9911796707
TMI Blog2016 (3) TMI 787X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s of the parties. All these considerations will be cast into a curial cauldron to be appreciated by the Court before which the suit is being contested. In these premises, we cannot conclude that a prima facie case has not been disclosed by the Plaintiff-Respondents. It is important to note that litigation was initiated by Plaintiff-Respondents, not Defendant-Appellant, even though the latter could have raised issue to Plaintiff-Respondents using a similar mark to the one for which it had filed an application for registration as early as in 1992. The Defendant- Appellant finally filed a Notice of Motion in the Bombay High Court as late as 14.12.2005, in which it was successful in being granted an injunction as recently as on 31.3.2012. We may reiterate that every High Court must give due deference to the enunciation of law made by another High Court even though it is free to charter a divergent direction. However, this elasticity in consideration is not available where the litigants are the same, since Sections 10 and 11 of the CPC would come into play. Unless restraint is displayed, judicial bedlam and curial consternation would inexorably erupt since an unsuccessful litigant in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Core Health Care Ltd., the predecessor-in-title of Plaintiff-Respondents is stated to have introduced the molecular preparation and generic drug Propofol in India, in respect of which an application had been filed before the Drug Controller of India on 22.4.1998. Product Permission was received on 2.5.1998 from the Commissioner of Food and Drugs Control Administration. It has been pleaded that the predecessor-in-title of Plaintiff-Respondent No.1 had coined and invented the trademark PROFOL in April 1998 and not applied for registration of the said trademark on 24.5.1998 in Class V. However, it seems to us that this claim may not find acceptance inasmuch as PROFOL is almost an anagram of and is phonetically almost indistinguishable from the molecular compound, namely Propofol . In our opinion, to claim exclusivity of user, the trademark should normally partake of a new creation, or if an existing word, it should not bear descriptive characteristics so far as the product is concerned, nor should it be of an extolment or laudation. It would be surprising if exclusivity is given to marks such as bestsoap etc. Having said this, we must accept the reality that in the pharmaceutical ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erial and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court s exercise of discretion . We shall be careful not to transgress these frontiers. 4 Before granting an ad interim injunction, the Court in seisen of the litigation has to address its attention to the existence or otherwise of three aspects (a) whether a prima facie case in favour of the applicant has been established; (b) whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the applicant; and (c) whether irreparable loss or damage will visit the applicant in the event injunctory relief is declined. We shall cogitate on the first factor first is the law favourable to the applicant. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... remained dormant for twelve years. We can appreciate that this passivity may be the result of research of the product or the market, but the Defendant-Appellant will have to explain its supineness through evidence. In this interregnum, the Plaintiff-Respondents had not only applied for registration but had also commenced production and marketing of the similar drug and had allegedly built up a substantial goodwill in the market for PROFOL. The legal nodus is whether the prior registration would have the effect of obliterating the significance of the goodwill that had meanwhile been established by the Plaintiff-Respondents. Would a deeming provision i.e. relating registration retrospectively prevail on actuality competing equities oscillate around prior registration and prior user. 7 Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (the Act) deserves reproduction herein: 34. Saving for vested rights.-Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation to goods or services in relation to which that person or a predecessor in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f a trademark; nay the Defendant-Appellant has allowed or acquiesced in the user of the Plaintiff-Respondents for several years. The legislative intent behind this Section was to ordain that an applicant of a trademark does not have a permanent right by virtue of its application alone. Such a right is lost if it is not exercised within a reasonable time. 9 We must hasten to clarify that had the Defendant-Appellant commenced user of its trademark ROFOL prior to or even simultaneous with or even shortly after the Plaintiff-Respondents marketing of their products under the trademark PROFOL, on the Defendant-Appellant being accorded registration in respect of ROFOL which registration would retrospectively have efficacy from 19.10.1992, the situation would have been unassailably favourable to it. What has actually transpired is that after applying for registration of its trademark ROFOL in 1992, the Defendant-Appellant took no steps whatsoever in placing its product in the market till 2004. It also was legally lethargic in not seeking a curial restraint against the Plaintiff-Respondents. This reluctance to protect its mark could well be interpreted as an indication that the Defendan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Defendant-Appellant. In other words, the question before the Court would remain whether the situation on the date of application for registration alone would be relevant, or whether the developments in the period between this date and the date of grant of registration would have any bearing on the rights of the parties. All these considerations will be cast into a curial cauldron to be appreciated by the Court before which the suit is being contested. In these premises, we cannot conclude that a prima facie case has not been disclosed by the Plaintiff-Respondents. 10 Since we are confronted with the legal propriety of a temporary injunction, we must abjure from going into minute details and refrain from discussing the case threadbare, in order to preclude rendering the suit itself an exercise in futility and the decision therein a foregone conclusion. All that we would say in the present Appeal is that since the Plaintiff-Respondents have alleged, and have prima facie supported with proof, that they had already been using their trademark well before the attempted user of an identical or closely similar trademark by the Defendant-Appellant, the former would be entitled to a tempo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
