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TMI Blog1980 (11) TMI 157X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rgument and judgment calls from me, the presiding judge of the bench which heard the case, a word of explanation and clarification so that misunderstanding about the judges may melt away in the light. A better appreciation of this court's functional adversities and lack of research facilities will promote more compassion than criticism and in that hope I add this note. The judicature, like other constitutional instrumentalities, has a culture of national accountability. Two factors must be highlighted in this context. A court is more than a judge; a collegium has a personality which exceeds its members. The price a collective process (free from personality cult, has to pay is long patience, free exchange and final decision in conformity with the democracy of judicial functionality. Sometimes, when divergent strands of thought haunt the mentations of the members, we pause, ponder and reconsider because we follow the words of Oliver Cromwell commended for courts by Judge Learned Hand: "My brethren, I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken." Utter incompatibility exists between judicial democracy and dogmatic infallibility; and so, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... udicial approach to the issues at stake in this case: Our judges are not monks or scientists, but participants in the living stream of our national life, steering the law between the dangers of rigidity on the one hand and of formlessness on the other. Our system faces no theoretical dilemma but a single continuous problems how to apply ever-changing conditions the never-changing principles of freedom. (1) For the Indian judicial process, the nidus of these neverchanging principles is the Constitution. The bearing of this broad observation on statutory construction will become evident as we get down to the discussion. Now let me proceed to the merits, but, at the outset, underscore the constitutional bias towards social justice to the weaker sections. including the working class, in the Directive Principles of State Policy-a factor which must enliven judicial consciousness while decoding the meaning of legislation. Victorian-vintage rules of construction cannot override this value-laden guide book. The flawless flow of facts, so far as I am able to remember, aided by our notes, finds expression in the stream of narration in our learned brother's judgment and that frees me from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o apply to the Corporation employees. The office of s. 11 of the LIC Act was to provide for a smooth take-over and to promote some common conditions of service in a situation where a jungle of divergent contracts of employment and industrial awards or settlements confronted the State. Unless such rationalisation and standardization were evolved the ensuing chaos would itself have spelt confusion, conflicts and difficulties. This functional focus of s.11 of the LIC Act will dispel scope for interpretative exercises unrelated to the natural setting in which the problem occurs. The inference is clear that s.11 does not repel the ID Act as that is not its purpose. Farewell to the context and fanatical adherence to the text may lead to the tyranny of literality-a hazardous road which misses the meaning or reaches a sense which the author never meant. Lord Denning has observed : "A judge should not be a servant of the words used. He should not be a mere mechanic in the power-house of semantics." Reed Dickerson has in his "The Interpretation and Application of Statutes" warned against 'the disintegration of statutory construction' and quoted Fuller to say :(1) ....(W) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Every whole-time employee of an insurer whose controlled business has been transferred to and vested in the Corporation and who was employed by the insurer wholly or mainly in connection with his controlled business immediately before the appointed day shall, on and from the appointed day, become an employee of the Corporation, and shall hold his office therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension and gratuity and other matters as he would have held the same on the appointed day if this Act had not been passed, and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment in the Corporation is terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions are duty altered by the Corporation : Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall apply to any such employee who has, by notice in writing given to the Central Government prior to the appointed day, intimated his intention of not becoming an employee of the Corporation. (2) Where the Central Government is satisfied that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and the other terms and conditions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nditions of Service of Employees) Order 1957 (the 1957 Order, for short). This related to the conditions of service of the transferees and was not confined only to Class III and Class IV employees among them. It was a general Order, not one limited to workmen as defined in s.2(s) of the ID Act. Clause 9 of the 1957 Order states that no bonus will be paid but certain other benefits of insurance, medical care etc., are mentioned therein. Clause 9 was later amended providing for non-profit sharing bonus to certain classes of employees. Be that as it may, the Corporation, with the clear approval of the Central Government, reached a settlement with its employees on July 2, 1959 providing for payment of cash bonus from September 1, 1956 to December 31, 1961. Obviously, this was under the ID Act and not under the LIC Act and proceeded on the clear assumption that the ID Act provisions regarding claims of bonus applied to workmen in the employment of the Corporation. In 1960, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (the 1960 Regulations) were framed. Regulation 58 states: The Corporation may, subject to such directions as the Central Government may issue, grant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to the approval of the Board of the Corporation and the Central Government. (3) This Settlement disposes of all the demands raised by the workmen for revision of terms and conditions of their service. (4) Except as otherwise provided or modified by this Settlement, the workmen shall continue to be governed by all the terms and conditions of service as set forth and regulated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff Regulations), 1960 as also the administrative instructions issued from time to time and they shall, subject to the provisions thereof including any period of operation specified therein, be entitled to the benefits thereunder. It is important and, indeed, is an impressive feature that these two settlements cover a wide ground of which bonus is but one item. Equally significant is the fact that the Board of the Corporation and the Central Government, which presumably knew the scope of the LIC Act and the ID Act, did approve of these settlements. The thought of terminating the payment of bonus to the employees covered by the 1974 settlements apparently occurred to the Central Government a year later and the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975, (rep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... us was still payable, that the ID Act prevailed over the LIC Act in the area of industrial relations, the former being a special law, and that the steps taken both by the Corporation and the Central Government under the LIC Act and Regulations as well as under the ID Act, were of legal inconsequence. Against this judgment the Corporation has come up in appeal and the questions raised are of great moment and of serious portent. If law allows administrative negation of bonus, judges are not to reason why; but whether law does allow nullification of industrial settlement is for judges to decide, not for the Administration to say, why not? That is Montesquien functionalism of sorts. So, against this backdrop, I will analyse the submissions, scan their substance and pronounce upon their validity. I may as well formulate, in more particularised form, the various contentions urged on either side-not exhaustively though, because that has been done by my learned brothers. I propose to confine the discussion to the decisive issues. First of all, we have to investigate whether the two settlements of January 24, 1974 and February 6, 1974, arrived at in pursuance of the provisions of s. 18 rea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... far as law can properly do so, within limits that I have already stressed, the realization of man's ends, ultimate