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TMI Blog1988 (3) TMI 424X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 167; AIR 1952 Pat 357, where their Lordships were considering a similar provision contained in section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944. Section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944 required the assessee to make an application within sixty days from the date of passing of any order by the Board of Revenue, for the purpose of making a reference to the High Court by the Board. The application, however, was not made within the time provided for the making of the order but within time after excluding the period taken for obtaining certified copy as envisaged under the Indian Limitation Act. The court held it barred by time, there being no provision in the Sales Tax Act for excluding the time requisite for obtaining copies unlike section 67A of the Income-tax Act which provides that in computing period of limitation the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order shall be excluded. Section 66(7A) of the Income-tax Act also states applicability of section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. There being no corresponding provision in the Sales Tax Act of 1944, their Lordships rejected the prayer for condonation following the principle "in a taxing Act one has only to look at what is clear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , when the assessee was actually appraised of the order of the Board of Revenue. 5.. Two lines of authorities were brought to the notice of the Bench (1) The starting point of limitation will be the date on which the officer concerned pronounced his decision if he had given the parties sufficient notice of the date on which the decision will be pronounced to enable them, if they choose, to be present and hear his decision; otherwise the starting point of limitation would be the date when the decision was actually communicated to the parties. (2) The other line of authorities brought to the notice of the court was that even no time for passing the order is fixed and the order is passed in absence of the assessee the time for limitation would be counted from the date of the making of the order even though it causes great hardship to the parties in certaincases. A reference was made to an earlier Patna Division Bench decision in the case of Firm of Mohan Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa [1930] ILR 9 Pat 172 where Fazl Ali, J., held "our concern (court's concern) is not to lay down what should be the law, but to interpret the law as it stands. In doing s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f time. An unreasonable statute which seeks to take away a remedy provided under the statute arbitrarily would be struck down as being violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. The fundamental principle of law which pervades the entire judicial spectrum is justice and fairplay. I am reminded of the observation of Justice Keating in Boon v. Howard [1874] LR 9 CP 277 (308), "If the words are susceptible of a reasonable and also of an unreasonable construction, the former construction must prevail". This according to me is irrespective of the nature of the statute. This is an essential canon of construction of statute. It follows, therefore, if a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation shall not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of it or had an opportunity of knowing the order and, therefore, presumed to have had knowledge of the order. 9.. In the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500 the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the expression "the date of the award" used in proviso (b) to secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ents of the 'cause' are important. The date when the plaintiff came to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port." The case of Raja Harish Chandra AIR 1961 SC 1500 was also noticed in this case in the context of cause of action (paragraph 45A). 13.. In the case of State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram AIR 1970 SC 214, the Supreme Court while referring to Raja Harish Chandra's case AIR 1961 SC 1500 and the case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395, a case of disciplinary action taken against the Government servant, it was said that an order is not said to have come into effect until it was communicated as until then, it can be reconsidered and modified and, therefore, has till then a provisional character. 14.. In the case of State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum AIR 1963 SC 1604, Raja Harish Chandra's case AIR 1961 SC 1500 was further expounded by observing "knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. When a party is pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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