TMI Blog1996 (7) TMI 577X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... October 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. When Writ Petition No. 432/95 was posted for hearing on July 17, 1995 before the learned Chief Justice of India and brother Justice S.C. Sen the Solicitor General for India, Shri Dipankar P. Gupta was sent for and the Court directed him to have the averments verified to be correct and directed the petition to be listed after two weeks. On August 7, 1995, the writ petition came before the Bench comprising the learned CJI, Justice S.C. Sen and Justice K.S. Paripoornan. It is not in dispute that the Solicitor General had placed the record before the Court and upon perusal thereof and after hearing the petitioner-in-person, the Bench summarily "dismissed" the writ petition which had triggered the petitioner to file yet another writ petition, this time against the learned Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. The Registry raised objections for its maintainability but, at the insistence of the petitioner, it was posted, with officer objections, for hearing, as unregistered Writ Petition (C) No. D- 17209/95 on January 13, 1996 before a Bench of three learned Judges, viz., Justice J.S. Verma and two of us (Justice N.P. Singh and Justi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e contempt petition. He is required-to file his reply within four weeks to show cause why proceedings for contempt should not be initiated against him. We request the learned Solicitor General to assist the Court in this contempt matter. List the matter after notice of the date fixed by Registry is given to Dr. D.C. Saxena and the Solicitor General." While dismissing the petition, this Court observed in the later part of the order the petitioner's conduct in his persistence to stand by the scandalous averments made against the learned Chief Justice of India. This Court was constrained to initiate contempt proceedings and enlisted 14 instances which would prima facie constitute contumacious conduct of the petitioner to scandalise the Court. In the meanwhile, the petitioner wrote in a newspaper criticising Justice, T.S. Verma. Resultantly, Justice J.S. Verma recluses himself from the Bench. Thus the matter was posted before this Bench. On April 12, 1996, the petitioner filed his reply to the show cause notice styling the same as "preliminary submissions" and reiterated his averments, which, as pointed by this Court, would constitute scandalisation of the Court and y ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al in nature. After their perusal and hearing the petitioner, the Court did not think it necessary to issue directions as sought for. At this stage, we would point out that when Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, as President of Indian National Congress or as the former Prime Minister, was alleged to have used the defence aircrafts, this Court obviously was of the view that the relationship between the two wings of the Government or the political party, i.e., the Indian National Congress is of debtor and creditor and that, therefore, prerogative writ under Article 32 of the Constitution would not lie to enforce contractual dues adjustable as per their practice. The exercise of the power under Article 32 was, therefore obviously thought to be uncalled for. Supreme Court being the highest judicial forum, the need to record reasons is obviated since there is no further appeal against the order of this Court. Recording reasons is not, therefore, necessary nor is called for. The learned Solicitor General, therefore, contended that when the Court dismissed the writ petition, the petitioner, being a professor of English in Chandigarh University, should have exercised restraint and felt duty-bound n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... public good. He stands to gain no personal benefit in the litigation. To the best of his understanding, the petitioner made only relevant allegations based on record and of law with no bad intention. They are valid defences to him. The Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is the legacy of the colonial rule and is ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) . All the contentions raised by him need to be decided by a Constitution Bench since they pose questions of considerable constitutional importance. The petitioner, therefore, has not committed any contempt of the Court. With a view to appreciate the respective contentions and to adjudge whether the petitioner has committed contempt of this Court, it is necessary to extract the relevant portions supplied to him by show cause and his reply thereto and of preliminary submissions and his modified statement as a substitution to the averments made in the second writ petition and the effect thereof. In respect of the averments made in the offending portions of item 1, 3, 5, 9, 13 and 14(a) and (d), the petitioner stood by them. He submitted his modified statement on April 24, 1996 only for the rest of the stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ustice "should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference of the course of justice.", he quoted the above statement of Lord Heward, C.J. Regarding Item 1 referred to hereinbefore; he justified the imputation stating that no person can be a Judge in his own cause directly or indirectly. In spite of his objection, the respondent (CJI) chose to constitute the bench himself as a presiding Judge. According to the petitioner the word "improper", therefore was used in that perspective. With regard to the averments made in Item 3, his reply was that the Court proceedings dated July 17, 1995 recording that the Solicitor General, Shri Dipankar Gupta appeared in his official capacity to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, a private Party, He had stated that even assuming, though not conceding, that he (Solicitor