and mediate. . . Law cannot stand aside from the social changes around it." Judicial acceptance of social dynamics, as projected by the Constitution, is the crucial factor in this case, if I may anticipate myself. The ID Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt are extant even after the notice under s.9A and the formal termination under s. 19(2) of the ID Act, Let me go to the basics. Before that, a glance at the nature of the two settlements, their ambit and ambience and their longevity, actual and potential, may be desirable, after sketching the broad basics of the ID Act and its means and ends. The ID Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provides the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infra-structure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counter-productive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill. Industrial peace is a national need and, absent law, order in any field will be absent. Chaos is the enemy of creativity sans which p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt shall be binding because of statutory sanction. Section 19 relates to the period of operation of settlements and awards and here also it is clear that both settlements and awards, as is evident from a reading of s. 19(2) and (6), stand on the same footing. Section 19 has a key role to play in the life and death of awards and settlements and so we may read the text here to enable closer comment. Particular attention must be riveted on s. 19(2), (3) and (6): 19. (1) A settlement shall come into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute. (2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon for a period of six months (from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute, and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ffect such change,- (a) without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; or (b) within twenty-one days of giving such notice: It will be apparent that the ID Act substantially equates an award with a settlement, from the point of view of their legal force. No distinction in regard to the nature and period of their effect can be discerned, especially when we read s. 19(2) and (6). I highlight this virtual identity of effect to bring home the fact that judicial pronouncements on this aspect, whether rendered in a case of award or settlement, will be a guideline for us and nothing turn on whether the particular is one of an award or settlement. Indeed, there are reported cases on both. The statutory regulation of industrial disputes is comprehensive, as is manifest from the rest of the Act. Chapter V prohibits strikes and lock-outs; Chapter VA deals with lay-off and retrenchment and Chapter VI puts teeth into the provisions by enacting penalties. Importantly, s. 29, which proceeds on the footing of equal sanctity for awards and settlements, punishes breaches: 29. Any person wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ibute to the expression in its context a meaning such as the one we derive rather than any other; and would consider any different meaning, by comparison, strained, or farfetched, or unusual, or unlikely. ... Implicit in the finding of a plain, clear meaning of an expression in its context, is a finding that such meaning is rational and "makes sense" in that context.(1) Interpretative insight will suffer, even as the judicial focus will blur, if the legislative target is not sharply perceived. Indeed, I lay so much stress on this facet because brother Koshal's otherwise faultless logic has, if I may say so with great deference, failed to convince me because of this fundamental mis-focus. To repeat for emphasis, the meat of the statute is industrial dispute, not conditions of employment or contract of service as such. The line of distinction may be fine but is real. Be that as it may, a bird's eye view of the ID Act reveals the statutory structure and legal engineering centering round dispute settlement in industries according to the rule of law and away from fight with fists or economic blackmail. This large canvas once illumined, may illustrate the sweep, of awards an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the totality is a living entity which does not permit of dismemberment, limb by limb, without doing violence to the wholeness and identity of the settlement. Here, the 1974 settlements have brought about a conflict-resolution on a variety of items including (a) scales of pay, (b) method of fixation in the new scales, (c) dearness allowance, (d) house rent allowance, (e) city compensatory allowance, etc. Thus bonus is but one component of a multi-point agreement. Para 12 of the Settlement has some significance: 12. Period of Settlement.-(1) This Settlement shall be effective from 1st April, 1973 and shall be for a period of four years, i.e., from 1st April, 1973 to 31st March, 1977. (2) The terms of the settlement shall be subject to the approval of the Board of the Corporation and the Central Government. (3) This Settlement disposes of all the demands raised by the workmen for revision of terms and conditions of their service. (4) Except as otherwise provided or modified by this Settlement, the workmen shall continue to be governed by all the terms and conditions of service as set forth and regulated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 as also t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... thus making it clear that the Settlements did not become subordinate to the Regulations. The core question that first falls for consideration is as to whether the Settlements of 1974 are still in force. There are three stages or phases with different legal effects in the life of an award or settlement. There is a specific period contractually or seatutorily fixed as the period of operation. Thereafter, the award or settlement does not become non est but continues to be binding. This is the second chapter of legal efficacy but qualitatively different as we will presently show. Then comes the last phase. If notice of intention to terminate is given under s. 19(2) or 19(6) then the third stage opens where the award or the settlement does survive and is in force between the parties as a contract which has superseded the earlier contract and subsists until a new award or negotiated settlement takes its place. Like Nature, Law abhors a vacuum and even on the notice of termination under s. 19(2) or (6) the sequence and consequence cannot be just void but a continuance of the earlier terms, but with liberty to both sides to raise disputes negotiate settlements or seek a reference and awa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lucid and luminous, sums up the ratio thus: Where an award is delivered by the industrial tribunal it has the effect of imposing a statutory contract governing the relations of the employer and the employe. It is true that statutory contract may be terminated in the manner prescribed by s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act. After the statutory contract is terminated by notice, the employer by failing to abide by the terms of the award does not incur the penalties provided by the Industrial Disputes Act, nor could the award be enforced in the manner prescribed by s. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. But the termination of the award has not the effect of extinguishing the rights flowing therefrom. Evidently by the termination of the award the contract of employment is not terminated. The employer and the employee remain master and servant in the industry in which they are employed, unless by notice the employer has also simultaneously with the termination of the award terminated the employment of the employee. If the employment is not terminated, it is difficult to hold that the rights which had been granted under the award automomatically cease to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g relevant provisions in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, the award that exists, shall continue to regulate the relations between the employer and the employees. The effect of termination of an award is not that the rights which flow from that award cease to be available to the employees, but the effect of termination is that the award continues to govern the relations between the employer and the employee until such time as a change is effected in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. (emphasis added) Indeed, the precise submission that upon termination by notice, the award ceased to have effect for all purposes and the employees were not entitled to benefit thereunder was raised and examined as a matter of great importance to industrial relations. The court, in our view rightly rejected the contention of the employer and with