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TMI Blog1992 (12) TMI 215X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m which would have established the actual date of the receipt of the postal cover by the applicant convincingly. We are also not inclined to hold that the delay in presenting the application deserves to be condoned in the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellant has taken a very bold stand that he had received the signed copy of the award only in May, 1965 and only within three weeks of such receipt, he had filed the application. On the face of such statement, the plea of ignorance of the change in the Limitation Act need not be considered and accepted. As the case sought to be made out by the appellant that he had received the signed copy of the award only in May, 1965 has not been accepted, and we may add, very rightly by the Court, the question of condonation of delay could not and did not arise. Appeal dismissed. - C.A. 2224 OF 1982 - - - Dated:- 8-12-1992 - B. J. Reddy and G.N. Ray, JJ. ORDER 1. This appeal arises out of a judgment dated 30th June, 1976 passed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court, in Misc. Appeal No. 194 of 1967 arising out of the decision of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Patna in Misc. Case No. 38 of 1961 since renumb ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... contention of bar of limitation was raised by the respondent. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld the award as valid. The learned Subordinate Judge also rejected the plea of bar of limitation. Accordingly the Misc. Case was allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge and the award was made a Rule of Court. 4. Being aggrieved by such decision of the learned Subordinate Judge, the respondent, Union of India preferred a Misc. Appeal No. 194 of 1961 in the High Court at Patna. In the appeal, the bar of limitation was raised by the Union of India for challenging the correctness of the decision made by the learned Sub Judge. It was contended on behalf of the applicant Shri Binod Bihari Singh that the application was not barred by limitation and in any event, it was a fit case where delay, even if any, in presenting the application for making the award a Rule of Court should be condoned. It was contended by the applicant that he had received the signed copy of the award alongwith forwarding letter of the arbitrator only in first week of May, 1965 and as such the application made by him was not time barred. The High Court made a limited remand for answering two issues framed by it by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplicability of the said Article 119(a) when a party to the agreement filed the original award and also in view of the fact that the arbitration proceeding was initiated as far back as in the year 1961 when the old Limitation Act was in force and the period of limitation for filing an application for making the award rule of court was ninety days under Article 178 of the old Limitation Act and the new Limitation Act having come into force only with effect from January, 1964 prescribing the period of limitation as thirty days, a litigant might bona fide think that the arbitration proceeding having been initiated in 1961, the old Limitation Act would be applicable. In the aforesaid facts, it was a fit case where the delay, even if any, in presenting the application should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. Such findings on the aforesaid two issues were taken into consideration by the High Court in disposing of the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 194 of 1967. It may be noted here that the High Court has come to the finding that the award was otherwise valid and there was no misconduct on the part of the arbitrator for which the award was liable to be set aside. The post ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y, the application made by the applicant must be held to be made under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act and Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act was attracted in the facts of the case. The contention of the applicant that the application presented by the applicant should be treated as an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act was not accepted by the High Court and the contention that the case was governed by the residuary Article 137 and not by Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act was also not accepted by the High Court. The High Court also did not accept the case of the applicant for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act in view of the fact that it was the positive case of the applicant that he had filed his application within three weeks from the date of receipt of the award. In such circumstances, the contention of the applicant that he was not aware of the change of the law of Limitation as sought to be contended was completely contradictory to the firm stand taken by the applicant that he had filed the award within three weeks from the date of receipt of the award. The High Court was of the view that in the aforesaid facts, the case of the applicant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rties to raise the plea of limitation and sending the aforesaid two issues to the learned Subordinate Judge for deciding and reporting back to the High Court. Mr. Ranjit Kumar has also contended that unfortunately the appellant could not file the registered cover but it was specifically stated by the appellant that the registered cover was received by him only in the first week of May. In the absence of any document showing such service of the copy of the award along with the forwarding letter of the arbitrator, the High Court was not justified in proceeding on the presumption that the registered cover must have been received within reasonable time, namely, by first week of March, 1965. He has contended that the evidence adduced by the arbitrator and his stenographer should not have been accepted by the High Court for coming to the finding that the registered cover had in fact been sent on February 27, 1965. Mr. Kumar has contended that in the instant case, the award made by the arbitrator who was the Dy. General Manager of the Eastern Railway, was otherwise found to be valid and the same was not liable to be discarded on account of the misconduct of the arbitrator. It is only unfo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of limitation to defeat a just claim because a litigant does not stand to gain by coming late to a court and then suffer a prejudice by making his case barred by limitation. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has, however, disputed the contentions made by Mr. Kumar and has contended that the case is squarely governed by Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act and the application presented by the applicant cannot be held to be an application made under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. In the instant case, there was no express authority from the arbitrator to file the award for making it a rule of court and the decision of this Court in Kumbha Mauji's case (supra) is squarely applicable. The learned Counsel has further contended that the appellant did not come with a clean hand and he made a false statement and stuck to such false case that he had received the signed copy of the award in the first week of May, 1965. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was justified in not accepting the prayer for condonation of delay. The High Court has clearly come to the finding that the case of the appellant was untrue and he had received the copy of the award som ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dering the sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Coming to the contention of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that to defeat a just claim of the appellant, the ignoble plea of bar of limitation sought to be raised by the respondent should not be taken into consideration, we may indicate that it may not be desirable for the government or the public authority to take shelter under the plea of limitation to defeat a just claim of a citizen. But if a claim is barred by limitation and such plea is raised specifically the court can not straightway dismiss the plea simply on the score that such plea is ignoble. A bar of limitation may be considered even if such plea has not been specifically raised. Limitation Act is a statute of repose and bar of a cause of action in a court of law, which is otherwise lawful and valid, because of undesirable lapse of time as contained in the Limitation Act, has been made on a well accepted principle of jurisprudence and public policy. That apart, the appellant, in this case, having taken a false stand on the question of receipt of the signed copy of the award to get rid of the bar of limitation, should not be encouraged to get ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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