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TMI Blog2016 (12) TMI 739X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icient in the circumstances, which was possible if Bank details were given (i.e. name of bank branch etc.). Likewise, the ITR form disclosing returns raise more questions than satisfy the queries. They merely show that the share applicants paid paltry amounts as income tax even while claiming to have invested amounts ranging over 8 crores. Clearly, there was no full disclosure of material facts. Thus we are of the opinion that the petitioner is disentitled to relief. The impugned notice is valid. - Decided against assessee X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1/321, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi The premises is a residence of Sh. R.K. Gupta and Sh. Sahil Gupta. 2. Sigma Real Tech P. Ltd. M-20, Dewan House, Ajay Enclave, Subhash Nagar, New Delhi The premises was locked. 3. Spark Computech P. Ltd. M-20, Dewan House, Ajay Enclave, Subhash Nagar, New Delhi The premises was locked. As the above said companies did not exist at their given addresses, the assessee vide question no. 5 of the statement recorded on 06.01.2012 was asked to provide other addresses of the companies, if any, from which it had received share capital. The assessee replied that they do not have any other addresses on record of these companies. From the above, it is clear that the assessee is not able to prove the genuineness of the transactions entered into with companies from whom it has received share capital and the identity and creditworthiness of such companies. From the above, it is clear that the assessee is not able to prove the genuineness of the transactions entered into with companies from whom it has received share capital and the identity, and creditworthiness of such companies and it clearly established that an amount of ₹ 12,35,00,000/- e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elating to it. Learned counsel relied upon the voluminous documents filed which include copies of account information issued to the share applicants/third parties, containing cheque numbers, the ITR forms of the share applicants/third parties etc. and stated that since the AO framed the assessment after being satisfied with regard to the replies to the queries and having regard to the re-assessment notice, there was no question of any material suppression of fact, nor any independent ground constituting valid reasons to believe that could sustain the impugned notice. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in ITO v. M/s. Mewalal Dwarka Prasad 1989 (2) SCC 279; the subsequent judgment in CIT v. Kelvinator of India Limited 2010 (2) SCC 723; Haryana Acrylic Manufacturing Co. v. CIT 2009 (308) ITR 38 (Del); Wel Intertrade Private Limited v. ITO 380 ITR 22. It was urged that the facts in Haryana Acrylic (supra) and Wel Intertrade (supra) are closely similar to the circumstances of the present case. In that, the Court was of the opinion that so long as disclosure of the materials elicited and the replies to the pointed queries were made during the assessment proceed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and stated inter alia that, "Hence, after 1-4-1989, the assessing officer has power to reopen, provided there is" tangible material" to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief". 7. Haryana Acrylic (supra) - on which the petitioner relied upon heavily is instructive in the circumstances of this case. The Court had occasion to consider validity of notice under Section 147 in the context of a reopening of assessment vis-à-vis receipt of share application amounts - much like in the present case. After discussing Kelvinator (supra), the Court held that in the circumstances of that case, the notice was invalid: "In the present case, what is to be seen is whether the petitioner failed to make a full and true disclosure of all the material facts necessary for its assessment for the assessment year 1998-99. Explanation I to section 147 also makes it clear that mere production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could, with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing officer, will not necessarily amount to disclosure wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... #8223; used in clause (a) referred only to primary facts and the duty of the assessee was confined to disclosure of primary facts and he had not to indicate what factual or legal inferences should properly be drawn from the primary facts………….." 9. Likewise in Wel Intertrade (supra), the Court again emphasized that: "…..it must also be established as a fact that such escapement of assessment has been occasioned by either the assessee failing to make a return under section 139, etc., or by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year…….." 10. In the present case, a reading of the reassessment notice brings out two salient aspects - firstly that information was received by the revenue with respect to bogus entries made, resulting in a survey and impounding of certain documents. On the basis of these, certain inferences were sought to be drawn. There cannot be any denial that this clearly amounted to tangible material. Nevertheless, the enquiry would not end there. The question is whether scrutiny by the AO at the time the original ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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