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TMI Blog1961 (11) TMI 59X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... until he had rendered the accounts and they had been checked and audited. The second proviso at the end of the convenants in the deed of dissolution reads: Provided however and it is agreed by and between the parties that as the parties entered into the partnership agreement at Indore (Holker State) all disputes and differences whether regarding money or as to the relationship or as to their rights and liabilities of the parties hereto in respect of the partnership hereby dissolved or in respect of question arising by and under this document shall be decided amicably or in court at Indore and at nowhere else. On September 29, 1945, a registered letter on behalf of the respondent was sent to the appellant. This required the appellant to explain to and satisfy the respondent at Indore as to the accounts of the said colliery within three months of the receipt of the notice. It was said in the notice that the accounts submitted by the appellant had not been properly kept and that many entries appeared to be wilfully falsified, evidently with malafide intentions and that there appeared in the account books various false and fictitious entries causing wrongful loss to the resp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sues were struck on February 4, 1950. The first two issues are: 1. Has this Court jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit? 2. Has the plaintiff rendered and satisfactorily explained the accounts of the partnership in terms of the deed of dissolution of partnership ? In December 1951, the respondent applied in the Court at Asansol for the stay of that suit in the exercise of its inherent powers. The application was rejected on August 9, 1952. The learned Sub-Judge held: No act done or proceedings taken as of right in due course of law is an abuse of the process of the Court simply because such proceeding is likely to embarass the other party. He therefore held that there could be no scope for acting under s. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, as s. 10 of that Code had no application to the suit, it having been instituted earlier than the suit at Indore. The High Court of Calcutta confirmed this order on May 7, 1953, and said: We do not think that, in the circumstance of these cases and on the materials on record, those orders ought to be revised. We would not make any other observation lest it might prejudice any of the parties. The High Court further gav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bjection for the stay or proceedings in the Court at Asansol had been rejected by that Court. He denied that his object in instituting the suit was to cause trouble and heavy expenses to the respondent. It may be mentioned that the respondent did not state in his application that his application for the stay of the suit at Asansol had been finally dismissed by the High Court of Calcutta and that that Court had directed the trial Court to decide the issue of jurisdiction at an early date. The appellant, too, in his objection, did not specifically state that the order rejecting the respondents s stay application had been confirmed by the High Court at Calcutta and that that Court had directed for an early hearing of the issue of jurisdiction. The learned Additional District Judge, Indore, issues interim injunction under O. XXXIX, Code of Civil Procedure, to the appellant restraining him from proceeding with his Asansol suit pending decision of the Indore suit, as the appellant was proceeding with the suit at Asansol in spite of the rejection of his application for the stay of the suit at Indore, and , as the appellant wanted to violate the provision in the deed of dissolution a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fference of opinion between the High Court on this point. One view is that a Court cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if the circumstances do not fall within the provisions of Order XXXIX of the Code: Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu (1), Govindarajulu v. Imperial Bank of India (2), Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami (3), Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudali (4) and Subramanian v. Seetarama (5). The other view is that a Court can issue an interin injunction under circumstances which are not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code, if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interin injunction: Dhaneshwar Nath v. Ghanshyam Dhar (6), Firm Bichchha Ram v. Firm Baldeo Sahai (7),Bhagat Singh v. jagbir Sawhney (8) and Chinese Tannery owners Association v. Makhan Lal (9). We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of O.XXXIX, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no such expression in s. 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by O. XXXIX or by any rules made under t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of these powers is not because these powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the Legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justices. In the above case, this Court did not uphold the order of the Civil Court, not coming under the provisions of order XXVI, appointing a commissioner for seizing the account books of the plaintiff on the application of the defandants. