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TMI Blog2003 (7) TMI 686X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the said provision it is clear that the same comes to an end by operation of law after release of the employee from detention. Factual scenario is almost undisputed and needs to be noted in brief. Respondent-employee in each case was arrested and detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours. With reference to Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10, the order was passed in each case indicating that in view of the detention in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours, the concerned employee is deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of suspension and shall remain suspended until further orders. The background facts of the appeal relating to respondent-Rajiv Kumar is referred for the purpose of adjudicating the issues involved as the factual position in the appeal relating to Bani Singh would not affect ultimate conclusions. Rajiv Kumar was arrested on 26.3.1998 for allegedly accepting bribe and was released on bail on 2.4.1998. The order purportedly under Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 to formally place on record was passed on 15.5.1998. On 2.7.2000 the order dated 15.5.1998 was assailed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short the CAT ) at its Delhi Bench o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Union of India submitted that if the interpretation put by the High Court is accepted the same would mean addition of words to Rule 10(2). The language used in the said provision is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, there is no scope for making any alteration in the statutory texture. It was further submitted that by accepting the interpretation, Rule 5(a) of Rule 10 would also be rendered purposeless. Per contra, respondents-employees who appeared in person submitted that the interpretation brings out the true essence of a deeming provision, which cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it was enacted. On a combined reading of Rules 10(2), 10(3), 10(4) and 10(5)(a) it is claimed for the respondents that the order of suspension in a case covered under Rule 10(2)(a) has limited operation for the period of detention and not beyond it. Further it is submitted that an employee cannot be placed under suspension for an indefinite period of time. Though suspension is not penal in character yet it has serious civil consequences. In the fact till date there has been practically no progress in criminal proceedings and the departmental actions initiated. With reference t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he said provision under Rule 10(5)(a) makes it crystal clear that the order continues to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority competent to do so while Rule 10(5)(c) empowers the competent authority to modify or revoke also. NO exception is made relating to an order under Rules 10(2) and 10(5)(a). On the contrary, specifically it encompasses an order under Rule 10(2). If the order deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2) is to loose effectiveness automatically after the period of detention envisaged comes to an end, there would be no scope for the same being modified as contended by the respondents and there was no need to make such provisions as are engrafted in Rule 10(5)(a) and (c) and instead an equally deeming provision to bring an end to the duration of the deemed order would by itself suffice for the purpose. Thus, it is clear that the order of suspension does not loose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. It could be modified and revoked by another order as envisaged under Rule 10(5)(c) and until that order is made, the same continues by the operation of Rule 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847). The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid . Judge Learned Hand said, but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them . (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981). In D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of an a priori determination o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt. But, on the other hand, it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; a casus omissus, observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovision is made for its continuance, until further orders in them itself due to certain further developments taking place and interposition of orders made by Court or appellate and reviewing authority to meet and get over such specific eventualities, in given circumstances and that does not in any way affect the order of suspension deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2). Strong reliance was placed on Nelson Motis v. Union of India (1992 (4) SCC 711) to contend that omission of the expression until further orders in Rule 10(2) was conscious and, therefore, the period covered for deemed suspension was restricted to period of detention. Such plea is without substance. In Nelson s case (supra) the respective scope and ambit of Rule 10(2) and Rule 10(3) fell for consideration. As indicated above, the said provisions apply in conceptually and contextually different situations and have even no remote link with a situation envisaged under Rule 10(2). In fact, this Court in the said case categorically observed as under: The comparison of the language with that of Sub-Rule (3) re-inforces the conclusion that Sub-Rule (4) has to be understood in the natural sense . (underlined f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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