forceful precision argued to reach the conclusion which the only sensible solution :(1) What this sub-section in effect provides is that if a notice of termination is given by either party to the award, then on the expiry of two months from the date of such notice the registered agreement, settlement or awa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat have already been actually enjoyed and destroying those which, although they may have accrued, have to be enjoyed in future in terms of the award. Mr. Patel for the petitioners has argued that on the termination of the award the effect or rather the result that is brought about is that the rights of parties are frozen as of that date. Assuming such a concept of freezing the rights was adopted, even the freezing would be in respect of rights that have already accrued and it is not quite easy to conceive of rights which would not accrue to an employee under an industrial award and which can only be contingent. In any event, if the original contract or agreement has been superseded by the award, holding that the award is no longer what governs the relations between the employer and the employees would necessarily create a vacuum. Trying to save the creation of a vacuum by splitting up the award into two parts, the award under which benefits have already been enjoyed and that part of the award under which benefits have not been enjoyed, is dissecting the award in a manner not justified in law or logic. There appears to be on the scene after the termination of the award only one thi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntion to terminate it and two months have elapsed from the date of such notice. The effect of s. 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act is that the award ceased to be in force after March 31, 1959. That however has nothing to do with question as to the period for which it will remain binding on the parties thereafter. The provision in s. 19(6) as regards the period for which the award shall continue to be binding on the parties is not in any way affected by s. 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act, 1955. Quite apart from this, however, it appears to us that even if an award has ceased to be in operation or in force and has ceased to be binding on the parties under the provisions of s. 19(6) it will continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties that has been made by industrial adjudication in place of the old contract. So long as the award remains in operation under s. 19(3), s. 23(c) stands in the way of any strike by the workmen and lock-out by the employer in respect of any matter covered by the award. Again, so long as the award is binding on a party, breach of any of its terms will make the party liable to penalty ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it has been observed by this Court that the very purpose for which industrial adjudication has been given the peculiar authority and right of making new contracts between employers and workmen makes it reasonable to think that even though the period of operation of the award and the period for which it remains binding on the parties may elapse-in respect of both of which special provisions have been made under sections 23 and 29 respectively-the new contract would continue to govern the relations between the parties till it is replaced by another contract. This observation clearly and emphatically brings out that the terms prescribed by an award, in law, and in substance, constitute a fresh contract between the parties. (emphasis added) Again, a Bench of four Judges in the Indian Oil Corporation case(3) reiterated the same principle in the context of s. 9A of the ID Act although the court did not specifically advert to Chacko's case (supra). In the Indian Oil Corporation case (supra) the question turned on the management seeking to effect changes in the service conditions of the workmen. The Court made observations which have pertinence to the non-extinguishment of the contract o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Industrial Disputes Act. The Authority in the present case was, therefore, not justified in rejecting the workmen's application on the ground that the settlement on which the workmen relied had ceased to be operative. (emphasis added) A precedent, as Disraeli said, embalms a principle. We have pointed out the principle and cited the precedents. There is more to it than mere wealth of precedents or what Burke called 'the deep slumber of a decided opinion'. It enlivens industrial peace, avoids labour discontent and helps to set the stage for next negotiations for better terms for workers. Economic freedom of the weaker sections is behind these precedents, almost reminding us of Tennyson: A land of settled government, A land of just and old renown, Where freedom slowly broadens down, From precedent to precedent. The law is lucid and the justice manifest on termination notice or notice of change the award or settlement does not perish but survives to bind until reincarnation, in any modified form, in a fresh regulation of conditions of service by a settlement or award. Precedents often broadly guide but when on the same point willy-nilly bind. So here, even if I would, I c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tally by a later contract of settlement or by force of an award? The horrendous consequences of such an interpretation may best be left to imagination. Moreover, if industrial peace is the signature tune of industrial law, industrial violence would be the vicious shower of consequences if parties were relegated either to an ancient and obsolete contract or a state of lawless hiatus. No canon of interpretation of statutes can compel the court to construe a statutory provision in this manner. We have, no doubt, that the precedents on the point, the principles of industrial law, the constitutional sympathy of Part IV and the sound rules of statutory construction converge to the same point that when a notice intimating termination of an award or settlement is issued the legal import is merely that the stage is set for fresh negotiations or industrial adjudication and until either effort ripens into a fresh set of conditions of service the previous award or settlement does regulate the relations between the employer and the employees. The court never holds justice as hostage with law as janitor! Law, if at all, liberates justice through the judicial process. Fundamental error can be avo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rule which has application to this case, which is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. That this is the law cannot be doubted, and the cases on the subject will be found collected in the third edition of Maxwell is generalia specialibus non derogant-i.e. general provisions will not abrogate special provisions. "When the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject matter and its own terms. The crucial question which demands an answer before we settle the issue is as to whether the LIC Act is a special statute and the ID Act a general statute so that the latter pro tanto repeals or prevails over the earlier one. What do we mean by a special statute and, in the scheme of the two enactments in question, which can we regard as the special Act and which the general ? An implied repeal is the last judicial refuge and unless driven to that conclusion, is rarely rest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... turer's chief business is spraying paints ! In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes-so too in life. The ID Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the ID Act has one special mission-the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the LI ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s follows: "Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so." In J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh this Court observed (at page 1174) (4) "The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect". We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a special Act dealing with a specific subject, namely with conditions of service, enum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oyer to fix the terms of employment had to be vested. This is a common provision of a general sort, not a particularised provision to canalise an industrial dispute. What is special or general is wholly a creature of the subject and context and may vary with situation, circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no abstraction but realises itself in the living setting of actualities. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence of both legislations is best achieved, if that be feasible, by allowing to each its allotted field for play. Sense and sensibility, not mechanical rigidity gives the flexible solution. It is difficult for me to think that when the entire industrial field, even covering municipalities, universities, research councils and the like, is regulated in the critical area of industrial disputes by the ID Act, Parliament would have provided as oasis for the Corporation where labour demands can be unilaterally ignored. The general words in ss. 11 and 49 must be read contextually as not covering industrial disputes between the workmen and the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... less fundamental in the governance of the country' and 'it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws'. Addressed to Courts, what the injunction means is that while courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, courts are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goals set out in the Director Principles of State Policy. This command of the Constitution must be ever present in the minds of judges when interpreting statutes which concern themselves directly or indirectly with matters set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Whatever be the powers of regulation of conditions of service, including payment or non-payment of bonus enjoyed by the employees of the Corporation under the LIC Act, subject to the directives of the Central Government, they stem from a general Act and cannot supplant, subvert or substitute the special legislation which specifically deals with industrial disputes between workmen and their employers. In this view, other questions, which have been argued at length and considered by my learned brother, do not demand my discussion. The High Court was right ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iii) Save as provided herein all other terms and conditions attached to the admissibility and payment of bonus shall be as laid down in the settlement on bonus dated the 26th June, 1972." The settlements were operative from 1st April, 1973 to 31st March, 1977. On 3rd March, 1978 the Life Insurance Corporation (the "Corporation") issued a notice, purportedly under s. 19(2), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, of its intention to terminate the settlements on the expiry of two months because of economic and other reasons. The notice, however, recited the reservation that the material provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act did not apply to the Corporation and that the notice was not necessary. Another notice, this time under s. 9A, Industrial Disputes Act and issued on the same date, stated that it was intended to effect a change in the conditions of service of the workmen with effect from 1st June, 1978. The change notified related to the existing provision for bonus. A new clause was proposed. The Life Insurance Corporation (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Service of Employees) Order, 1957 (the "Standardisation Order") was amended ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... service applicable to transferred employees. Predictably, when the transferred employees of different insurers were brought together in common employment under the Corporation they would have been enjoying different scales of remuneration and other terms and conditions of service. The power under this part of sub-s. (2) is intended for the purpose of securing uniformity among them. The second limb of sub-s. (2) is the source of controversy before us. It empowers the Central Government to reduce the remuneration payable or revise the other terms and conditions of service. That power is to be exercised when the Central Government is satisfied that the interests of the Corporation and its Policy holders require such reduction or revision. The question is whether the provision is confined to transferred employees only or extends to all employees generally. In my opinion, it is confined to transferred employees. The provision is a part of the scheme enacted in Chapter IV providing for the transfer of existing life insurance business from the insurers to the Corporation, and the attendant concomitants of that process. There is provision for the transfer of the assets and liabilities per ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r any other law for the time being in force or any award, settlement or agreement for the time being in force. Benefits conferred thereunder on the employees must yield to the need for ensuring that the Corporation and its policy holders do not suffer unreasonably from the burden of such benefits. The need for such a provision arises because it is a burden by which the Corporation finds itself saddled upon the transfer a burden not of its own making. Unless the statute provided for such relief, the weight of that burden could conceivably cripple the successful working of the Corporation from its inception as a business organisation. It is situation to be distinguished from what happens when the Corporation, launched on its normal course, voluntarily assumes, in the course of its working, obligations in respect of its employees or becomes subject to such obligations by reason of subsequent industrial adjudication. Like any other employer, the Corporation is then open to the normal play of industrial relations in contemporary or future time. That the two provisions of subs. (2) are linked with the process of transfer and integration is further indicated by the circumstance that the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry, the circumstance that an identical provision has been made by the Corporation, with the prior approval of the Central Government, in the new Regulation 58 by a notification issued under both clauses (b) and (bb) of the s. 49(2), that is to say, in respect of both newly recruited as well as transferred employees, demonstrates that the provision has no particular relationship with that process. Accordingly, I am of opinion that the notification dated 26th May, 1978 purporting to amend the Standardisation Order is invalid. It has no effect on the right to bonus claimed by the workmen. That takes us to question whether the new Regulation 58 inserted in the (Staff) Regulations by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Second Amendment Regulations, 1978 can be invoked against the workmen of the Corporation. The workmen contend that the Industrial Disputes Act constitutes special legislation for the resolution of industrial disputes and inasmuch as it has been specially enacted for the promotion of harmonious relations between an employer and his workmen all matters concerning the workmen must be regarded as falling within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Corpo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d in the Industrial Disputes Act. In essence, it is a contract between the employer and the workmen prescribing new terms and conditions of service. These constitute a variation of existing terms and conditions. As soon as the settlement is concluded and becomes operative, the contract embodied in it takes effect and the existing terms and conditions of the workmen are modified accordingly. Unless there is some thing to the contrary in a particular term or condition of the settlement the embodied contract endures indefinitely, continuing to govern the relation between the parties in the future, subject of course to subsequent alteration through a fresh settlement, award or valid legislation. I have said that the transaction is a contract. But it is also something more. Conceptually, it is a "settlement". It concludes or "settles" a dispute. Differences which had arisen and were threatening industrial peace and harmony stand resolved in terms of a new contract. In order that the new contract be afforded a chance of being effectively worked out, a mandate obliging the parties to unreservedly comply with it for a period of time is desirable. It was made "bindi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t held that when an award was made and it prescribed a new wage structure, in law the old contractual wage structure became inoperative and its place was taken by the wage structure prescribed by the award. The court said: "In a sense, the latter wage structure must be deemed to be a contract between the parties, because that, in substance, is the effect of industrial adjudication. The true legal position is that when industrial disputes are decided by industrial adjudication and awards are made, the said awards supplant contractual terms in respect of matters covered by them and are substituted for them." Learned counsel for the Corporation and the Union of India submit that the law declared by this Court in respect of an award does not hold true in the case of a settlement. I am