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TMI Blog1971 (4) TMI 22X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... kam, was to enjoy the properties for her life. After Ramathilakam's death, the estate was to devolve on her putra poutrathi santhathi, and in default of such heirs, to her female descendants, and in default of such heirs also, to her husband, Sethu Chetty, and his descendants. Sethu Chettiar died on October 28, 1919, without leaving a male or a female issue through Ramathilakam, Seshammal, wife of Gopalasami Chettiar, died in 1938. On September 10, 1953, Ramathilakam adopted the petitioner, but lived up to November 4, 1962. On the date when the petitioner was adopted, Ramathilakam had a life estate over the properties secured by her as legatee under the will of Gopalasami Chettiar. It is to be stated that the properties held by her on the date of adoption were not the properties of her husband, Sethu Chettiar, over which Sethu Chettiar secured any interest on the properties as on the date of his death. After the death of Ramathilakam on November 4, 1962, after the coming into force of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (Act XXXIV of 1953), the petitioner, as the accountable person under the Act, filed, pursuant to a notice under section 55 of the Act from the appropriate authority, the esta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... santhathi, because, in such a case, it would not be necessary to give the estate to Sethu Chettiar, the husband of Ramathilakam. The indication of the daughters of Ramathilakam as the next line of heirs after the failure of her male issue points to the anxiety of the testator to give the estate after the life of Ramathilakam to the children born of her body. We, therefore, agree with counsel for the respondents that the second defendant as the adopted son of Ramathilakam could not take the bequest under the will. They further went into the question as to the status of the petitioner vis-a-vis his adoptive father, Sethu Chettiar. The observations of the learned judges of the Division Bench in the above appeal are : " Consequently, even though Sethu Chettiar died during the lifetime of his wife, Ramathilakam, he took a vested interest in the bequest which would descend by the law of inheritance as also by reason of the words in the will, giving the estate to Sethu Chettiar and his santhathis ...... This flows from the principle that adoption takes effect from the date of death of the adoptive father even though it is made long after his death. In conclusion, the Bench observed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f limitations then ceased to have effect and another became operative. " In this view of the matter it is to be considered whether the limitations which were apparent before the death of Ramathilakam, did undergo effectively any change thereafter and whether on a comparison between the estate which Ramathilakam had the moment before her death remained unaffected after her death, and whether the petitioner acquired interest in the property only on the moment, after her death. Under section 6 of the Act, the property which the deceased was at the time of his death competent to dispose of shall be deemed to pass on his death. The poser that looms large, therefore, is whether Ramathilakam, at the time of her death, was competent to dispose of the property in question without reference to the petitioner. The normal answer is in the negative, because Ramathilakam, if at all she had any disposing capacity over the property, had only a life interest. Though life interest also can be the subject matter of disposition, yet in the peculiar circumstances of this case, when the petitioner was adopted by her and the adoption is retrospectively effective from the date of death of Sethu Chefttia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s there is a widow, there is always a prospect of an heir to the deceased by a subsequent valid adoption made by her in exercise of an authority given to her by the husband. The result of adoption would be to relate back the vesting of the estate in the adopted son from the date of the death of the deceased. A widow, once she has adopted, has no right to alienate property of her deceased husband as under the Hindu law that property vests in the adopted son. The widow has no disposing power over the property on and from the date of adoption. Therefore, it could not be said that such property is one which the widow was competent to dispose of or had interest therein, and that passed on her death within the meaning of the Estate Duty Act, and is therefore not liable to estate duty." Under similar circumstances, Jaganmohan Reddy C.J., as he then was, in Dwaraka Prasad v. Controller of Estate Duty was considering the question whether the mere act of adoption did amount to a voluntary transfer of property in favour of the adopted son within the meaning of section 9 of the Act. Negativing the contention as posed, the learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Bench, said that by adoption a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oner could gain an interest in the estate in question. One was under the will which was negatived by the Division Bench and the other was by reason of his adoption. Whilst considering the latter aspect it was found that the bequest in his favour, though not as the puthra pouthrathi santhathis of Sethu Chettiar, but as his adopted son, became vested in him the moment the valid adoption was made. As the adoption is not challenged in the instant case and as I am bound by the finding of fact of the Division Bench that such a bequest became vested in him even under the terms of the will, it appears to me that this is not a case where there was a passing of property over which the deceased Ramathilakam had a disposing capacity or property which accrued to the petitioner by reason of the death of the previous holder. A Full Bench of this court in A. Kuppuswamy v. Controller of Estate Duty presided over by my lord, the Chief Justice, makes the position very clear under very similar circumstances. There the learned judges were considering the interest of a widow under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The learned Chief Justice, speaking for the Full Bench, obse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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