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TMI Blog1995 (12) TMI 388X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m by the State Government. As the management was not paying the pay and allowances as per one declared by the State Government, the petitioners had filed an application before 'the Tribunal' and ultimately the Tribunal passed an award to the following effect, when translated: In the result, the application No. 171 of 1991 of the applicants is allowed. Opponent - school is directed to pay difference of salary with necessary increments in the pay-scale of ₹ 1200-2040 as per the resolution dated 25-9-1987 and arrears of salary due to them till date and go on paying regularly pay and allowances by account payee cheque between 1st and 10th of every months. 3. This order of the Tribunal came to be challenged by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by way of writ petition, being Spl. Civil Application No. 11767 of 1994 before this Court. However, the same came to be rejected on 8-3-1995 by this Court (Coram: H.L. Gokhale, J.). Prior to the dismissal of the petition, the present application for contempt was filed and was pending. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, when prayed for stay of that order of this Court, it was agreed by the petitioners that they will not press their contempt app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Primary Education Tribunal (Procedure) Order, 1987, made in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (5) of Section 40-F of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947; (3) The application is barred under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as the proceedings are initiated after the expiry of one year from the date of the order; (4) Even if the alleged act of non-compliance of the award is an act of contempt, then the same is neither wilful nor deliberate as required under Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act; (5) If the contention that the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable is not accepted, then the action under the Act as initiated by the petitioner is bad, inasmuch it contravenes the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and (6) The petition is not supported by any affidavit and the same being in contravention of the Rules framed by this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, the petition cannot be entertained. 9. In view of the fact that there being no specific provision to execute the awards of the Tribunal not only under the Gujarat Primary Education Act, but also qua other Tribunals constituted for educational instit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... medbhikhan Hussainbhai v. Manager, Chandrabhanu Cinema [1986(1)] XXVII(1) GLR 1 (FB) has held that Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act is a Court within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is true that Full Bench judgment is a binding judgment, but when the Supreme Court has now held that Labour Court is not a Court subordinate to High Court within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, that judgment of the Full Bench has not remained a good law in view of the constitutional provisions of Article 141. 12. As no reasons are assigned in Alahar's case (supra) by the Supreme Court, we may venture to assign some reasons for our purpose (which we hope that the Supreme Court will excuse) to accept that judgment, which otherwise also we are bound to accept. 13. Before we appreciate the contention of Learned Counsel Mr. Shah based on Alahar's case, wherein Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act is held to be not a Court subordinate to the High Court as contempted under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it may be noted that the Division Bench of this Court had dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it was pointed out that a true judicial decision pre-supposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involved four requisites: (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law. All these requisites were found present in that case because the Assistant Registrar had almost all the powers which an ordinary civil Court possessed and after considering the evidence he had to come to a conclusion on the evidence adduced and the arguments advanced. Parties could be represented even by legal practitioners. The result was the same as if a decree was pronounced by a Court of law. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad finality and authoritativeness and, therefore, they are judicial pronouncements. The question is whether the judicial pronouncements of Labour Courts under Section 7, Tribunals under Section 7-A, National Tribunals under Section 7-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as I.D. Act for short, though had the trapping of a judicial Tribunal, had finality and authoritativeness? It appears that the Supreme Court had in its view this prime consideration. In view of the provisions of Section 17 and Section 17-A the pronouncements of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under I.D. Act had neither finality nor authoritativeness though they fall within the trappings of the Courts. The Supreme Court has held that Labour Court is not a Court subordinate to the High Court under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act probably as awards of Labour Court under Section 7, Tribunals under Section 7-A and National Tribunals under Section 7-B have neither finality nor authoritativeness inasmuch as they are subject to publication by the appropriate Government . Section 17 of the I.D. Act reads as under: 17. Publication of reports and awards - (1) Every repo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er has been made by the Central Government. (3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under Sub-section (2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under Sub-section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to Sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in Sub-section (2). (4) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (3), as the case may be. From the provisions of Section 17-A, it is clear that despite the judicial pronouncement by the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, power lies with the appropriate Government to reject or modify the same. When the power is lying with the Government to reject or modify the award given ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... propriate Government intervening under the I.D. Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in light of this fact of interference of the appropriate Government, when the award of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal has no finality or authoritativeness, it must have been held to be not a Court subordinate to the High Court. We, therefore, hold that the 'Tribunal' of the educational institutions are Court subordinate to the High Court and 'Tribunal' in the instant case is a Court subordinate to High Court. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to refer this point to a larger Bench, We, therefore, do not deal with the authorities cited by Learned Counsel Mr. Shah to show that single Judge may refer an issue to a larger Bench, if the single Judge is not in agreement with the view taken even by the Division Bench. The authorities are: 1. 1984 GLH 1134 (Jai Ranchhod Bhogilal Sevak v. Thakorlal P. Jumkhawala) 2. AIR 1862 SC 1302 (Food Corpn. of India v. Yadav Engineer and Contractor) 3. (Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand) 4. 1983 GLH 273 (SC) (Somabhai Mathurbhai Patel v. New Shorrock Mills.) 19. Learned Counsel Mr. Shah ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at this Order is provided in view of Sub-section (5) of Section 40-F of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1986. To substantiate his argument, he also relied on Sub-section (6) of Section 40-F of the said Act. Sub-section (5) and Sub-section (6) of Section 40-F reads as under: 40-F. (5) The Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the State Government may by general Order direct. 40-F. (6) The Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (d) such other matters as may be prescribed; and every inquiry or investigation by the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. If one reads the whole of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1986, and in particular Chapter VII-B, which provides for procedure for imposition of penalty ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch specific provision that the Tribunal need not be without any power to enforce its own orders, Clause 14 provides to meet that exigency. Thus, what is not provided by clauses 1 to 13 is tried to be provided by Clause 14. What lacks in clauses 1 to 13 is specific provision for enforcement or execution of orders that may be passed. To make adjudication complete and effective, Clause 14 provides for application of provisions to follow the procedure of Code of Civil Procedure as far as it is applicable. This may also be read to provide for the enforcement or execution of the order as per the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. This is how the Civil Procedure Code is brought in by Clause 14. It will be relevant to refer that where jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide rights and liabilities is conferred by a statute, power to enforce said rights and liabilities must be provided. If it is not provided specifically, it should be impliedly read in, if the same can be read from some of the provisions to make the Code or the Act complete for the purpose of determining and adjudicating finally the issue which came before the Tribunal. It can be said that if a Court has power t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce of such teacher, which are pending in any Civil Court on the date of the commencement of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 (Guj. Order 6 of 1986) shall be transferred to and continued before the Tribunal: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to execution proceedings and appeals arising out of decrees or orders passed by such Court before the commencement of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 (Guj. Order 6 of 1986) and such execution proceedings and appeals shall be decided and disposed of as if the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1986 had not been passed. Sub-section (2) of Section 40G saves the proceedings, which had been initiated and pending prior to coming into operation of the Bombay Primary Education (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1986. Prior to coming into operation of this Act, all the disputes which are referred to under Section 40E, now to be decided by the Tribunal, were decided by the ordinary civil Court under Section 9 of C.P.C. and the decision was a decree or order executable under the provisions of C.P.C. If we do not read Clause 14 to bring in provisions of C.P.C. for th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... granted by the civil Court. Order of the first teacher, whose matter came to be decided by the civil Court, was enforceable by way of execution under C.P.C. and the order in favour of second teacher passed by Tribunal will not be executable, as power to execute is absent as contended by the applicants. Should such anomaly continue? Is it not the duty of the Court to interprete any legislation to make it complete and logical by removing discrimination, if any, arising between two similarly situated persons? Of the two teachers why one can reap the fruits of litigation and other is deprived of saying want of procedure and power? 