unable to agree. Not only are the statutory provisions pertaining to a settlement and an award comparable in this regard but, if anything, the observations if read in respect of a settlement, which after all is a voluntary agreement between the parties, would seem to hold more strongly. The contract between the parties embodied in the settlements of 1974 set forth the terms and conditions of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spute. And all the employees of an employer are not "workmen". Those employees are "workmen" who satisfy the definition contained in s. 2(s). A restricted category of employees is contemplated, and in an industrial dispute that category alone of all the employees can be interested. The resolution of industrial disputes under the Act is envisaged through the particular machinery and processes detailed therein. A special jurisdiction is created for the purpose. Industrial disputes, according to the Act, can be resolved by settlement or award. There are provisions setting forth the consequences of a settlement or an award, and there are also provisions indicating how a change can be initiated in the resulting industrial relations. Other chapters in the Industrial Disputes Act lay down the law in respect of strikes and lock-outs, lay off, retrenchment and closure and penalties for breach of its provisions. Plainly, if a settlement resolves an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, it pertains to the central purpose of that Act. The Act constitutes special law in respect of a settlement reached under its auspices between an employer and his "workm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4. Support is derived for this conclusion from U. P. State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Hari Shanker Jain & Ors.(3) where reference has been made to Mary Sewards v. The Owner of the Vera Cruz(4) and J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh(5). At the same time, it is pertinent to note that the "workmen" employees of the Corporation continue to be governed in matters not covered by the settlements by the (Staff) Regulations, and that position is expressly recognised in clause 12(4) of the settlements of 1974. Clause 12(4) declares: "Except as otherwise provided or modified by this settlement, the workmen shall continue to be governed by all the terms and conditions of service as set forth and regulated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960..... as also the administrative instructions...." Our attention has been drawn to s. 11(1), Corporation Act which empowers the Corporation to duly alter the terms and conditions of service of transferred employees. In construing the scope of the Corporation's powers in that behalf, it seems to me that appropriate importance should be attached to the qualifying word &q ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e result, Civil Appeal No. 2275 of 1978 is dismissed with costs to the first, second and third respondents. The fourth respondent shall bear its own costs. The Transfer Petition No. 16 of 1979 is allowed in the terms set out above, costs to be paid to the petitioners by the second respondent. KOSHAL, J.-By this judgment I shall dispose of Civil Appeal No. 2275 of 1978 which has been instituted by special leave granted by this Court against a judgment dated August 11, 1978 of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India and issuing a writ of mandamus to the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) directing it not to give effect to a notice dated the 6th May, 1978, issued by it under section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act (I. D. Act for short) as also to a notification dated the 26th May, 1978 issued under subsection (2) of section 11 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the L. I. C. Act). This judgment shall also cover Transfer Case No. 1 of 1979 in which another petition under article 226 aforesaid instituted before the High Court of Calcutta an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Central Government prior to the appointed day, intimated his intention of not becoming an employee of the Corporation. "(2) Where the Central Government is satisfied that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service applicable to employees of insurers whose controlled business has been transferred to, and vested in, the Corporation, it is necessary so to do, or that, in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders, a reduction in the remuneration payable, or a revision of the other terms and conditions of service applicable, to employees or any class of them is called for, the Central Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), or in the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, or any other law for the time being in force, or in any award, settlement or agreement for the time being in force, alter (whether by way of reduction or otherwise) the remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service to such extent and in such manner as it thinks fit; and if the alteration is not acceptable to any employee, the Corporation may terminate his employment by giving him compensation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rder, 1957 (for short "the 1957 order") altering the remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of those employees of the Corporation whose services had been transferred to it under sub-section (1) of that section (referred to hereinafter as the transferred employees). Clause 9 of the 1957 order declared that no bonus would be paid but directed that the Corporation would set aside an amount every year for expenditure on schemes of general benefit scheme and on other amenities to them. On the 26th June 1959, the Central Government amended clause 9 of the 1957 order so as to provide that non-profit sharing bonus would be paid to those employees of the Corporation whose salary did not exceed ₹ 500/ per month. On the 2nd July, 1959 there was a settlement between the Corporation and its employees providing for payment to them of cash bonus at the rate of 1/2/1 months' basic salary for the period from the 1st September, 1956 to the 31st December, 1961. In the year 1960 were framed, under section 49 of L. I. C. Act, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (the 1960 regulations, for brevity), whereof regulation 58 ran thus: "The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st March, 1977. (2) The terms of the settlement shall be subject to the approval of the Board of the Corporation and the Central Government. (3) This Settlement disposes of all the demands raised by the workmen for revision of terms and conditions of their service. (4) Except as otherwise provided or modified by this Settlement, the workmen shall continue to be governed by all the terms and conditions of service as set forth and regulated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff Regulations), 1960 as also the administrative instructions issued from time to time and they shall, subject to the provisions thereof including any period of operation specified therein, be entitled to the benefits thereunder." It is not disputed that the settlements were approved by the Board of the Corporation as also by the Central Government. Under clause 11 of each settlement every employee of the Corporation had the option to elect to be governed either by the new scale of pay applicable to him or the scale which he had been enjoying hitherto. It is common ground between the parties that all the employees of the Corporation opted for the new scales of pay and that bonus was paid in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to its workmen a notice under sub-section (2) of section 19 of the I. D. Act declaring its intention to terminate the settlements on the expiry of a period of two months from the date the notice was served. The notice, however, mentioned in express terms that according to the Corporation no such notice was really necessary for termination of the settlements. On the same date, another notice was issued by the Corporation under section 9A of the I. D. Act stating that it intended to effect a change in accordance with the contents of the annexure to the notice, as from the 1st June, 1978, in the conditions of service of its workmen. The said annexure contained the following clause: "AND WHEREAS for economic and other reasons it would not be possible for the Life Insurance Corporation of India to continue to pay bonus on the aforesaid basis; "NOW, therefore, it is our intention to pay bonus to the employees of the Corporation in terms reproduced hereunder; "No employee of the Corporation shall be entitled to profit sharing bonus. However, the Corporation may, having regard to the financial