General) was acting as amicus curiae also was not recorded in the Court proceedings. Therefore, his comment that CJI had fabricated false record is fair and an accurate report of the Court proceedings protected under Section 4 of the Act. With regard ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... beat the petitioner, he stated that it would be taken up at the end of the cause list". In his preliminary submissions he has stated that "this is a fair and accurate submission of the Court proceedings on matter which had already been "heard and finally decided", (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). He sought protection to it, as a fair comment, under Section 4 of the Act. He further justified it stating that even the use of the word "browbeat" by the petitioner is a "fair criticism of judicial act" (inverted comma was put by the petitioner himself) to imply that proper hearing was not being granted to the petitioner who had approached the highest Court of the land to "protect and safeguard public property". He justified them as a "statement of truthful facts", for public good should not be construed as disrespect to the Hon'ble Court. After offering justification in his modified statement, he reiterates thus: "The petitioner discerned reluctance on the part of the presiding judge to allow the relief claimed, which was in public interest, and actuated by the desire to "preserve and protest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The act of the Court was not transparent. According to the petitioner, it is a lapse on the part of the Court for which the Court conduct, by implication, was not transparent and the Court must be accountable. Item 6 at page 7 in paragraph 18(c) reads thus: "For causing fabrication of courts proceedings of 7th August, 1995, and not mentioning the fact of appearance of the Solicitor General, would Justice Ahmadi not be liable to prosecution under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code in consonance with the time- honoured maxim, "Be you ever so high, the law is above you ?" (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). In his preliminary submissions, he stated that "Although somewhat unhappily worded, it is one of the substantial questions of law, which needed to be determined by the Constitution Bench of the apex court". According to him, above maxim is one to which this Court has repeatedly stated to have avowed allegiance. In his modified version, he stated thus: "For inaccurate recording of the court proceedings of 7 August, 1995 and not mentioning even the fact of appearance of the Solicitor General for the respondent, wha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Justice of India should not be allowed to take judicial immunity and is liable to criminal prosecution even during his term of office as CJI. Item 8 of the imputation at page 7 in para 18(e) reads thus: "For willfully and advertently violating (emphasis supplied) the fundamental rights of not only the petitioner as an individual, but that of the people of India, who are ultimately sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, has not Justice Ahmadi forfeited any legal protection, even if it were available to him ?" In his preliminary submissions, he has stated that "That first part of the sentence is based on the implicit constitutional provisions and in fact shows that the petitioner/defendant looks upon the apex court as the guardian of his fundamental rights and those of the voiceless millions. The second part raises a constitutional question, which needed determination by an appropriate bench." In the amended version, he reiterated that "for violating the fundamental rights of not only the petitioner, as an individual, but also that of the people of India, who are the ultimate sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion". He attributed that Justice Ahmadi, Chief Justice of India deliberately and willfully failed to perform his fundamental duties by dismissing the first writ petition and stultified the performance of the duty by the petitioner. Thereby Justice Ahmadi "be stripped of his citizenship". He also knew that for exercise of legal or constitutional rights one owes corresponding duties. The person who fails to perform the duty is accountable to the people. CJI willfully, in other words, deliberately with supine indifference dismissed the writ petition. CJI does not get legal protection but also forfeits his citizenship. Imputation 11 at page 8 in paragraph 18(h) reads thus: "For allowing his son who is a practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably misusing official facilities and prestige of office of Chief Justice of India, is not Justice Ahmadi liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, in view of the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami's case ?" In his preliminary submissions, he reiterated that this is a question of law based on information he had received from "public documents&quo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te statement of fact reported therein. We may mention that this imputation has no relevance to the first proceedings. As a fact, the son of Justice Ahmadi is not practising in the Supreme Court. The alleged facility of permitting his son to stay in his official residence bears no relevance to the proceedings. The imputations were obviously off the cup. Imputation 12 made at page 8 in paragraph 18(i) reads thus: "Is Justice Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner in C.W.P. No. 432 of 1995 and the present petition, but also the loss caused to the public exchequer by non-payment of dues with 18% interest by Shri P.V.N. Rao ?" In his preliminary submissions he reiterated it giving further justification thus: "This is the law laid down by this Hon'ble Court in relation to public servants. Whether it is also applicable to holders of constitutional office or not is a substantial question of law, which should have been answered by a Constitution bench." In his modified version he has stated thus: "who would be liable to reimburse the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner by filing C.W.P. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld not function as Chief Justice pending his second writ petition. CJI also should not constitute any benches. That should done by the senior-most puisne Judge. Any Judge appointed to this Court during his tenure as CJI should not hear the case as CJI directly or indirectly would influence them when the case relating to him was dealt with. In other words, his imputation is that Judges appointed to the Supreme Court during the tenure of Justice A.M. Ahmadi as CJI, are amenable to influence in deciding the cases at the behest of the CJI as they owe their appointments to him. In other words, as soon as a writ petition under Article 32 or petition under Article 136 was filed attributing motives or bias to the CJI (it would equally apply to any Judge) he should desist to perform judicial and administrative work. He should proceed on leave till that case is decided. The senior-most puisne Judge should assume the work of the CJI. Imputations in Prayer (b) and (c) read as under: (b) strip the respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) of his citizenship"; and (c) Direct the registration of an FIR against the respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) under the Indian Penal Code for committing forgery ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... il the Matter is decided. On appointment by the President by a warrant and on his taking oath of office, the CJI becomes entitled to discharge the functions and duties of that office including Constitution of benches and assignment of judicial work to judges as per procedure. This responsibility flows from the office and none including a litigant has right to demand for contra position. As regards his personal disposition to hear a case by a bench of which he is a member, it is his own personal volition. The Chief Justice's prerogative to constitute benches and assignment of judicial business would not hinge at the whim of a litigant. The decisions of different benches are the decisions of the Court. For the convenient transaction of business, the senior Judge among the members composing the Bench gets the privilege to preside over the Bench but the decision is that of the Court. The members composing the Bench collectively speak for the Court and would bear collective responsibility for the decision unless separate opinions are expressed by individual members composing the Bench. Majority opinion is the law as envisaged under Article 145(5) of the Constitution. Their opinion ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tends to lower the authority of any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. (Emphasis supplied) It is doubtless that freedom of speech and of expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) is one of the most precious liberties in our secular, socialist republic, freedom of expression is a prized privilege to speak one's open mind although not always in prefect good taste of all institutions. Since it opens up channels of open discussion, the opportunity of speech and expression should be afforded for vigorous advocacy, no less than abstract discussion. This liberty may be regarded as an autonomous and fundamental good and its value gets support from the need to develop our evolving society from unequal past to a vigorous homogeneous egalitarian order in which each gets equality of status and of status and of opportunity; social, economic and political justice with dignity of person so as to build an integrated and united Bharat. Transformation for that strong social restr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... munity and maximizes the source and breeds for more likely revolution. If maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech, society equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech or expression by democratic action. The reason is obvious, viz., that society accepts free speech and expression and also puts limits on the right of the majority. Interest of the people involved in the acts of expression should be looked at not only from the perspective of the speaker but also the place at which he speaks, the scenario, the audience, the reaction of the publication, the purpose of the speech and the place and the forum in which the citizen exercises his freedom of speech and expression. The State has legitimate interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression which liberty represents the limits of the duty of restraint on speech or expression not to utter defamatory or libelous speech or expression. There is a co-relative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. Each is entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has a right to denigrate others right to person or reputation. Therefore, freedom of speech and expression is tolerated so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unsel that law ought to be astute to criticism. Constructive public criticism even if it slightly oversteps its limits thus has fruitful play in preserving democratic health of public institutions. Section 5 of the Act accords protection to such fair criticism and saves from contempt of court. The best way to sustain the dignity and respect for the office of judge is to deserve respect from the public at large by fearlessness and objectivity of the approach to the issues arising for decision, quality of the judgment, restraint, dignity and decorum a judge observes in judicial conduct off and on the bench and rectitude. In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankci 1988 CriLJ 1745 this Court has held that administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e., to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. Thus the judges must do, in the light given to them to determine, what is right. Any criticism about judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the fai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. As stated hereinbefore, they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the Court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary. In E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar 1970 CriLJ 1670 a Bench of three Judge had held that the law of contempt stems from the right of a court to punish, by imprisonment or fine, persons guilty of words or acts which obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them, even if committed outside the courts. Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamounts to contempt. All acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dign ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rotecting either the court as a whole or the individual judges of the court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired. In consequence, the court has regarded with particular seriousness allegations of partiality or bias on the part of a judge or a court. On the other hand, criticism of a judge's conduct or of the conduct of a court, even if strongly worded, is not a contempt provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith, and is not directed to the personal character of a judge or the impartiality of a judge or court. Therefore, it is of necessity to regulate the judicial process free from fouling the fountain of justice to ward off the people from undermining the confidence of the public in the purity of fountain of justice and due administration. Justice thereby remains pure, untainted and unimpeded. The punishment for contempt, therefore, is not for the purpose of protecting or vindicating either the dignity of the court as a whole or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection with office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. Yet defamatory publication concerning the judge as a judge brings the court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to justice and an inroad on majesty of justice. Any caricature of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or majesty of justice. It would, therefore, be scandalising the judge as a judge, in other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a Judge is scandalisation of the court would be contempt of the court. Event imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges the authority of the Court, he interferes with the performance of duties of Judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary into contempt. Section 2(c) of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of justice but also those which have that tendency, that is to say, are likely to produce a particular result. It was held that the likely effect of the words must be seen and they clearly have effect of lowering the prestige of the judges and courts in the eyes of people. Same view was reiterated in Sambu Nath Jha v. Kedar Prasad Sinha [1992]1 SCC573 . As stated earlier, imputation of corrupt or improper motives in judicial conduct would impair the efficacy of judicial dispensation and due protection of the liberties of the citizen or due administration of justice. This paramount public interest is protected by the definition in Section 2(c) of the Act. It is, therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention on the part of the contemnor to interfere with the administration of justice. Making reckless allegations or vilification of the conduct of the court or the judge would be contempt. The question, therefore, to be considered is: whether the imputations referred to hereinbefore have necessary tendency to impinge or tendency to impede the public confidence in the administration of justice or would create disbelief in the efficacy of judicial administration or lower the aut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irtue and is entitled to respectful scrutiny. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness of the judgment; order or sentence with dignified and moderate language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order or sentence. That is alter the event as post-mortem. In Shri Barudakanta Mishra Etc. v. The Registrar of Orissa High Cowl and Anr. Etc. 1974 CriLJ 631, the appellant, a District judge was suspended and a spate of litigation in that behalf had ensued. When an order of suspension was set aside by the Government, in exercise of his power under Article 235 , the High Court further ordered suspension of him pending enquiry of the allegations made against Judges in a memorandum and letters sent to the Governor in a valedictory criticism of the judges in their function on the administration side. When contempt action was initiated, he challenged the jurisdiction of the court and the competency to initiate action for contempt on the specious plea that the acts done by the High Court were on the administration side and were not judicial actions. A three-Judge Bench had negatived the plea and convicted the appellant under Section 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... presenting address to the President praying for the removal of a judge under Article 124(4) of the Constitution in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the Rules made thereunder. In A.M. Bhattacharjee's case on which great reliance was placed by the petitioner emphasising the rectitude on the part of a judge, this Court laid rule for the advocates to adhere to a code of conduct in seeking redressal on the perceived aberration of the conduct of a judge otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 124(4) of the Constitution. The respect for and the dignity of the court thereby was protected from scurrilous attack on the judge or the court. If the forum of the judicial process is allowed to