26. Assume that there is no provision for execution, as contended by the petitioners. Then what is the remedy for the teacher or the management in whose favour the Tribunal has decided the issue? How that relief granted to the petitioner be enforced? If we do not read the Procedure Order to cloth the Tribunal with power and procedure of C.P.C. for the purpose of execution of the order passed by the Tribunal, then only remedy available to the person in whose favour the order is passed is to move this Court by way of writ petition, praying for a writ of mand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that Clause 14 brings in the order the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 except one provided in the Act and Tribunal order and in particular for execution. 28. We are supported in our view that the Tribunal has power to enforce its decision by a judgment in the case of Ex parte Martin reported in 1879 (4) Queen's Bench Division 212. In that case, an application made by the plaintiff to commit the defendant to prison for having disobeyed the injunction was refused on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to commit to prison for disobedience of an injunction. There, Kelly, C.B. has observed as under: Then comes the second question, whether the Court has power to enforce the injunction by commitment to prison. If we looked only at those statutes which conferred upon county Courts express powers of commitment in particular instances, it might be said that the cases ought to be governed by the principle expressio unius exclusio alterius, but it does not rest on those enactments alone. The powers of every inferior Court have been enlarged by Section 89, and the question is whether, according to the natural interpretation of its language, that section does not con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovided that the Tribunal shall have also powers of civil Court for such other matters as may be prescribed. Sub-section (5) of Section 40F provides that the Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the State Government may, by general order, direct and Clause 14 of the Procedure Order provides for the Tribunal to follow the procedure, as far as it is applicable, laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying on this, Mr. Mehta contended that in absence of any specific provision, power to execute cannot be implied. He also relied on a judgment in the case of Grindlays Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal . There, the question was whether the Tribunal is competent to review its order. The question was whether such a power can be read in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court there held: We are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex-parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex-parte award, in fact, amounts to review. The decision in Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyamansinghji, , is distinguistable. It is an authority for the proposition that the power of review is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t Court get it enforced through any agency? Can there be forcible recovery of arrears? In our opinion, 'no'. By not complying with the order, the contemner may go on committing contempt again and again and there would be no end to this process of committing contempt repeatedly. Would it be just and proper for the Court to go on taking action for repeated contempts? In our opinion, 'no' and, therefore, there should be some provision to enforce the same. We may state that this may not be a case if a contemner is an employer like Government, semi-Government or Corporation or like run by Government. 32. Learned Advocate Dr. Sinha, an Intervenor, contended that the Primary Education Act or the Tribunal Act or the Procedure Order does not provide for power to execute the orders. Clause 14 of the Procedure Order reads to the effect that the Tribunal shall in any matter not provided for in this Order, follow the procedure, as far as it is applicable, laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. He emphasises on the words as far as it is applicable. He contended that providing with this Clause is not with a view to clothe the Tribunal with C.P.C. In absence of any so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n, have rendered it convenient and practical, nay, necessary, for the legislatures to have frequent resort to the practice of delegating subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice. The Parliamentary procedure and discussion in getting through a legislative measure in the legislatures usually time-consuming. Again such measures cannot provide for all possible contingencies because one cannot visualise various permutations and combinations of human conduct and behaviour. This explains the necessity for delegated or conditional legislation. Due to the challenge in the complex socioeconomic problems requiring speedy solution the power of delegation has by now as per necessity become a constituent element of legislative power as a whole. The legal position as regards the limitation of this power is, however, no longer in doubt. The delegation of legislative power is permissible only when the legislative policy and principle are adequately laid down and the delegate is only empowered to carry out the subsidiary policy within the guidelines laid down by the legislature. The legislature, it must be borne in mind, cannot abdicate its authority and cannot pass on to some oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the Primary Education Act does not specifically provide for execution of the orders that may be passed by the Tribunal. In view of Sub-section (9) of Section 40F, the Tribunal can decide legality or justification of the orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a teacher of a recognised private primary school. The Tribunal can also while deciding the same direct that the teacher to be reinstated in service or restored to the rank which he held immediately before the reduction in rank by