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TMI Blog2008 (10) TMI 651X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... moval was passed by the Bank against the appellant on April 29, 1982. Even the first petition u/s 55 of the Act was filed by the appellant/applicant on June 30, 1982, i.e. after two months which was time- barred. The High Court considered the first petition filed by the appellant herein before the Registrar, but even that petition was barred by time. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ petition holding that the application filed by the applicant was not within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 55 of the Act. The ld counsel for the respondent-Bank rightly submitted that the plea raised by the appellant has no force. It was submitted that there was no concession by the Bank. Relying on Zimni, the counsel submitted that on July 06, 1993, i.e. the day on which the concession was said to have been made, the Presiding Officer was not present as he was on a tour. No proceeding took place on that day. It was, therefore, factually incorrect to state that a concession was made on behalf of the Bank and it did not object that the application was barred by time. But even otherwise, according to the counsel, if the application was not within the period of li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this Court. Appeal deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... parties. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Tribunal as well as the High Court were wrong in dismissing the claim of the appellant. It was contended that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the appeal filed by the appellant was barred by res judicata. The High Court was, therefore, right in observing that the Tribunal committed an error of law in treating the appeal as barred by res judicata. The High Court, however, went wrong in not allowing the writ petition and in coming to the conclusion that the application filed by the appellant/petitioner under Section 55 of the Act was barred by limitation and the Registrar had no power, authority or jurisdiction to entertain such dispute. The counsel contended that when the matter came up before the Tribunal, it was stated on behalf of the respondent-Bank through its counsel that the application was `within time' and hence, it was decided on merits. Thereafter, it was not open to the Bank to contend that the application was beyond time and delay could not be condoned. 10. The learned counsel submitted that even on merits, the case did not call for punishment of removal. Certain allegations were made a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... financial irregularities, if the appellant was removed from service, it cannot be said that no order of removal could have been passed. The appellant was a Bank employee and holding the office of Manager, a position of trust. It is in the light of the said fact that his case was required to be considered which was done and punishment was imposed. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having applied our mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed. The High Court has not committed any error of law which requires to be interfered with in exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. 15. So far as res judicata is concerned, in our opinion, the appellant is right in submitting that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the application filed by the appellant was barred by res judicata. It is clear from the facts stated hereinabove that the application was filed by the appellant to Joint Registrar, Raipur. It was pending. Meanwhile, however, District Bastar had its own Registry and hence, an application was submitted to District Regis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rding terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society and its employees arises, the officer specified therein will decide such dispute which shall be binding on the society and its employees. The first proviso to sub-section (2) of the said section prohibits the Registrar from entertaining the dispute unless such dispute is presented to him within thirty days from the date of the order impugned. The second proviso declares that in computing the period of limitation, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the order would be excluded. It is thus clear that if an employee, aggrieved by any decision taken by the society intends to approach the Registrar, he must invoke provisions of Section 55 of the Act by filing an application within thirty days from the date of such order or action. 19. In the instant case, admittedly, the order of removal was passed by the Bank against the appellant on April 29, 1982. Even the first petition under Section 55 of the Act was filed by the appellant/applicant on June 30, 1982, i.e. after two months which was time- barred. The High Court considered the first petition filed by the appellant herein before the Registra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t or his agent. 22. We are of the view that the aforesaid provisions do not apply to the case on hand. Apart from the fact that Rule 59 merely lays down procedure of appeals instituted within the period of limitation and provides for removal of defects, neither the provisions relating to appeals nor of revisions apply to the case on hand. 23. In our view, the scheme of the Act is clear. Chapter X of the parent Act which deals with appeals and revisions applies to those cases where orders have been passed by the authorities and officers under the Act and a person is aggrieved by such orders. In the present case, the action is taken not by an authority or officer under the Act but by the respondent-Bank. The appellant, therefore, rightly applied to the Registrar under Section 55 of the Act complaining against such action. The appellant could not have preferred an appeal under the Act either to the Registrar or to the State Tribunal. The provisions of Chapter X of the Act relating to appeals and procedure laid down in Chapter IX of the Rules, therefore, had no application. The first ground in support of the application that it should be treated as within the period of limitation has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (emphasis supplied) 29. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the Court or Authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. 30. As stated earlier, Section 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if "sufficient cause" is shown. In view of this fact, in our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the Bank is well founded that the application submitted by the appellant was barred by time. 31. To us, the High Court was right in observing that the Tribunal was in error in allowing the appeal and dismissing the claim of the appellant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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