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TMI Blog2017 (2) TMI 562X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roceedings of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Therefore, with due respect, we are of the considered view that the interpretation that any person, not being a borrower, but owner of the property, totally unconnected with the debt, but his property at peril, would fall within the residuary clause (e) of Rule 13(2)(1) of the Rules, relatable to any other person, would not be a proper interpretation to the words, "any person", occurring in Rule 13(2)(1)(e) of the Rules. Indisputably, the writ petitioner has filed an application, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, challenging sale certificate and vide order, dated 14.03.2013, DRT-III, Chennai, has dismissed the same. As stated supra, the contention of the Bank that while preferring an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the writ petitioner has paid the requisite court fee, has not been disputed. We have also extracted the heading, under which, the writ petitioner has pursued his further remedy, under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, which is an appeal. As per Rule 13 of the Rules, 2002, the amount of fee payable to an appeal to the appellate authority, against any order, passed by the DRT, the same has to be accom ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he has been in absolute possession and enjoyment of the land in question. Mutation of revenue records has been done and patta has been issued by the revenue authorities, in original patta No.2930. Since 1991, he was employed in Africa and living there, he used to come to India once in two years. When he came to India, he visited the property on 20.5.2009 and shocked to know that the abovesaid property was auctioned by Indian Bank, Asset Recovery Management Branch, Chennai, the third respondent herein, for certain alleged dues of M/s.Blue Jaggers Estates Ltd. 4. The petitioner has further submitted that the third respondent- Bank, for certain alleged dues of M/s.Blue Jaggers Estates Ltd., had initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the SARFAESI Act") and proposed to auction the entire layout in Harita Enclave in Tambaram. 5. Aggrieved by the auction conducted by the Bank, the petitioner has filed S.A.No.95 of 2009, before Debt Recovery Tribunal-III (In short "DRT"), Chennai, on various grounds. The third respondent Bank has entered appearan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... esides payment of deficit court fee, on or before 3.12.2014. As against the abovesaid order, the present writ petition has been filed. 9. Referring to second proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the said provision obligates only the borrower to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal, 50% of the amount claimed by the secured creditor or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal and not a person, other than the borrower. Reiterating that the petitioner is not a borrower, not claiming any right, under the mortgage, he submitted that DRAT has passed an erroneous order, dated 10.09.2014, on the grounds that a waiver application ought to have been filed. 10. Referring to Rule 13(2)(e) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") and a Hon'ble Division Bench order of this Court in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case of the petitioner would fall under the abovesaid clause, as interpreted by the Hon'ble Divisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e on which such measure had been taken: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal whichever is less: PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty five percent of debt referred to in the second proviso." 14. What is challenged in S.A.No.95 of 2009, is the proceedings initiated by the Bank, against the schedule property, under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, including the sale certificate, dated 13.01.2009, on the grounds, inter alia, that no notice was given to the writ petitioner, under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, including the offer given to oth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce, dated 20.09.2008. Possession was also taken and then issued the Sale Notice, dated 30.09.2008. Applicant is a subsequent purchaser. No where in the application it is specifically stated that the purchase was made with the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. His sale was never brought to the notice of the respondent. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, SARFAESI proceedings initiated by the bank was already challenged by the borrower by way of filing S.A.No.221 of 2007 and the S.A., was also dismissed on merits. Then, Sale Certificate was issued and the property was sold in public auction. No step was specifically challenged by the applicant herein. The relief sought in the applicant is not specific. Under these circumstances, the applicant is not entitled to get any order as prayed for. The mortgage can be enforced and any encumbrance created after the creation of the mortgage will only be subservient to the mortgage. Point is found accordingly." 16. During the course of hearing of the present writ petition, Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly admitted that the Court fee affixed on interim applications, pending disposal of the applica ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act, was filed, the petitioner has paid some court fee. Along with RA(SA)No.49 of 2013, the petitioner has filed I.A.No.442 of 2013, for interim injunction. During the course of the proceedings, when the Bank raised a plea that Court fee has not been paid and that the Tribunal cannot entertain an appeal, vide proceedings, dated 10.09.2014, the appellate Tribunal has ordered as follows: "It is seen that deficit Court fee has to be paid and also the waiver application has to be filed. Therefore, time is given to the appellant to pay the deficit court fee and also the waiver application upto 03.12.2014, failing which, this RA(SA) shall stand automatically dismissed." 