the Manager. This suggests that the Tribunal can equally pass an order of reinstatement with retrospective effect, i.e., from the date of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. In such situation, there will be a claim for past salary. If the same is not paid, what would be the remedy available to the teacher? To ameliorate this situation of the teachers, under Sub-section (5) of Section 40F, Procedure Order is made and Clause 14 provides for Tribunal to follow provisions of Civil Procedure Code in the matters not provided in this Order. If we read Clause 14, it can be said that Cvil Procedure Code, 1908 is made applicable by incorporation. When a statute is incorporated in another ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itution read with Article 311 thereof. (6) The Parliament and the Legislatures also can make a law laying down and regulating the scope and content of the doctrine of reasonable opportunity embodied in Article 311 of the Constituion; but the said law would be subject to judicial review. (7) If a statute could be made by Legislatures within the foregoing permissible limits, the rules made by an authority in exercise of the power conferred thereunder would likewise be efficacious within the said limits. (23) What then is the effect of the said propositions in their application to the provisions of the Police Act and the rules made thereunder? The Police Act of 1861 continues to be good law under the Constitution. Paragraph 477 of the Police Regulations shows that the rules in Chapter XXXII thereof have been framed under Section 7 of the Police Act. Presumably, they were also made by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 46(2) of the Police Act. Under para 479 (a), the Governor's power of punishment with reference to all officers is preserved; that is to say, this provision expressly saves the power of the Governor under Article 310 of the Constitution. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed for the purposes of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to include therein restrictions in respect of the articles specified in Section 8 thereof, including currency notes as well...It is, however, unnecessary to consider this aspect because even if the currency notes are not goods, the restrictions prescribed in Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act cannot be nullified by Section 23A thereof which incorporates Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act.... 37. In these circumstances, we come to the conclusion that Clause 14 of the Procedure Order provides for application of procedure for execution of the order that may be passed by the Tribunal by way of execution provided in C.P.C. 38. In view of our finding that all procedure as far as it is applicable laid down in C.P.C. will apply, we would like to make it clear that after passing the award if the same is not complied with by the respondent, then the petitioner can move the Tribunal again by way of application to execute the same and the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal, utilising its own infrastructure, would be like a Civil Court, which executes its own decree and orders. May be that the Tribunal be burden ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... exercise its power of imposing effective and meaningful conditions even while issuing interim orders to see that the interim orders are complied with. This can and should be done by the Tribunals. We may illustrate as to what can be done by the Tribunal: (a) The Tribunal can direct the opponent to remain present in Court and report compliance of its interim order; (b) The Tribunal can direct that in case the amount is not paid as per the direction by its interim order, the amount shall carry interest at the appropriate rate which in the present day market condition can be between 15 to 21 per cent; (c) The Tribunal can and should indicate that in case there is failure to comply with its order, defence of the opponent may be strcuk off. After giving an opportunity to the opponent, if the opponent fails to show sufficient cause relieving him from the consequences of the non-compliance of the order, its defences may be struck off. Later on, in fit cases on compliance of the order or on any other suitable condition the opponent may be permitted to appear and defend; (d) The Tribunal in appropriate cases can award cost and in given cases, it can be even exemplary costs. Even ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e year from the date of the alleged commission of act of contempt. There is no dispute of the fact that the action is required to be initiated after application of mind to the facts placed before the Court. In the present case, application is filed, stating all the facts alleging that respondents have committed Contempt of Court. This Court on 10-10-1994 ordered to issue notice. Under the Rules framed by this Court, any application filed by a party comes before the Court for admission and if admitted, then for final hearing. At that stage, the Court has to decide whether the matter is fit one to be admitted or not. While considering that aspect, Court applies its mind on the facts stated in the application and the documents annexed thereto. At the stage of admission hearing, again another course is available to the Court to issue notice and call upon the other side. Issuance of notice is not a matter of course. When the Court feels it necessary on reading the papers on application of mind, it may order to issue notice. Therefore, issuance of notice by the Court is only after application of mind by the Court on perusing the facts stated in the petition and the documents, if any, ann ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r from the date of the alleged commission of contempt, but the Court has passed no order thereon before expiry of one year from the said date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred because Court did not apply its mind to the complaint or information within a period of one year. It is this application of mind by the Court which amounts to initiation of proceedings within the meaning of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Emphasis supplied). So, in the instant case, the Court did apply its mind and has ordered to issue notice on 10-10-1994 and this amounts to initiation of proceedings within the meaning and time prescribed under Section 20 of the Act. Thus, we do not find any substance in this contention raised by Mr. Shah. 42. Mr. Shah has further contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, as the case of the petitioners does not fall within the purview of Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which reads as under: Civil Contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of undertaking g ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he order is not a disobedience. Intention to file Special Leave Petition does not absolve the respondents from their duty to comply with the order passed by the Tribunal. It was the duty of the respondents to obtain necessary stay, for which they failed in the High Court before single Judge as well as Division Bench. In absence of such stay, non-compliance amounts to disobedience. Therefore, we hold that noncompliance of the order by the respondents is disobedience. Special Leave Petition is not a right under any statute. A party may or may not file S.L.P. We are, therefore, of the opinion that non-compliance of the order by the respondents is disobedience. 45. Learned Counsel Mr. Shah has relied on the following two Supreme Court judgments to show that there is no wilful disobedience. They are Niaz Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. and Manish Gupta and Ors. v. Gurudas Roy . In the instant case, the Tribunal has held that the petitioners are entitled to the scale fixed by the Government and the difference of scale should be paid as directed in the order. For non-payment of the same, it is alleged that contempt is committed. In the case of Niaz Mohammad (supra), the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nioirty of the petitioner on the basis of continuous lenght of service from 27-5-1969 and confer upon the petitioner all consequential benefits. L.P.A. filed against the said judgment of the learned single Judge was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. It was alleged in that case that one Hrishikesh Roy, who was admittedly junior to the petitioner, was promoted as Upper Division Assistant on the same day when the respondent, i.e., Gurudas Roy was promoted. In view of this fact, in an action for contempt, Supreme Court held that it cannot be held that on circulating the gradation list on 30-1-1990, the appellant has violated the first direction given by the appellate Court. It is further held: 20. We do not propose to go into the question of interpretation of Rule 55(4) of the Rules. But at the same time we cannot say that there is no merit in the submission of Shri Sanghi that in view of the proviso to Rule 55(4), the respondent cannot claim the fixation of his basic pay on the same level as the basic pay drawn by Hrishikesh Roy. In our view, the appellants could reasonably proceed on the basis that in view of the proviso contained in Rule 55(4) of the Rules, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provide free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years, under Article 45 of the Constitution do arise for consideration as related matters to the main controversy. It would, therefore, be appropriate that these matters be heard as regular matters. Accordingly, delay condoned in S.L.P. (CC 27113). We grant leave in all these matters. It would be appropriate that these matters are heard by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges at an early date in view of the significance of these matters. Necessary directions in this behalf be obtained from the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. Question is whether the statement made in the earlier order of 4-8-1994 by Senior Counsel Mr. Haroobhai Mehta that contempt proceedings initiated against the petitioner would not be pursued in the meantime continues or not. Mr. Shah, learned Advocate for the respondents, contended that the same continues. Mr. Haroobhai Mehta contended that the said statement has come to an end. However, If we read two orders i.e., order dated 4-8-1994 and 28-11-1994 of the Supreme Court, it is not clear that that statement of Mr. Haroobhai Mehta, Senior Counsel comes to an end or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rcised the option, the respondents have written a letter to the Department for fixation of the salary and unless the same is carried out, no further action for payment can be made by them. In view of these facts, we are of the opinion that though there is a disobedience on the part of the management, it cannot be said to be a wilful one and, therefore, the case of the petitioners does not fall within the purview of the Contempts of Courts Act. 51. As an alternative argument, Mr. Shah had also contended that if Civil Procedure Code is not made applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal in view of Clause 14 of the Procedure Order, then the proceedings are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as Section 40G (2) read with its proviso creates discrimination between similarly situated persons. This contention is required to be stated for the purpose of its rejection. Respondents have no right to raise this contention, as they are not complying with the Court's order. Secondly, we have dealt with this contention while deciding whether provisions of Civil Procedure Code would be applicable or not and we have held that procedure of Civil Procedure Code ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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