mount scurrilous attack on a judge, the question arises whether the forum of the judicial process of vilification of the judges of imputations to the judges in the pleadings presented to the court would give liberty of freedom of expression to an advocate or a litigant. In the light of the above discussion, we have little doubt to conclude that when an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to conduct himsel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... against the Magistrate before whom he conducted the trial of an accused. His conviction and sentence for contempt was accordingly upheld. In Grillers "Regulation of Lawyers - Problems of Law and Ethics" (Third Edition - 1992) at page 747 it was pointed out that in spite of First Amendment protection of free speech, lawyers who committed contempt of the court were punished by American court even if they were advocating their client's interest at that time. The lawyer's behavior threatens the dignity and authority of the courts was held to constitute contempt of the Court. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India and Anr. 1988 CriLJ 181, in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the advocate indulged in mud-slinging against advocates and this Court. It was held that those allegations were likely to lower the prestige of this Court. This Court accordingly held that he committed contempt in drawing up the petition and directed to initiate proceedings against him for overstepping the limits in particular of self-restraint. It would, thus, be seen that when the first writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as a responsible citizen, the petitioner would have k ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court. Recording of the proceedings by the court generally is not noted by the Court. Is it improper for the Chief Justice to hear the case? Was the dismissal totally unjust and unfair for not recording the reasons? The petitioner obviously with half-baked knowledge in law mixed up the language as "improper for Chief Justice of India to hear it". "Dismissal of the "grouse" of the petitioner was totally unjust, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful, flagrant violation of mandate of Article 14 "Violation of the sacred oath of office" and to "declare Justice A.M. Ahmadi unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India". When these imputations were pointed out to the petitioner by three-Judge Bench presided over by brother Verma, J. while dismissing the second writ petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he had stated that he "stood by" those allegations. He reiterated the same with justification in his preliminary submissions. He has stated that the accusations made were truthful and "carefully" worded. In this backdrop scenario, the effect of these imputations is obviously reckless apart from scandalising this Court, in par ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... conduct recklessly made by the contemnor in the second writ petition. In item 4, the contemnor attributed that Justice Ahmadi "ultimately" dismissed the petition observing that the Government of India was capable of realising dues from Shri Rao (which it had not done in two years) and without recording reasons for dismissing the petition. So much for the vaunted adherence to the twin principles of the "transparency and accountability" . It would be seen that insinuations that emerge from these words in writ petitions together with the phrase that CJI brow boated him ex facie scandalise the Court and tend to lower the authority of the Court. As seen, the insinuations tend to bring the court into contempt in the estimate of the general public and that the court lacked fairness, objectivity and dismissed the writ petition for known reasons. It also tends to interfere with the administration of justice and that the court should give reasons lest the order be believed to be shrouded with suspicion. Therefore, it is ex facie contumacious. The contemnor seeks to justify his averments under Section 4 of the Act as fair and accurate report of the judicial proceedings an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Ex abundanti cautela, Article 19(2) excludes the operation of Article 19(1) when speech or expression is trapped in contempt of court or tends to trench into it. When the contempt of court is committed by a litigant, the freedom of expression being contemptuous become punishable under Article 129 of the Constitution de horse the power under Section 12 of the Act. Item 7 relates to the imputation that the Chief Justice of India gets no judicial protection unlike the President of India for being prosecuted even while Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi holds office as Chief Justice of India and is accordingly liable to prosecution. This bravado not only impinges upon the protection given by Article 124(4) of the Constitution and under relevant provisions of the Protection of Official Act ex facie it is an outrageous tendency to lower the authority of the Court and interference with judicial administration. The assertion of the petitioner that this is a constitutional conundrum required to be decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court highlights contumacious conduct of the contemnor. In item 8 he attributes that this Court "willfully" and "advertently" (emphasis supp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his duties and stultified the performance of fundamental duties by the petitioner. This imputation is the consequence of the dismissal of the first writ petition. Thereby, he seeks stripping of citizenship of Justice Ahmadi, It is an unbelievable outrageous affront to the majesty of justice on the part of the contemnor and scandalisation of this Court. It tends to lower the dignity and authority of the Court and also sows seeds for persons with similar propensity to undermine