19. In the interim application in I.A.No.442 of 2013, the Appellate Tribunal has ordered as follows: "Orders have been passed in RA(SA). Await the outcome of the order" 20. As per Rule 13(1) of the Rules, 2002, every application under sub section (1) of section 17 or an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, under subsection (1) of section 18 shall be accompanied by a fee provided in the sub-rule (2) and such fee may be remitted through a crossed demand draft drawn on a bank or Indian Postal Order in fa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... b-section (1) of section 17 against any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, by the borrower or an aggrieved person, other than the borrower, the amount of fee payable, varies depending upon the amount debt, but if, for any other application by any person, the amount of fee payable is ₹ 200/-, which means that under Section 17 of the Act, there could be a main application and incidental or connected application/s, for any interim prayer. 24. Paragraph 9 of the judgment in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], strongly relied on by Mr.A.V.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner, is extracted hereunder: "9. A perusal of the provisions makes it clear that the expression "debtor" includes guarantor. It is thus obvious that if a debtor or a guarantor is aggrieved by any section under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, he has remedy to file an appeal as contemplated under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, against any such measures as referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is obvious that in such a case borrower or a guarantor is concerned with the entire debt payable to the secu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and his account in respect of such debt is classified as nonperforming asset, then the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge his liabilities within sixty days from the date of the notice with an indication that if he fails to do so, the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of its rights in terms of Section 13(4). Subsection (3) of Section 13 lays down that notice issued under Section 13(2) shall contain details of the amount payable by the borrower as also the details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the bank or financial institution. Sub-section (3-A) of Section 13 lays down that the borrower may make a representation in response to the notice issued under Section 13(2) and challenge the classification of his account as non-performing asset as also the quantum of amount specified in the notice. If the bank or financial institution comes to the conclusion that the representation/ objection of the borrower is not acceptable, then reasons for nonacceptance are required to be communicated within one week. Sub-section (4) of Section 13 specifies various modes which can be adopted by the secured creditor for rec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Section 529-A of the Companies Act, 1956. The second proviso deals with the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act. If the secured creditor of such company opts to realise its security instead of relinquishing the same and proving its debt under Section 529(1) of the Companies Act, then it can retain sale proceeds after depositing the workmen's dues with the liquidator in accordance with Section 529-A. The third proviso requires the liquidator to inform the secured creditor about the dues payable to the workmen in terms of Section 529-A. If the amount payable to the workmen is not certain, then the liquidator has to intimate the estimated amount to the secured creditor. The fourth proviso lays down that in case the secured creditor deposits the estimated amount of the workmen's dues, then such creditor shall be liable to pay the balance of the workmen's dues or entitled to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited with the liquidator. In terms of the fifth proviso, the secured creditor is required to give an undertaking to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ether the measures taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If the Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that the measures taken by the secured creditor are not in consonance with sub-section (4) of Section 13, then it can direct the secured creditor to restore management of the business or possession of the secured assets to the borrower. On the other hand, if the Tribunal finds that the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor can take recourse to one or more of the measures specified in Section 13(4) for recovery of its secured debt. Sub-section (5) of Section 17 prescribes the time-limit of sixty days within which an application made under Section 17 is required to be disposed of. The proviso to this sub-section envisages extension of time, but the outer limit for adju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... per the Oxford Dictionary, is " Used to refer to a person or thing that is different or distinct from one already mentioned or known; additional; alternative of two; those not already mentioned." In Chamber's Dictionary, the word "other" refers to "second; alternate; different; different form or not the same as the one in question (often with than); nor the same; remaining; additional; one of two. In Cambridge Dictionary, the word "other" means, "as well as the thing or person already mentioned; used at the end of a list to show that there are more things, without being exact about what they are; different from the thing or person already mentioned. 30. In the process of interpreting a statute or a provision, it should also be kept in mind that it is the duty of the Court to conceive and perceive the true intention of the Legislature and in the words of Hon'ble Justice G.P.Singh, in his Book, "Interpretation of Statutes", "how far and to what extent each component part of the statute influences the meaning of the other part, would be different in each given case. Let us consider some judgments on the interpretation of statutes, (i) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice." (iv) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R.Das, held as follows: "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction." (v) In Poppat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... licy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct." (x) In Attorney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49, Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained unambiguous, as "unambiguous in context". (xi) In M.Pentiah v. Veeramallappa reported in AIR 1961 SC 1107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to, a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence." (xii) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Ho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry, v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- "The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated." Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:-- "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 11. Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 226 observes t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... qually to both. But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the sense that they can reasonably bear more than one meaning, that is to say, if the words are semantically ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the other provisions of that instrument, the court would be justified in construing the words in a manner which will make the particular provision purposeful. That, in essence is the rule of harmonious construction." (xix) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku.Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in 1981 (2) SCC 585 = AIR 1981 SC 1274, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. (xx) In Philips India Ltd., v. Labour Court reported in 1985 (3) SCC 103, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at Paragraph 15, held as follows: "(15) No cannon of statutory construction is more firmly, established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applica ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... legislate for the sake of legislation, nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an enactment are important, the context is no less important. For instance, "the fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case falling literally within them should be governed by that statute, and the context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning" (see Halsbury, 4th edn. Vol. 44 para 874). (xxii) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1988 SC 1979, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. (xxiii) It is a well settled law of interpretation that "when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, ie., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespectiv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ver the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the laguage of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected." (xx ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest. 19. In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr. [1977 (2) SCC 273] it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation." (xxix) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot rea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute." (xxxiv) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 52 held as follows: "52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the Court construed the expression `prize chit' in Srinivasa [(1980) 4 SCC 507] and we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise-Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907] 13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission - Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678]" (xxxviii) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors., v. A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors. reported in 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that, "6. It is now well settled that a pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s rejection or addition of words and resort to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve the purpose of Act or give purposeful meaning. It is also a cardinal rule of interpretation that words, phrases and sentences are to be given their natural, plain and clear meaning. When the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted in an ordinary sense and no addition or alteration of the words or expressions used is permissible. As observed earlier, the aforesaid enactment was brought in view of the need of leniency in the administration of the Act because a large number of defaults are of technical nature and many defaults occurred because of the complex nature of the provision." (XLI) In Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2014 (3) SCC 92, at Paragraphs 43 and 44, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "43. The court cannot proceed with an assumption that the legislature enacting the statute has committed a mistake and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot go behind the language of the statute so as to add or subtract a word playing the role of a political reformer or of a wise counsel to the legisla ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her, an d it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act…… 28. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause..... 29. …….under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation." 31. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. 32. As per Section 17(1) of the Act, any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures, referred in sub-Section (4) of Section 13, taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer, may make an application, along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. At this juncture, this Court deems it fit to consider, as to how, Courts have interpreted the meaning of the word, "any", in the statutes. (i) In Ashiq Hasan Khan v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Monghyr reported in AIR 1965 Patna 446, a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court, with reference to the word, "any", held as follows: "...it is clear that the use of the expression "any" would be equal to the word "all" in certain contexts and as has been referred to in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Edition, page 150), the word "any" excludes limitation or qualification. Referring to Liddy v. Kennedy, (1871) 5 HL 134, Stroud has quoted the following passage "So, a power in a lease, enabling the lessor to resume possession of any portion of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the context and the subject- matter of the statute". The use of the word `any' in the context it has been used in clause (o) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all." 33. We have noticed that in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], a Hon'ble Division Bench has held that the petitioner therein was an aggrieved person. Therefore, the main condition to be satisfied for preferring an application, under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, is that the applicant must be an aggrieved person. Expression "any person" employed in Section 17(1) of the Act and Rule 13(2) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, can have reference, only to the borrower or guarantor or any person aggrieved or affected by any action taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and that law is not designed, enabling all the persons to challenge the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 34. Therefore, with due respect, we are of the considered view that the interpretation of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.9604 of 2009, dated 01.07.2009 [P.Valmoorthy ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot;any other person". 