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TMI Blog2005 (9) TMI 618X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e notification dated 24.10.1961 and ₹ 98/- per sq. yard and ₹ 72/- per sq. yard with China Clay and without China Clay respectively in relation to the notification dated 23.01.1965. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Two notifications dated 24.10.1961 and 23.01.1965 were issued for acquisition of the lands measuring 1105.04 bighas and 3895.07 bigha respectively situated in village Masoodpur for the public purpose of planned development of Delhi, i.e., for construction of Jawahar Lal Nehru University. Declarations under Section 6 of the Act were issued on 6.08.1966 and 6.12.1966. Two awards being award Nos. 2040 and 2225 were made on 2.12.1967 and 8.04.1969. The Land Acquisition Collector for the purpose of computation of the amount of compensation payable for acquisition of said land divided the acquired lands in three categories viz. Blocks A, B C and awarded compensation @ ₹ 1000/- per bigha for Block A, ₹ 900/- per bigha for Block B and ₹ 600/- per bigha for Block C in respect of the acquisition of land under notification dated 24.10.1961 and ₹ 1580/- per bigha for Block A, ₹ 1175/- per bigha for Block B and ₹ 60 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rest as contained under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act being mandatory in nature cannot be waived. For computing the market value of the lands, the High Court proceeded on the basis that the lowest category of residential developed plots, as in the year 1965, should be taken to be the base therefor i.e. @ ₹ 150/- per sq. yd. and directed deduction of 40% therefrom on the premise that some time would have been necessary for excavating minor minerals and to make the lands fully developed having regard to their tremendous building potential. The High Court also directed further deduction of 20% from the wholesale price opining that ₹ 72/- per sq. yard would be a fair market price for the acquired land in the year1965. However, as regard the lands which were the subject matter of acquisition in terms of notification dated 24.10.1961, relying on or on the basis of a decision of the High Court in Rameshwar Solanki Anr. Vs. Union of India Anr. [57 (1995) DLT 410], further deductions @ 12% p.a. were directed to be made therefrom working out the amount of compensation at ₹ 30/- per sq. yard for lands without China Clay and ₹ 56 per sq. yard with China Clay. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le by the High Court applying the principles of res judicata, the cross objections filed by the Respondents were also not maintainable. Mr. Harish Salve, Mr. P.P. Rao, and Mr. Ramamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment. At the outset we may notice that Mr. Salve conceded that the principles of res judicata and/ or issue estoppel were not applicable to the fact of the present case. The learned counsel would, however, point out that the High Court in fact entertained the appeals preferred by the Appellants as regard : (a) ownership of China Clay, (b) value of the land and (c) application of Section 25 of the Act. It was furthermore submitted : (i) The Land Acquisition Act being an existing statute on the date of coming into force of the Constitution of India the right to property was a fundamental right in terms of Article 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India when the notifications under Section 4 were issued and, thus all the procedural requirements laid down therein were required to be scrupulously complied with in fulfillment of the legislative purpose. (ii) Section 25(2) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it to notice that the Respondents herein claimed their right, title and interest in the lands in question measuring 4307 bighas, 17 biswas from one Gulab Sundari who was said to be the proprietor of M/s Kesri Pottery Works having a non-occupancy tenancy right therein. It is not in dispute that several proceedings had been initiated before different forums by Gulab Sundari on the one hand and the Gaon Sabha of the village and the Union of India, on the other, in respect of the right, title and interest of the respective parties after coming into force of the Delhi Land Reforms Act. The aforementioned Gulab Sundari had allegedly been declared Bhumidhar by the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi. It may be noticed that an intervention application has been filed on behalf of Shri Madan Gopal Gupta and Shri Sudhir Jain contending that there exists an inter se dispute as regard the ownership of the property in question inasmuch as the applicants therein are proprietors/owners thereof. According to the said applicants the principal dispute between the parties is as to whether the said Gulab Sundari had had any right, title or interest as Bhumidhar or otherwise in the said land and the same ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ta and they jointly have claimed 1/4th share in the land acquired by these awards and the other set of claimants against each award was Surinder Gupta, who was substituted by Rattan Lall Gupta in proceedings u/s 30/31 of the Act before Shri P.L. Singla. Now Rattan Chand