the authority of the Court or the judiciary as a whole; he crossed all boundaries of recklessness and indulged in wild accusations. He sought justification in his preliminary submissions that it being a question of law, it does not amount to personal imputation or insinuation. In spite of this Court pointing it out to be scandalous, when the second writ petition was dismissed and his persistence that he stood by those allegations, it does not lie in his mouth to contend either in his preliminary submissions or his modified form that the dismissal of the first writ petition amounts to failure to perform fundamental duties by the CJI and, therefore, it would further compound the contempt. In imputation 11, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court respectively. Therefore, when the Constitution prohibits the discussion of the conduct of a Judge, by implication, no one has power to accuse a judge of his misbehavior or incapacity except and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution and the Judges (Inquiry) Act or as per the procedure laid down in Bhattachaijee's case. Irrelevancy of the accusations apart, the prayer for prosecution of the Chief Justice of India under the Prevention of Corruption Act is an assault on majesty of justice, affront to authority of law, the gravest contumacious conduct and scurrilous scandalisation of the court. Item 12 of the accusation relates to the payment of litigation cost incurred by the contemnor in both the writ petitions and the loss said to have been caused to the public exchequer by non- payment by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, from personal pocket of Justice Ahmadi as a Chief Justice for dismissal of the writ petition. He stated in his preliminary submission that when loss was caused by a public servant in his official capacity to the public exchequer due to his dereliction of duty and under the law it was recoverable from pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , in his amended statement, he did not touch upon this aspect of the matter. In other words, as stated earlier, he stood by his averments calculatedly made. His justification that Justice P.N. Bhagwali (as he then was) decided first S.P. Gupta's case when allegations against CBI Chandrachud were made has no application. In a judicial proceedings taken by this Court, the office of the Chief Justice of India was directly involved in appointment of additional Judges or extension of their tenure as additional Judges or their transfer' The Chief Justice of India recluses himself from the Bench; resultantly, the senior-most puisne Judge came to preside over that Bench. Thus, the contemnor has committed the contempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. The question then is: what punishment is to be awarded to the contemnor? As pointed out earlier, the repeated assertions of the petitioner that he has no personal gain in the litigation and was actuated by the public duty and laid the petitions, bear no relevance or a defence. It is already held that in a contempt proceedings, the motive, in other words, the mens rea is not relevant. What would be the effect of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Bar suggested to him that he should modify the offending portions noted in the contempt notice. It would, thus, be seen that he appears to have had consultation with some advocates at the Bar and that he did not retract his steps. He did not tender any unconditional apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from the totality of the facts and circumstances, the gravest magnitude of the contumacious conduct of the contemnor, we are left with no option but to convicted and sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months with a fine of ₹ 2,000 payable in a period of 3 months and in case of default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. The contempt petition is accordingly disposed of. N.P. Singh, J I have the privilege of perusing the judgments of my learned brothers K. Ramaswamy and S.P. Bharucha, JJ. I agree to the conclusions arrived at by them and the sentence imposed against the contemner. S.P. Bharucha , J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment and order proposed by my learned Brother, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy. I agree with the or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o perform fundamental duties and stultifying their performance by the petitioner"; and - for allowing his son who is practising in the Supreme Court to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably misusing official facilities and prestige of office of Chief Justice of India. The alleged contemnor added that during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent "may be advised to proceed on leave, so that he may not directly or indirectly influence any of the judges hearing the matter". The second writ petition came up for admission before a Bench comprised of Verma, J. and two of us (N.P. Singh and S.P. Bharucha, JJ). After hearing the alleged contemnor, the second writ petition was dismissed, the following order being passed: The several averments in the writ petition are scandalous and it is surprising that the petitioner, who is, said to be a Professor in a University, has chosen to draft and file such a writ petition. His understanding of the meaning of Article 32 of the Constitution, is ' to say the least, preposterous. The allegations made are reckless and disclose irresponsibility on the part of the petitioner. This writ petition is whol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Indian Penal Code, in consonance with the time-honoured maxim, "Be you ever so high, the law is above you ? (vii) page 7 Para-18(d) Can Justice Ahmadi be allowed to take shelter behind the cloak of judicial immunity, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, particularly when unlike the President of