38. In A.L.Shah v. The Authorised Officer, State Bank of Hyderabad, Pondicherry reported in 2016(2) CTC 593 : 2016 (2) LW 81 : 2016 (2) MLJ 274 : AIR 2016 MAD 98 : 2016 (2) MWN (Civil) 113, the petitioner therein, claiming himself to be the lawful owner of the subject property, filed three applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai, questioning the legality and validity of the notices, issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, by the respondent Bank, on the ground that the second respondent therein had mortgaged the property in question without having legal title over the property in question. 39. In O.S.No.7 of 2006, the leanred III Additional District Judge, Puducherry, vide judgment and decree, dated 19th December, 2014, declared that the petitioner therein, as the absolute owner of the property. Against which, three applications in S.A.Nos.55 to 57 of 2012 were preferred by the petitioner therein and the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai, has considered all the three applications and passed a common order, dated 13th February, 2015, holding that the respondent Bank has initiated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Rule 13(2)(1)(c) and (d) of Rules 2002, depending on the amount of debt due. 44. After considering the rival submissions and taking assistance of the Amicus Curiae, decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tara Chand and others Vs. Gram Panchayat, Jhupa Khurd and others reported in 2012 (13) SCC 269 and Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal reported in 2014 (1) SCC 479, at Paragraphs 26 to 30, in A.L.Shah's case (cited supra), a Hon'ble Division Bench, held as follows: "26 In the case on hand, we are concerned with the fee payable by the petitioner. Indisputably, the petitioner was neither borrower nor guarantor, but any other person under the SARFAESI Act. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act does not distinguish between borrower, guarantor or any other person, who is aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in subsection (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. The proviso to Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act prescribes payment of fee by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. 27 The Central Government, in exercise of its power conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 38 read with sub-sections (4), (10) and (12) of Section 13 of the SA ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the enactment. The Court must examine and give meaning to the said words, in view of the statute of which it is a part, considering the context and the subject of the said statute. (Vide: Shri Balaganesan Metal v. M.N.Shanmugham Chettry & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1668; and Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd., v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune (2003) 3 SCC 506)." 46. In P.Valmoorthy v. Authorized Officer, United Bank of India], rendered on 01.07.2009, the Hon'ble Division Bench, at Paragraph 10, held that, "It is well settled proposition of law that payment of Court Fees being a fiscal measure, the provision would be strictly construed and if there is any scope for any doubt, it should be interpreted in favour of the subject rather than in favour of the state. (See State Of Maharastra V. Mishri Lal ( AIR 1964 S.C., 457; Gujarat State Financial CORPN. V. Natson MFG. Co. (AIR 1978 S.C., 1765)." 47. A.L.Shah's case (cited supra), has been decided on 02.02.2016, by another Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, taking note of the interpretation of the expression "any person", occurring in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and Jagdish Singh's cas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in (2001) 7 SCC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, "13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there." (iii) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held that, "So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) and followed in Jagdish Singh's case (cited supra) and it is also a well settled law that when there is a subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the point of law, the same is binding on this Court and there is no need to follow the judgment of a co-ordinate bench, which had no occasion to consider the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, explaining what, "any person", occurring in Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, means. 51. Yet another reason, as to why, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when there are two decisions, on the point of law, the judgment rendered at a later point of time, proximate and which has considered the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, will prevail over the former. Reference can be made to few decisions, (i) In D.V. Lakshmana Rao Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2001(4) KAR.L.J. 185, the Karantaka High Court has held thus: "It is now well-settled that if there are two conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court, of Benches with equal number of Judges, then the latter will prevail over the earlier. But where the earlier judgment is of a l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in the later case of Mysore State Transport Corporation." (iv) In Vasant Tatoba Hargude and Ors. v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari (AIR 1980 Bom. 341), it is held that in case of conflict between earlier and later decisions of Supreme Court, each consisting of equal number of Judges, later decision prevails. A Full Bench of Karnataka High Court (Five Judge Bench) in Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Company Limited and Anr. (AIR 1980 Karnataka 92), at Paragraph 5, held that- "If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law can not be reconciled and one of them is by a Larger Bench while the other is by a Smaller Bench, it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other Court." 52. Indisputably, the writ petitioner has filed an application, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, challenging sale certificate and vide order, dated 14.03.2013, DRT-III, Chennai, has dismissed the same. As stated supra, the contention of the Bank that while pref ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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