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h its provisions. It is to be noted that this view is supported by the fact that s. 3 of the Act is peremptory and that the duty of the Court is to notice the Act and give effect to it, even though it is not referred to in the pleadings . These observations have no bearing on the question of the Court s exercising its inherent powers under s. 151 of the Code. The section itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code. We therefore repel the first contention raised for the appellant. On the second question, we are of opinion that in view of the facts of the case, the Courts ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The considerations which would make a suit vexatious are well explained in Hyman v. Helm (1). In that case, the defendant, in an action before the Chancery Division of the High Court brought an action against the plaintiffs in San Francisco. The plaintiffs, is an action in England, prayed to the Court to restrain the defendants from proceeding further with the action in San Francisco. It was contended that it was vexatious for the defendants to bring the action in San Francisco as the witnesses to the action were residents of England, the contract between the parties was an English contract and that its fulfilment took place is England. In repelling the contention that the defendants subsequent action in San Francisco was vexatious, Brett, M. R., said at page 537: If that makes an action vexatious it would be a ground for the interference of the Court, although there were no action in England at all, the ground for alleging the action in San Francisco to be vexatious being that it is brought in an inconvenient place. But that is not the sort of vexation on which an English Court can act. It seems to me that where a party claims this interference of the Court to stop an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... entertaining the suit, as it is not disputed in these proceedings that both the Indore and Asansol Courts could try the suit in spite of the agreement. The appellant s institution of the suit at Asansol cannot be said to be in anticipation of the suit at Indore, which followed it by a few months. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the appellant knew, at the time of his instituting the suit, that the respondent was contemplating the institution of a suit at Indore. The notices which the respondent gave to the appellant were in December 1945. The suit was filed at Asansol in August 1948, more than two years and a half after the exchange of correspondence referred to in the plaint filed at Asansol. In fact, it is the conduct of the respondent in applying for the injunction in September 1953, knowing full well of the order of the Calcutta High Court confirming the order refusing stay of the Asansol suit and directing that Court to proceed with the decision of the issue of jurisdiction at an early date, which can be said to amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was really in the respondent s interest if he was sure of his ground that the issue of jurisdi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... convenient position. It has been said that the Asansol Court would not act in a way which may put the appellant in a difficult position and will show a spirit of cooperation with the Indore Court. Orders of Court are not ordinarily based on such considerations when there be the least chance for the other Court not to think in that way. The narration of facts will indicate how each Court has been acting on its own view of the legal position and the conduct of the parties. There have been case in the past, though few, in which the Court took no notice of such injunction orders to the party in a suit before them. They are: Menon v. Parvathi Ammal(1), Harbhagat Kaur v. Kirpal Singh (2) and Shiv Charan Lal v. Phool Chand (3). In the last case, the Agra Court issued an injunction against the plaintiff of a suit at Delhi restraining him from proceeding with that suit. The Delhi Court, holding that the order of the Agra Court did not bind it, decided to proceed with the suit. This action was supported by the High Court. Kapur J., observed at page 248: On the facts as have been proved it does appear rather extra-ordinary that a previously instituted suit should be sought to be sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... did not. Further, s. 22 of the Code provides for the transfer of a suit to another Court when a suit which could be instituted in any one of two or more Courts is instituted in one of such Courts. In view of the provisions of this section, it was open to the respondent to apply for the transfer of the suit at Asansol to the Indore Court and, if the suit had been transferred to the Indore Court, the two suits could have been tried together. It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature had contemplated the contingency of two suits with respect to similar reliefs being instituted and of the institution of a suit in one Court when it could also be instituted in another Court and it be preferable, for certain reasons, that the suit be tried in that other Court. In view of the various considerations stated above, we are of opinion that the order under appeal cannot be sustained and cannot be said to be an order necessary in the interests of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. We therefore allow the appeal with costs, and set aside the order restraining the appellant from proceeding with the suit at Asansol. SHAH, J.-I have perused the judgment delivered by Mr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... outside the limits of the Act a general discretion to dispense with the provisions of the Act. Inherent jurisdiction of the court to make order ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by s. 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code. Where the Code deals Expressly with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive. Power to issue an injunction is restricted by s. 94 and O. 39, and it is not open to the civil court which is not a Chartered High Court to exercise that power ignoring the restriction imposed there by, in purported exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The decision of this Court in Padam Sen v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1) does not assist the case of the appellant. In Padam Sen s case this Court was called upon is a original appeal to consider whether an order of a Munsiff appointing a commissioner for seizing certain account books of the plaintiff in a suit pending before the Munsiff was an order authorised by law. It was the case for the prosecution that the appellants offered a bribe to the commissioner as consideration for being allowed to tamper with entries therein, a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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