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TMI Blog2008 (1) TMI 216X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... petition. The first respondent was employed as Superintendent of Central Excise at Komarapalayam Range, Erode from 01.5.1995 to 11.7.1996. While discharging his duties as Range Officer, in respect of the monthly returns submitted by P.K.P.N. Spinning Mills Private Limited from July 1995 to February 1996, it was alleged that he failed to issue show cause notice for the short levy of duty required to be paid by the assessee on revision of prices for the sale from the depot and for the goods removed for own use for which the factory gate prices were not available. The first respondent made only an endorsement in the RT 12 Assessment Form for each month and informed the assessee that they were liable to pay differential duty of Rs.27,30,692-. Since the assessee did not pay the differential duty, they were not issued with show cause notice as per the instructions of the Customs and Central Excise Board. It was also alleged that in terms of Rule 173-C(4) of the Central Excise Rules, an obligation is caused on the Assessing Officer (first respondent) and that he did not follow the said rule. The said assessee filed 8 appeals before the Commissioner of Appeals each one for every month a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... igence on his part. Before the CAT, the first respondent also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1999 (7) SCC 409 [ Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others ] to contend that the Government has no right to initiate disciplinary action on an information which is vague and indefinite and that suspension has no role to play in such matter. It was also contended that wrong interpretation of law cannot be a ground for misconduct. In the absence of any deliberate act or any action actuated by mala fides, no such action can be taken. 5. Even before this Court, reliance was placed on the following passage found in paragraphs 40, 42 and 43 of the Nagarkar's case (cited supra) were pressed into service. Para 40: "When we talk of negligence in a quasi-judicial adjudication, it is not negligence perceived as carelessness, inadvertence or omission but as culpable negligence. This is how this Court in State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh interpreted "misconduct" not coming within the purview of mere error in judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of duty. In the case of K.K. Dhawan the allegation was of conferr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ara 42: "Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty." Para 43: "If every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers like the appellant. Since in sum and substance misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet on the face of it does not proceed on any legal premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi-judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in the nature of some extraneous consideration infl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sted six instances when such action could be taken and the relevant passage found in paragraph 28 of the judgment is extracted below: Para 28: "(i) where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great"." 9. In fact, subsequently, K.K. Dhawan's case was to be considered by the Supreme Court in Government of Tamil Nadu v. K.N. Ramamurthy [1997 (7) SCC 101] wherein the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Tribunal in quashing the punishment of an officer, who was discharging judicial function by observing that the order of the Tribunal was contrary t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... harm the judicial system at the grassroot level." But, however, there was no reference to Duli Chand's case in this decision. 13. Once again, another two Judges Bench in Inspector Prem Chand v. Government of NCT of Delhi and others [2007 (4) SCC 566] considered the decision in Nagarkar's case. While referring to Nagarkar's case, the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 observed as follows: Para 15: "A finding of fact was arrived at that the accused did not make demand of any amount from the complainant and thus no case has been made out against him. This Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India has categorically held: "42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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