was said by Holmes, J., in his inimitable style: 'A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.' Where a word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature. The reason is that, as pointed out by Story, J., in Two hundred Chests of Tea (1824) 9 Wheaton (US) 430, the legislature does 'not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists'. But here the word 'textiles' is not sought by the assessee to be given a scientific or technical meaning in preference to its popular meaning. It has only one meaning, name ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Supreme Court held that "dryer felts" under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act was "textiles" and therefore it was not liable to sales tax. 9.. A similar point came up for consideration in the later case of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [1980] 46 STC 256; AIR 1980 SC 1552. Though, in that case, the relevant entry in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act was linked to item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, the Supreme Court examined the general question of interpretation of statutes in tax matters and observed as follows: "In determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article or commodity the turnover of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well-settled, it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted." In our view, since item 1 in the Schedule to the Act is not defin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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