India, who cannot be impleaded in civil or criminal proceedings" during his terms of office" he enjoys no such constitutional protection ? (viii) Page 7 Para 18(e) For wilfully and advertently violating the fundamental right of not only the petitioner as an individual, but that of the people of India, who are ultimately sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, has not Justice Ahmadi forfeited any legal protection, even it if were available to him ? (ix) Page 8 Para-18(f) What are the legal consequences of the violation of the sacred oath of office by Justice Ahmadi ? (x) Page 8 Para-18(g) For deliberate and wilful failure to perform his fundamental duties and stultifying their performance by the petitioner, should not Justice Ahmadi be stripped of his citizenship, because duties alone can confer the corresponding legal and c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t fused the offices of the prosecutor and the judge and "belongs with the infamous Spanish Inquisition". After his signature at the foot of the written submissions, the alleged contemnor added in hand, "N.B. If some passages seem strident or pungent, the defendant is willing to suitably modify them." The contempt notice came up before this Bench on 15th April, 1996. The following order was then passed: "Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court the Contemnor Dr. D.C. Saxena is present today in person. He has stated that he would modify the offending portions noted show case notice in Item (ii), (vi), (vii), (viii), (x), (xii), (xiii) and wishes to withdraw unconditionally item xiv, paras B and C. The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that even if the Contemnor withdraws or files statement in the modified form what the Court required to do is whether his statements made in the writ petition originally filed constitute contempt of the Court or not and his modification of the above statements would not be of material reliance for consideration. Since the contemnor seeks time to submit the show cause in the modified language which he wishes no place b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... them, by Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, with 18% interest?" In respect of item (xiv), it read: (Prayers) (b) and (c) may kindly be treated as deleted The matter was heard on 2nd May, 1996. The Solicitor General, appearing amicus curiae, suggested at the outset that the alleged contemnor would be advised to take legal counsel before proceeding further, but the suggestion was not heeded. The Solicitor General drew our attention to what has been set out above. He submitted that the averments in the second writ petition were made and remained on the record; they were ex-facie contumacious. The alleged contemnor had sought to delete some of these averments and modify some others but had expressed no regret for what he had already said. Even the modified averments were contumacious. The alleged contemnor submitted that he had the greatest respect for this Court and that he had expressed the same in his reply to the contempt notice. The modifications that he had made indicated his own fallibility, for he had used exaggerated language in the second writ petition. He submitted that the certified copy of the first order in the earlier writ petitions did not indicate that the Solicitor General ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Canada and Alexander al (1976) 65 D.L.R. 608 , a newspaper was held by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories of Canada to have committed contempt for alleging a "cover-up" by court officials, participated in by a Supreme Court judge, to shield a public figure from adverse publicity. In New Zealand solicitor was held by the Court of Appeal to have committed contempt for alleging that in a previous case judges had been guilty of forgery, fabrication of evidence and partiality; in the court's opinion, "there could not be a clearer case of a serious contempt of court." (Re. Wiseman, (1969) NZLR 55). The contempt jurisdiction is not, therefore, to be found in "banana republics" but in democracies that abide by the rule of law. It is intended to uphold the authority and dignity of the courts of law which, on behalf of the State, deliver justice and protect the public confidence that is reposed in them. The contempt notice to the alleged contemnor pursuant to the order of dismissal of the second writ petition was issued in exercise of the power of this Court, recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution, to punish for contempt of itself. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e than some moderation of language. The allegations of fabrication, forgery fraud and inaccurate recording of proceedings are made in respect of a judge in the performance of his judicial function. They are of a most serious character. They are intended to lower the authority of and respect for the court and the office of the judge. Upon the same facts there are allegations in the second writ petition that the respondent violated his oath of office and failed to perform his fundamental duties. The summary dismissal of a writ petition by a judge is not a violation of his oath or fundamental duties; at worst, it might be a judicial error. The dismissal of a writ petition cannot warrant the charge of violation of his oath by a judge; and, in my book, no more serious charge against a judge can be made. What the alleged contemnor conveniently does not mention is that the three learned judges (including the respondent) who constituted the Bench found no merit in the earlier writ petition and dismissed it. The suggestion of the alleged contemnor in paragraph 15 of the second writ petition that the earlier writ petition was dismissed by the respondent suggests that the other two learned j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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