Gupta has been substituted by Rajiv Gupta, Sanjay Gupta, Parmod Gupta and Sumangli Gupta. The first set of claimants, Sri Ram Gupta, Mehar Chand Gupta and Babu Ram Gupta stand substituted by Rajiv Gupta, Sanjay Gupta, Shri L.R. Gupta, Smt. Parmod Gupta and Sumangli Gupta being the members of the L.R. Gupta HUF. They jointly have 1/8th share in the land acquired by both the awards. The aforementioned five claimants, viz., Smt. Promod Gupta, Shri Rajiv Gupta, Sanjay Gupta, Smt. Sumangli Gupta and Shri LR. Gupta have also been arrayed as Respondents in the appeals filed before the High Court by the appellants herein. RES JUDICATA : The principle of res judicata has been applied by the High Court in relation to two issues, viz., determination of market value and title of the Respondents in respect thereof. We have noticed hereinbefore that Shri Salve conceded that the High Court has committed an error in ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... om raising the said question in a different proceeding as in a given case it is permissible in law to do the same keeping in view larger public interest. In Government of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347] repelling the contention that the State is estopped from maintaining an appeal while from a similar matter which has been implemented no appeal was filed, it was observed : 28. In the aforementioned situation, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court manifestly erred in refusing to consider the contentions of the appellants on their own merit, particularly, when the question as regards difference in the grant of scale of pay on the ground of different educational qualification stands concluded by a judgment of this Court in Debdas Kumar1. If the judgment of Debdas Kumar is to be followed, a finding of fact was required to be arrived at that they are similarly situated to the case of Debdas Kumar which in turn would mean that they are also holders of diploma in Engineering. They admittedly being not, the contention of the appellants could not be rejected. Non-filing of an appeal, in any event, would not be a ground for refusing to consider a matter on its ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 54 a person can either be a Bhumidhar or Asami and there is no other class of proprietors or tenure-holder after coming into force of the said Act. It was further opined: 11.1. Therefore, the legal position is absolutely clear that a person can be either a bhumidhar or an asami of the agricultural land in a village. He can also be an owner of the property of the type which is enumerated in Section 8 of the Act, like private wells, tanks, groves, abadis, trees and buildings. Except for these, all other kinds of lands and property would vest in the Gaon Sabha. The proprietors and the concept of proprietors of land stands totally abolished with the enforcement of the Act. The respondents neither claimed to be bhumidhar nor asami of the land which has been acquired. The acquired land does not come within the purview of Section 8 of the Act. In such circumstances the only inference possible is that the land stood vested with the Gaon Sabha on the date of the commencement of the Act and it was the Gaon Sabha which was the owner thereof and was entitled to receive the entire amount of compensation. From the impugned judgment of the High Court, it does not appear that it had taken ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the decision of House of Lords in Great Western Railway Co. vs. Carpalla United China Clay Co. Ltd. [(1910) AC 83], wherein a grant reserving minerals was held to exclude a deposit of China clay despite the fact that the same was found near the surface. In Jagat Mohan Nath Sah Deo vs. Pratap Udai Nath Sah Deo and Others [AIR 1931 PC 302], the Privy Council affirmed its earlier decision in Gobinda Narayan Singh vs. Sham Lal Singh [AIR 1931 PC 89] stating: A long series of recent decision by the Board has established that if a claimant to subsoil rights holds under the zamindar or by a grant emanating from him, even though his powers may be permanent, heritable and transferable, he must still prove the express inclusion of the subsoil rights. [See also H.V. Low and Company Ltd. vs. Raja Bahadur Jyoti Prosad Singh Deo AIR 1931 PC 299; Onkarmal Agarwalla and Others vs. Bireswar Hazra and others, AIR 1959 Calcutta 195; and Bageswari Charan Singh (supra)] Yet again in Bejoy Singh Dudhoria vs. Surendra Narayan Singh [1929 ILR (56) Cal. 1], it was held that in absence of any reference to minerals or to the subsoil; or to the right to excavate for making bricks or to anything in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rry, land or interest was taken into account in the assessment of the land-revenue. (4) Until the presumption is so rebutted, the forest, quarry, land or interest shall be held to belong to the Government. 60-C. Power to issue instructions. The State Government or the Financial Commissioner with the approval of the State Government may, for the guidance of Revenue-officers, from time to time issue executive instructions relating to all matters to which the provisions of this chapter apply, provided that such instructions shall be consistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. Section 60-C of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 empowers the State to issue general instructions which are binding on the tenure-holders. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said power, the State of Punjab made rules known as Punjab Minor Minerals Rules, 1934, Rules 3, 5 and 7 whereof read, thus: 3. (1) No person shall quarry any minerals belonging to Government from land, whether privately owned or otherwise included within any revenue estate, or situated in land the property of Government not included within the limits of a revenue estate, unless he has first obta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... only for their personal use and that too after obtaining a requisite permit in terms of the Rules. Government of India Act came into force in the year 1935. Entry 36 of List I of the Seventh Schedule contained in the Government of India Act empowered the Governor General in Council to make laws relating to regulation of mine and mineral development. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said power, Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1948 was enacted; in terms of Section 4 whereof mining operation could be carried out only under a licence or lease to be granted in the manner prescribed under the rules framed thereunder. The Parliament thereafter enacted Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; section 4 whereof reads as under: 4. Prospecting or mining operations to be under licence or lease.--(1) No person shall undertake any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a reconnaissance permit or of a prospecting licence or, as the case may be, of a mining lease, granted under this Act and the rules made thereunder: Provided that nothing in this sub-secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s China Clay was declared to be a minor mineral. The State of Delhi, however, made rules only in the year 1969. Prior thereto, presumably the rules made by the State of Punjab were governing the field. The attention of the High Court and the Reference Court was not drawn to the aforementioned statutes and the statutory rules. The application of the said rules will go a long way in not only determining the question of res judicata but also the question as regard to the limited nature of right the Respondents under the aforementioned statutes, if any. Determination on the said issues would be relevant for the purpose of computing the amount of compensation. Ownership in respect of an immovable property would mean a bundle of rights. Only a proprietor of a surface land will have the sub-soil right. But such rights may also have certain limitations. Tenure holder or sub-tenure holder and / or an agricultural tenant created for carrying out agricultural operation per se would not become the owner of the sub-soil right. The right granted in favour of such sub-tenure holder, tenure holder or the agricultural tenant would, thus, depend upon the concerned statute and/ or the relevan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fertile, Marbal, metals, stones, coal, sand is under the ownership of the Government. But within the boundires of this village mountain is stated to be existed. If the Government wants to take the stone then the Govt. will not liable to pay the price of that stone. If any mine is found then the same will be property of the Government. The evidentiary value of wazib-ul-arz is no longer res integra in view of the decisions cited at the bar including Prem Chand vs. State of Haryana [AIR 1972 (P H) 50 (DB)]; Man Chand vs. State of Haryana [74 (1972) PLR 508], Chunni Lal vs. State of Haryana [73 (1971) PLR 159], Gram Panchayat vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [AIR 1973 HP 7]. The said decisions lay down the principle that in absence of any entry made in favour of the Government, with respect to mines and minerals a presumption shall be drawn that the same belongs to the landowner being a tenure-holder. We have noticed hereinbefore a large number of decisions of the Judicial Committee and different High Courts which lay down the principle that only the landowners have subsoil rights but so far as the sub- tenureholders and others are concerned no such presumption shall be r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such entries are made. It is true that the legislature used two different phraseologies 'shall be presumed' and 'may be presumed' in Section 42 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and furthermore although provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as regards right to mines and minerals said to be vested in the Government vis-`-vis absence thereof in relation to the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words 'shall presume' would be conclusive. The meaning of expressions 'may presume' and 'shall presume' have been explained in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression 'shall presume' cannot be held to be synonymous with 'conclusive proof'. It is interesting to note that this Court in Raja Rajinder Chand vs. Mst. Sukhi and Others [AIR 1957 SC 286] whereupon Mr. Rao has placed strong reliance observed : Whether the statutory presumption attaching to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Devi Vs. Kamla Ors. [JT 2005 (4) SC 315], this Court referring to various decisions of this Court including Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal Ors. Vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [(1970) 1 SCC 613], Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh Ors. Vs. L.V.A. Dixitulu Ors. [(1979) 2 SCC 34], Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs. State of T.N. Anr. [(2004) 3 SCC 1], Management of M/s. Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Ajit Singh [JT 2005 (2) SC 481] observed : 15. From the above principles laid down by this Court, it is clear that if the earlier judgment which is sought to be made the basis of res judicata is delivered by a court without jurisdiction or is contrary to the existing law at the time the issue comes up for reconsideration such earlier judgment cannot be held to be res judicata in the subsequent case unless, of course, protected by any special enactment. In Ramnik Vallabhdas Madhvani and Others Vs. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani [(2004) 1 SCC 497], in which one of us (S.B. Sinha, J.) was a member, it was observed: Principles of res judicata is a procedural provision. The same has no application where there is inherent lack of jurisdiction. The question of application of princi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a share or portion of an estate held by one land-owner or jointly by two or more land- owners; Section 61 of the Land Revenue Act provided for security for payment of land revenue. In terms of the provisions thereof, the land owners need not necessarily be the owners of the land. The term land- owner is a wider term and it does not include a tenant as specifically mentioned in the definition. What was the actual status of Smt. Gulab Sundari vis-`-vis her predecessors is not known. Section 31 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 provides for preparation of record of rights and other documents in respect of an estate including the nature and extent of the interest of the land owners and the conditions and liabilities attached thereto. Section 32 provides for special provision for record of rights in the situations specified therein. Section 41 provides that minerals mentioned therein shall vest in the Government. Section 42, however, provides that when such right has not been stated to be vested in the land owners, the same would be presumed to be belonging to the Government although such presumption is not absolute. Sub-section (2) of Section 42, however, states that whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Gaon Sabha. Section 11 provides for declaration of bhumidhari rights by the Deputy Commissioner. Such declaration is said to have been made in case of the aforementioned Smt. Gulab Sundari but it is not on record of the case. The effect of such declaration is also required to be considered for the purpose of determining the questions arising in these matters. Section 22 confers a right upon a bhumidhar in exclusive possession of all land comprised in his respective holding so as to enable him to use the land for any purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming and to make any improvement thereupon. Section 23 provides use of holding for industrial purposes. Section 154 provides for vesting of certain lands in Gaon Sabha. By Section 185 a hierarchy of courts has been created for the purpose of determination of the question relating to rights and liabilities regarding such lands in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted for certain purposes. Interpretation of the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act came up for consideration before this Court in Nathi (supra). It opined that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Revenue Act, set out above. It has not stopped to consider the further question why a holding, which is a share or a portion of an estate, as defined in the Punjab Act, should not partake of the characteristics of an estate. Keeping in view the background of the legislative history and the objective of the legislation, is there any rational reason for holding that the makers of the Constitution thought of abolishing only intermediaries in respect of an area constituting one entire estate but not of a portion thereof? On the other hand, as indicated above, they have used the expression estate in an all-inclusive sense. They have not stopped at that; they have also added the words or any rights therein . The expression rights in relation to an estate again has been used in a very comprehensive sense of including not only the interests of proprietors or sub- proprietors but also of lower grade tenants, like raiyats or under-raiyats, and then they added, by way of further emphasizing their intention, the expression other intermediary , thus, clearly showing that the enumeration of intermediaries was only illustrative and not exhaustive. If the makers of the Constitution have, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mil Nadu and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 12] Mineral may be found in the mineral-bearing land. Mineral-bearing land may, thus, contain mineral as the product of nature. Thus, in a case it may be