condition of the Corporation in respect of any year and subject to the previous ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the Allahabad High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. After consideration of the various contentions raised before it the Allahabad High Court arrived at the following conclusions: I. The I. D. Act is an 'independent Act' which deals with adjudication and settlement of matters in dispute between an employer and his workmen. It is thus a special law which would override the provisions of a general law like the L. I. C. Act. II. Three corollaries follow from conclusion 1: (a) Section 23 of the L. I. C. Act which envisages employment of persons by the Corporation implies settlement of conditions of service which may legally be superseded (only) by another settlement arrived at under section 18 of the I. D. Act. (b) The new regulation 58 framed under section 49 of the L. I. C. Act and the notification issued under subsection (2) of section 11 thereof substituting a new clause 9 in the 1957 Order are wholly ineffective against the operation of the 1974 settlements which were arrived at in pursuance of the provisions of the I. D. Act and which therefore, continue to govern the parties thereto. (c) After the issuance of the notices under sections 19(2) and 9 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o that granted by this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak's case (supra). The contention raised on behalf of the Corpo- ration about the non-maintainability of the petition is therefore without force. It was on the basic of these conclusions that the writ of mandamus mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment was issued by the High Court to the Corporation on whose behalf the first four of those conclusions have been impugned before us and I proceed to examine the same in the light of arguments advanced at length by learned counsel for the parties and for the Class II employees of the Corporation who were permitted to intervene in the appeal before us. 5. As conclusion II consists merely of corollaries derived directly from conclusion I and it is the correctness or otherwise of the latter that would determine the sustainability of the former, the two may legitimately be dealt with together, although it is conclusion I on which I would primarily concentrate. 6. For convenience of examination, conclusion I may be split up into two propositions: (a) The I. D. Act is a special law because it deals with adjudication and settlement of matters in dispute between an employer and his ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cial law and (in comparison thereto) the I. D. Act as a general law. 8. Proposition (b) is equally insupportable even if the I. D. Act is regarded as a special law in comparison to the L. I. C. Act. The High Court appears to have somehow tried to apply the maximum generalia specialibus non derogant to the situation with which it was concerned. But does that maxim lead to the proposition under discussion? The general rule to be followed in the case of a conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one (Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant). To this general rule there is a well known exception, namely, generalia specialibus non derogant (general things do not derogate from special things), the implications of which are thus stated succinctly by Warl Jowitt in 'The Dictionary of English Law': "Thus a specific enactment is not affected by a subsequent general enactment unless the earlier enactment is inconsistent with the later enactment, or unless there is some express reference in the later enactment to the earlier enactment, in either of which cases the maxim leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant applies." In other words a prio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mere implication. But the matter does not end here as sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 11 and clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 49 of the L. I. C. Act pose other insurmountable hurdles in the way of the acceptance of proposition (b). The scope of sub-section (2) of section 11 was stated in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee & Ors (supra) by Gajendragadkar, J., in the following terms: "Section 11(2) as it originally stood was substantially modified in 1957, and the plain effect of the provisions contained in the said sub-section as modified is that the Central Government is given the power to alter (whether by way of reduction or otherwise) the remuneration and the other terms and conditions of service to such extent and in such manner as it thinks fit. It is significant that this power can be exercised by the Central Government notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or in any other law, or in any award, settlement or agreement for the time being in force. It was thought a that for a proper functioning of the Corporation it was essential to confer upon the Central Government an overri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any award, settlement, or agreement for the time being in force, would not stand in the way of the exercise of that power even if such exercise is to the detriment of the employees of the Corporation. The conferment of the power in thus in express supersession of the I. D. Act and of any settlement made thereunder. The provisions of that Act and the two settlements of 1974 must, therefore, yield to the dictates of section 11(2) and to the exercise of the power conferred thereby on the Central Government. Sub-section (4) of section 11 is again illuminating as in the matter of compensation to be paid to a transferred employee it provides specifically that the provisions of sub-section (2) of that section shall override those of the I. D. Act and of any other law for the time being in force and that no claim to the contrary shall be entertained by any court, tribunal or other authority. In the face of an express provision like this it is not open to the employees to contend that the law laid down in the I. D. Act and not sub-section (2) of section 11 would govern them. The rule-making power conferred on the Corporation by section 49 of the L. I. C. Act must also be held to be exerci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 49 conforms on the Corporation "ordinary" powers of framing subordinate legislation and that the Corporation has not been invested with any right to unilaterally promulgate a regulation altering the conditions of service of its employees to their detriment and that such regulations cannot override the provisions of the I. D. Act and the settlements reached thereunder. Reliance for the proposition was placed on U. P. State Electricity Board and Ors. v. Hari Shanker Jaing and Ors.(3) and Bangalore Water-Supply & Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & Others,(4). In the former the case of the employees was that they were governed by the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act which, according to them, was a special Act laying down provision in relation to their conditions of service and which could not, therefore, be superseded by section 79 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. In holding that the section last mentioned was a general law which did not override the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, this court observed: "Chapter VII (from section 70 to section 83) which is headed "Miscellaneous" contains various miscellaneous p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... overn the relationship between the State as an employer and its servants as employees it may be contended; on the strength of such provisions, that a particular set of employees are outside the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act for that reason. The special excludes the applicability of the general. We cannot forget that we have to determine the meaning of the term 'industry' in the context, of and for the purposes of matters provided for in the Industrial Disputes Act only............ Hence, to artificially exclude State-run industries from the sphere of the Act, unless statutory provisions, expressly or by a necessary implication, have that effect, would not be correct." (emphasis supplied) Far from assisting the case of the employees these observations only support the conclusion arrived at by me above in as much as they specifically state that if express provision has been made under a particular enactment governing the relationship of an employer and his employees, such special provision would govern those employees in supersession of the dictates of the I. D. Act. 9. I thus hold that section 11 and clauses (b) and (bb) of subsection (2) of section 49 of the L. I. C. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the impugned Act was violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and was hence null and void." "3. The impugned Act deprived Class III and Class IV employees of the right to annual cash bonus for the years 1st April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976 and 1st April 1976 to 31st March, 1977, which was vested in them under clause 8(ii) of the Settlement and there was, therefore, clear infringement of their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) and since this deprivation of the right to annual cash bonus, which was secured under a Settlement arrived at as a result of collective bargaining and with full and mature deliberation on the part of the Life Insurance Corporation and the Central Government after taking into account the interests of the policy-holders and the community and with a view to approximating towards the goal of a living wage as envisaged in Article 4 of the Constitution, amounted to an unreasonable restriction, the impugned Act was not saved by Article 19(5) and hence it was liable to be struck down as invalid." In relation to point A the argument raised on behalf of the Corporation was that under the then existing regulation 58 the grant of annual cash ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... view of this conclusion Bhagwati, J., considered it unnecessary to consider point B. Chandrachud, Fazal Ali and Shinghal, JJ., agreed with the conclusion arrived at by Bhagwati, J., on point A. Beg, C.J., however, delivered a separate judgment seriously doubting the correctness of the proposition enunciated by Bhagwati, J., that the extinguishment of the right to bonus amounted to acquisition of property, and deciding point B in favour of the employees with a finding that in view of the provisions of article 43 of the Constitution the 1976 Act was vitiated by the provisions of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and was not saved by clause (6) of that article. Beg, C.J., was further of the opinion that the 1976 Act was violative of article 14 of the Constitution. Three factors are noteworthy: (a) Points A and B detailed above were specifically limited to the duration of the settlements as appearing in clause 12 thereof and the judgment, therefore, does not cover any period subsequent to 31st March, 1977, as has been rightly contended by learned counsel for the Corporation. (b) No finding at all was given nor was any observation made by Bhagwati, J., to the effect that section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the dispute, and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. "(3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17A: "Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit: "Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. "(4) Where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made, there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Governmen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he parties before the Court in that case were the South Indian Bank Ltd. and one of its clerks named A. R. Chacko who had been promoted as an accountant with effect from the 13th July 1959 and claimed certain allowances for periods subsequent to that date in terms of what is called the Sastry award. On behalf of the Bank reliance was placed on section 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act, 1955 which runs thus: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 the award as now modified by the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the manner referred to in section 3 shall remain in force until March 31, 1959." and a contention was raised that the non-obstante clause contained in this section made the provisions of section 19(6) of the I.D. Act inapplicable to the Sastry award which therefore, became dead for all purposes after the 31st March, 1959. Repelling the contention this Court observed: "The effect of section 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Banking Companies) Decision Act is that the award ceased to be in force after March 31, 1959. That however has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plied) It is the underlined portion of this paragraph which impelled the High Court to come to the conclusion that even a notice under section 19(6) of the I.D. Act would not terminate a settlement (which, according to the High Court, stands on the same footing as an award and, in fact is indistinguishable therefrom for the purpose of section 19) but would have the effect of merely paving the way for fresh negotiations resulting ultimately in a new settlement- a conclusion which has been seriously challenged on behalf of the Corporation with the submission that Chacko's case has no application whatsoever to the present controversy in as much as the special law comprised of section 11 and 49 of the L.I.C. Act fully covers the situation in the 3rd period following the expiry of the 1974 settlements. The submission is well based. In Chacko's case this Court was dealing with the provisions of the I.D. Act alone when it made the observations last extracted and was not concerned with a situation which would cover the 3rd period in relation to an award (or for that matter a settlement) in accordance with a specific mandate from Parliament. The only available course for filling the void c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mely, that in the present case there is a special mandate by Parliament to fill the void of the 3rd period which did not obtain in Chacko's case. However, I may briefly dwell on another aspect of the same distinction and that consists of the circumstance that while in Chacko's case the employer was the South Indian Bank Ltd.-a non-statutory banking company-the employer before us now is the creation of the L.I.C. Act itself and therefore a statutory corporation. This circumstance coupled with the contents of the L.I.C. Act leads to the following deductions, as laid down in Suchdev Singh & Ors v. Bhagataram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and anr.(1). (a) The Corporation carries on the exclusive business of life insurance as an agency of the Government by which it is managed and which alone can dissolve it. It is, therefore, an authority within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution of India. The status of persons serving the Corporation thus carries with it the element of public employment. (b) The L.I.C. Act enables the Corporation to make regulations which may provide, inter alia for the terms and conditions of service of its employees. Such regulations cannot be equated with th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for. According to learned counsel for the employees the expression "employees or any class of them" occurring in sub-clause (i) of the above analysis must be interpreted to mean transferred employees or any class thereof and the expression does not cover the employees recruited under section 23. Support for the contention is sought from the circumstance that the section is not only a part of Chapter IV of the L.I.C. Act, which is headed "Transfer of existing Life Insurance Business to the Corporation" but also carries the marginal note "Transfer of service of existing employees of insurers to the Corporation". This circumstance is wholly immaterial not only for the reason that headings of chapters and marginal notes cannot be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature unless the language employed by it is ambiguous but also because the absorption of the transferred employees into the Corporation may itself necessitate a change in the conditions of service of the employees recruited under section 23. It is not disputed that transferred employees, amongst themselves, were governed by widely different conditions of serv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the further presumption that a change of working denotes a change in meaning." 17. The matter may also be looked at from another angle. As stated in clause (c) of the above analysis the Central Government is empowered to take action under subsection (2) of section 11 if it is satisfied about the existence of either of two conditions. It may take such action if it is satisfied that for the purpose of securing uniformity in the scales of remuneration, etc., applicable to transferred employees it is necessary to do so. But then if no action is intended to be taken for that purpose it may still be taken provided the Central Government is satisfied that it is in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders to make a reduction in the remuneration payable or a revision of the other terms and conditions applicable to its employees. Now the first condition which envisages the securing of uniformity in the scales of remuneration clearly applies to transferred employees only but the same is not true of the second condition. At a particular juncture in the life of the Corporation it may become necessary to make a reduction in the remuneration payable to its employees or a rev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government in relation to "transferred employees" whereas the second part appears to apply to all employees of the Corporation irrespective of whether they are transferred or directly recruited." I find myself in complete agreement with this view for the reasons already stated. 