theoretically possible for the State to grant a mining lease of quarry or permit, in favour of an applicant in respect of an area over which a mineral right is also held by a private owner but in that event the private owner would be only entitled to royalty. The legislative intent contained in the 1957 Act envisages that even in certain cases the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, in the event of their undertaking of mining operations from the land belonging to the private owners may have to pay royalty to them. The rate of royalty, however, will be limited to the amount prescribed in the 1957 Act or the rules framed thereunder The amount of compensation, therefore, in view of the statutory provisions will depend upon several factors, as noticed hereinbefore. In any event, the profit earned by illegal mining i.e. carrying on mining operations contrary the 1957 Act or the rules framed thereunder, would by no means be a safe criteria for determining the amount of com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and Others vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others (2004) 1 SCC 467]. It is also trite to state that the market value of agricultural land is lower than that of land suitable for commercial purposes [See Om Prakash (Dead) By LRs. and Others vs. Union of India and Another (2004) 10 SCC 627] . The Reference Court, it is trite, has to apply the comparable sales method as also the situation of the land which is to be appreciated keeping in view the fact as to whether acquired land is similar to any land sold in the vicinity. In Shaji Kuriakose and Another Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and Others [(2001) 7 SCC 650], this court observed: 3. It is no doubt true that courts adopt comparable sales method of valuation of land while fixing the market value of the acquired land. While fixing the market value of the acquired land, comparable sales method of valuation is preferred than other methods of valuation of land such as capitalisation of net income method or expert opinion method. Comparable sales method of valuation is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of the market value of the acquired land at which a willing purchaser would pay for the acquir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of sales of similar lands in the neighbourhood at or about the date of notification under Section 4(1) or otherwise, other sale instances as well as other evidences have to be considered. 20. The amount of compensation cannot be ascertained with mathematical accuracy. A comparable instance has to be identified having regard to the proximity from time angle as well as proximity from situation angle. For determining the market value of the land under acquisition, suitable adjustment has to be made having regard to various positive and negative factors vis-`-vis the land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. The positive and negative factors are as under: Positive factors Negative factors (i) smallness of size (i) largeness of area (ii) proximity to a road (ii) situation in the interior at a distance from the road (iii) frontage on a road (iii) narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth (iv) nearness to developed area (iv) lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up (v) regular shape (v) remoteness from developed locality (vi) level vis-`-vis land under acquisition (vi) some special disadvantageous factors ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Others - [(1996) 9 SCC 640] The High Court, as has been noticed hereinbefore, without assigning any reason discarded the method of valuation adopted by the reference court. Before the reference court, the Respondents herein only relied upon the judgments and awards granting compensation for acquisition of similar lands. The High Court while allowing an application for adduction of additional evidence referred only to certain notifications issued by the Union of India in the year 1965 which were meant for the residential plots whereby allegedly the market value was stated to be 150 per sq. yd. for lands situated at Vasant Vihar wherefor certain deductions were made @ 12% p.a. therefrom in respect of the lands acquired under the notification dated 24.10.1961. We fail to understand as to how or on what basis, the High Court took recourse to the said method wholly ignoring the other materials on records. We may also observe that the High Court failed to take into consideration that recourse to such circulars may be impermissible and particularly in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In Jawajee Nagnatham vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad, A.P. and Others [ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of lease; and while determining the amount DDA was required to take into account the amount of consideration specified in the agreement and/or clearance certificate issued by the Income Tax Officer, which was not done. In Shakuntalabai (Smt.) and Others vs. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 2 SCC 152], this Court categorically held that if the owner himself has purchased some lands, the same should be taken into consideration having regard to the admission on market value of the land made by him stating : 5. It is seen that the reference court blissfully overlooked the admission of the owner on the surmise that it is an estimate made by the claimant and the evidence of the sale deeds under Exs. 38 and 44 being prevailing prices, it acted thereon and determined the compensation. The approach of the reference court is clearly illegal and that of the High Court is quite correct and it was the only way in which the market value could be determined on the face of the evidence on record. The reference court committed manifest error in determining the compensation on the basis of sq. ft. When lands of an extent of 20 acres are offered for sale in an open market, no willing and prudent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... id not advert thereto. But suffice it to say that for the purpose of carrying out mining operation, the Respondents were required to comply with the safety provisions contained in the Mines Act, 1952 and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. The Reference Court and the High Court unfortunately did not consider the question as to what amount was required to be expended for bringing the said area back to the normal so as to enable the University authorities to raise construction thereon. Minerals were evidently taken out by taking recourse to the quarry method, but there is no evidence adduced by the Respondents to show that the pits caused by such mining activities have already been filled up. We have been taken through the evidence adduced on behalf of the Respondents. The witnesses examined on behalf of the Respondents did not state as to when the pits had been filled up or what was the costs incurred therefor. It is also difficult to rely on the said evidence as witnesses examined on behalf of the Respondents were not expert witnesses. No document has also been filed in support of the case of the Respondents. Mr. Ramamurthi when confronted with this question, concede ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Respondents would not amount to estoppel or waiver. Sections 28 and 34 of the Act read as under: 28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.--If the sum which, in the opinion of the court, the Collector ought to have a awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court. Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry. 34. Payment of interest.--When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a plea was raised that the representation of the claimants was confined to the amount of compensation but the High Court negatived the same stating: Although it is true that in the agreement dated February 24, 1969 which the respondents signed and sent to the government along with their letter of that date they stated that they would not make any further claim in regard to compensation , but that expression, in our opinion, was clearly used by them not in the sense in which it is used in Sections 23 and 34 of the Act but more comprehensively, meaning reimbursement in full satisfaction of their claim in respect of the acquisition. That this was so was made clear in the letter addressed to them by the Under-Secretary in which he expressly stated that you and your co-sharers will make no further claim for the land thus acquired by the Government . The Under-Secretary did not use the word compensation in his letter nor did the respondents use it in their reply in which, on the other hand, they made a grouse of the hardship which the delay in payment had caused to them and brought it to the pointed attention of the Under-Secretary that immediate payment was an essential part of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Onkarmal Nathmal Trust [AIR 1975 SC 2065 : (1976) 1 SCC 766]. In that case the proceedings were not stayed pursuant to any undertaking or representation made by the claimant. The order of interim injunction was passed whereunder the claimants enjoyed certain benefits and in that fact situation the plea of waiver was raised. The Constitution Bench observed: 23. The third contention of the Solicitor-General is that the respondents waived service of a notice within two years of the expiry of the return period by reason of the order of injunction obtained by them. Waiver is either a form of estoppel or an election. The doctrine of estoppel by conduct means that where one by words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at that time. The fundamental requirement as to estoppel by conduct is that the estoppel must concern an existing state of facts. There is no common law estoppel founded on a statement of future intention. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (2003) 5 SCC 413] Even otherwise it is now well-settled that a person cannot be made to suffer owing to an action by the Court. (Actus curiae neminem gravabit) [See Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319 and Board of Control For Cricket in India and Another Vs. Netaji Cricket Club and Others [(2005) 4 SCC 741] We, therefore, are of the view that the High Court committed a manifest error in allowing interest for the said period. In fact, Mr. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents frankly conceded that interest for the said period shall not be payable.. We are not oblivious of various decisions of different High Courts taking one view or the other as regard the mandatory or directory character of Sections 28 and 34 but in view of our findings aforementioned, it may not be necessary to advert thereto. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 25 OF THE ACT It is not in dispute that in the proceeding giving rise to Award No. 2040 dated 2.12.1967 a claim was made by the Respondent Smt. Pramod Gupta claiming compensation to the extent of 1/4th share in the entire land. It has also not been disputed before us that Section 25 contains a substantive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ub-section (3) of Section 9 is concerned, we may, however, notice that in the awards of the Collector, it was categorically stated that the notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act had been issued. Before the High Court only the records of the Reference Court were available. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents stated before us that the fact as to whether such notices had been served or not could only be ascertained from the records of the Collector. Although the question as regard service of notice is a pure question of fact, we may observe that the said question may have to be answered keeping in view certain legal principles, viz., (i) the object for which Section 9 has been enacted; (ii) the situation in which the Respondent had filed a claim having knowledge of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act as also service of notice in terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 9 thereof; (iii) service of notice under Sub-section (1) of Section 9 together with service upon those persons may substantially serve the purpose; and (iv) the prejudice doctrine. In the report submitted before the Reference Court, the Land Acquisition Collector stated that such n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fication dated 24.10.1961 it was contended that the compensation at the rate of ₹ 12,000/- per bigha should have been awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. It is true that a faint argument was advanced before the Reference Court that the lands under acquisition were superior to those situated in Munirka and Ber Sarai. Even for the purpose of determination as regard superior quality of land under acquisition vis-`-vis the lands situated in the villages which were the subject matter of the other acquisition cases, it was obligatory on the part of the High Court to consider the contra plea raised by the Appellants herein. Furthermore, it was also obligatory on the part of the High Court to consider the question that a part of the lands consisted of hills and furthermore pits have been dug up while extracting minerals; the same may not be equated with the land, which had potential for building purposes. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not adverted to this aspect of the matter at all. It is relevant to notice the following observations of the Reference Court: But even if we take that the land in dispute is superior to the land acquired in village Ber Sarai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for adduction of additional evidence in support of their amended claim. The High Court while rejecting the claim application filed by the Appellants allowed the application for amendment as also the application for adduction of additional evidence filed by the Respondents. Mr. Salve submitted that the bar under Section 25 of the Act must be considered having regard to Section 53 thereof which provides for applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel urged that the Respondents had already filed an application for amendment of Memo of Appeal in terms of Order 41, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which having been allowed, would amount to amendment of the claim application in the reference case itself. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Harcharan Vs. State of Haryana [(1982) 3 SCC 408] Ghaziabad Development Authority Vs. Anoop Singh and Another [(2003) 2 SCC 484]. We do not agree. The pleadings before the Trial Court are the basis for adduction of evidence either before the Trial Court or before the Appellate Court. By amending the memo of appeal the original pleadings cannot be amended. The claimants Respondents made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... No ratio has been laid down therein and the observations made therein are without any discussion. Furthermore no reason has been assigned in support of the said proposition of law. In Harcharan (supra) also this Court did not address the question as to whether Order 6, Rule 17 would be applicable in relation to the original claim petition or memo of appeal. It may be true that not only the memorandum of appeal but also the reference was amended. Mr. Rao pointed out that the necessary amendments have been carried out in the application for reference or memorandum of appeal. In terms of Order VI Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such amendments are required to be carried out in the pleadings by a party who has obtained leave to amend his pleadings within the time granted therefor and if no time was specified then within fourteen days from the date of passing of the order. The consequence of failure to amend the pleadings within the period specified therein as laid down in Order VI Rule 18 of the Code is that the party shall not be permitted to amend his pleadings thereafter unless the time is extended by the court. It is not in dispute that such an order extending the tim ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the basis of the case pleaded and proved by leading proper evidence and just not on the basis of other reported judgments [See Surendra Kumar Vakil and Others Vs. Chief Executive Officer, M.P. and Others, (2004) 10 SCC 126 and Sanjay Gera vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority and Another (2005) 3 SCC 207]. We have noticed hereinbefore that the amendments have not been carried out in the pleadings in terms of Order VI, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said provision being mandatory, if not complied with the consequences flowing therefrom shall ensue. The purported amendments of the Memo of Appeal and the Reference applications, therefore, could not have been the basis for allowing adduction of additional evidence as has been done by the High Court. The submission of Mr. Rao that all the procedural requirements contained in the Land Acquisition Act were required to be strictly complied with having regard to the fact that at the relevant point of time, the right to property was a fundamental right, is misconceived. We are not, in these appeals, concerned with the action of the State in acquiring the properties but only concerned with determination of the mark ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... njay Gupta, Smt. Sumangli Gupta and Shri L.R. Gupta and for continuing with the proceedings in his name and in the name of Smt. Pramod Gupta, inter alia, on the ground that the bhumidhari rights continued to remain in his name and in the name of Smt. Pramod Gupta only and not on any application filed by any party to the said proceeding in this behalf. We fail to appreciate as to how the aforementioned directions had been made by the High Court on the application made by Shri Rajiv Gupta. We may also notice that Shri L.R. Gupta had already withdrawn a sum of money as awarded by the Reference Court, the details whereof are as under : Name Compensation Amount Interest Received upto 31.03.91 Interest refundable upto 31.03.91 At the rate of 15% p.a. in case of restitution as per terms of order dated 23.03.87 passed by this Hon'ble Court Deficit 1. Sh. L.R. Gupta 2,87,72,757.60 68,09,404/-1,54,66,355/-86,55,951 2. Mrs. Pramod Gupta 10,07,04,651.23 2,87,05,730/-5,41,28,748/-2,54,23,018/- 3. Sh. Rajiv Gupta 5,27,50,055.56 1,25,11,387/ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has been contended by the applicants herein, we would observe that this Court had not determined the question that the Respondents herein being successors of Gulab Sundari were entitled to the Bhumidhari rights by reason of the alleged deed of sale executed in their favour, but we only have proceeded on the basis that assuming they are Bhumidhars; in what manner their claim for awarding compensation should be dealt with. Any observation made herein by us should not be taken to mean that we have determined the question of entitlement of the Respondents herein as Bhumidhar under the Delhi Land Reforms Act finally or otherwise. Such a finding has to be arrived at by the courts determining the said question in the pending proceedings. CONNECTED MATTERS: We may, however, notice that in the appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) CC No.5724 of 2004 an award was made @ ₹ 1.74 per sq. yard, although the claim of ₹ 30/- per sq. yard was made and the High Court despite the fact that neither application for amendment nor adduction of additional grounds was filed, blindly followed its decision in other appeals filed by the Union of India. No finding therein has also been arrived a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sequently pursued the remedies available under law, then this anomalous situation would not have been created. Though the Division Bench has given the benefit of the pay scales up to 1-10-2001, the said cut-off date is extended till this date because we are invoking the inherent jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6825- 6832 OF 2003 For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments are set aside and the matters are remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration, in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs. CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 950, 2661 OF 2005, CIVIL APPEAL NOS-5566-5569-OF 2005 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 14383 of 2004, CC Nos. 5724, 9371, 11751 of 2004] These appeals were disposed of by the High Court on the basis of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Bhooria Ors. vs. Union of India [95 (2002) DLT 100 (DB)]. In view of the fact that in Civil Appeal Nos.6825-26 of 2003 etc., the impugned judgments are being set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court, the judgments and awards passed in these appeals must also be set asid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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