18. In order to steer clear of the above interpretation of section 11(2) learned counsel for the employees put forward the argument that the word 'for' occurring in the section should not be read as a disjunctive and should be given the meaning 'and' so that the two clauses forming the conditions about which the Central Government has to be satisfied before it can act under the section are taken to be one single whole; but we do not see any reason why the plain meaning of the word should be distorted to suit the convenience or the cause of the employees. It is no doubt true that the word 'or' may be interpreted as 'and' in certain extraordinary circumstances such as in a situation where its use as a disjunctive could obviously not have been intended. (see Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax.(1) Where no compelling reason for the adoption of such a cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Parliament the then Finance Minister had given an assurance in that behalf. The argument is wholly unacceptable to me. One good reason is available in the provisions of section 14 of the General Clauses Act which runs thus: "14(1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any power is conferred, then unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. "(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887." In view of the clear language of the section, no Central law, while conferring a power, need say in so many words that such power may be exercised from time to time; and if a law does make use of such an expression that would not change the position. The deletion of such an expression by the legislature at a given point of time may, therefore, follow the detection of the superfluity and that would not mean, all by itself, that the legislature intended to limit the exercise of such power to a single occasion. This is precisely the view that was taken by this Court in a similar situation in Vasantlal Magan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a modification of the said maximum rent and that itself shows that the fixation of any maximum rent was not treated as immutable. If it was necessary to issue one notification under section 6(2) it would follow by force of the same logic that circumstances may require the issue of a further notification. The fixation of agricultural rent depends upon so many uncertain factors-which may vary from time to time and from place to place that it would be idle to contend that the Legislature wanted to fix the maximum only once, or, as Mr. Limaye concedes, twice. Therefore the argument that the power to issue a notification has been exhausted cannot be sustained." The language of section 14 of the General Clauses Act being identical with that of the Bombay General Clauses Act this reasoning is fully applicable to the interpretation of section 11(2) of the L.I.C. Act. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Harivadan K. Desai and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others(1), in the following words: "While construing a statutory provision, it is not permissible to traverse beyond the language of the provision unless the legislative ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oration of the service conditions of the employees when the affairs of the Corporation so warrant? To put such a restricted meaning on the language used does not appear to be warranted for any reason whatsoever. 21. In so for as the proceedings of Parliament and speeches made during the course thereof are concerned, they are not admissible for the purpose of interpretation of the resultant statute unless the language used therein is ambiguous and impels the Court to resort to factors outside the statute for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the law-makers. This is what was clearly held this Court in Anandji Haridas & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh & Anr.,(1) by Sarkaria, J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of himself and Alagiriswami,J., and the observations made therein are worth repetition: "As a general principle of interpretation, where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external evidence such as Parliamentary Debates, Reports of the Committees of the Legislatures or even the statement made by the Minister on the introductio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e been doing. Thus, if progress towards goals found in articles 38 and 39 and 43 is desired, there should not be any curtailment of wage rates arbitrarily without disclosing any valid reason for it as is the case here. It is quite reasonable, in my opinion, to submit that the measure which seeks to deprive workers of the benefits of a settlement arrived at and assented to by the Central Government, under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, should not be set at naught by an Act designed to defeat a particular settlement. If this be the purpose of the Act, as it evidently is, it could very well be said to be contrary to public interest, and therefore, not protected by article 19(6) of the Constitution." These observations are of no help to the case of the employees as they were made in relation to the change of conditions of service of employees in an industrial establishment under a settlement which was then in operation and therefore, covered only the first period mentioned in section 19(2) of the I.D. Act--a period with which we are not concerned. As pointed out by Bhagwati, J., in his separate judgment, the bonus for the period up to the 31st March 1977 had actua ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion, it was bound in law to exercise that power itself and that it could not delegate that power to the Corporation as it has done in clause 9. This argument is again without substance. The clause itself states in unmistakable terms that the Corporation may grant non-profit sharing bonus to its employees in respect of any particular year subject to the previous approval of the Central Government, and so the real bonus-granting authority remains the Central Government and not the Corporation. There is thus no delegation of any real power to the Corporation through the promulgation of clause 9. 25. Clause 9 was also challenged on the ground that although the notification promulgating it began with the preamble "whereas the Central Government is satisfied that in the interests of the Corporation and its policy-holders it is necessary to revise the terms and conditions of service.. " there is nothing to show that the Central Government was actually so satisfied. This is a stand which cannot be allowed to be raised at this late stage in as much as it involves questions of fact. which cannot be determined without the Central Government being given a full opportunity to rebut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll not be so governed. Regulation 2 is definitely not susceptible of the interpretation that if a settlement has been reached between the Corporation and its employees, the regulations shall not apply to them even though the settlement makes no provision in that behalf. It is nobody's case that the 1974 settlements contain any such provision and regulation 2, therefore, does not come into play at all. 28. In the result appeal No. 2275 of 1978 succeeds and is accepted. The impugned judgment is set aside and the petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India decided thereby is dismissed along with transfer case No. 1 of 1979. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties are left to bear their own costs. ORDER In view of the opinion expressed by the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs to the first, second and third respondents, and the Transfer Petition No. 1 of 1979 stands allowed insofar that a writ will issue to the Life Insurance Corporation directing it to give effect to the terms of the settlements of 1974 relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation. Costs in respect of the Transfer Petition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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