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TMI Blog2018 (1) TMI 566X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any approval from the Board of Approval under Section 9(d) of the said Act. Much was argued on whether there is any inconsistency between the SEZ Act and PNGRB Act, and whether the SEZ Act has an overriding effect over the PNGRB Act or not. It can not be gainsaid that in view of Section 51 of the SEZ Act, the provisions of the said Act would have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. The expression “for the time being in force” would not only include the existing legislations but would also include future legislations. The facilities or services sought to be provided by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2 being not the infrastructure facilities, the Court does not find any inconsistency between the provisions of the said two Acts. The issue whether Clause- 1(g) of Schedule J of the PNGRB Authorisation Regulations, 2008, as amended in 2016, is applicable to the respondent No.1 GAIL or not, also pales into insignificance, in view of the fact that requisite approvals have already been obtained by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 under the SEZ Act for the purpose of laying 8” dia pipeline in question. Ther ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt, considering the urgency in the matter. The Court after hearing the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Mihir Thakore for the petitioner and the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Kamal Trivedi appearing on caveat for the respondent No.1 M/s.GAIL India Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s.GAIL ), had issued the notices to the respondents making them returnable on 1.12.2017 and granted an ad-interim relief restraining the respondent No.1 M/s.GAIL from laying and connecting the 8 Natural Gas Pipeline by tap off from its existing Dahej-Uran Pipeline (DUPL) for supplying gas to the respondent No.2 ONGC Petrol Additions Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s.OPAL ) situated in Special Economic Zone, Dahej (hereinafter referred to as SEZ, Dahej ) till the next date. The said order is continued till this date. The respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL on filing the Civil Application No.15785 of 2017, seeking vacation of the said ad-interim relief, and the parties having completed the pleadings, the Court heard the Special Civil Application for admission at length along with the said Civil Application. FACTUAL MATRIX: 3. The case of the petitioner as stated in the petition is that the petitioner GSPL is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... red into with the respondent No.3, DSL. The petitioner, therefore, wrote a letter on 8.11.2017 (Annexure-E) to the respondent No.3 i.e. the CEO, M/s.DSL, requesting him to reconsider the decision of granting approval to the respondent No.1. The CEO of the respondent No.3, therefore, wrote a letter dated 24.11.2017 (Annexure-F) to the respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL with a copy marked to the respondent No.1 GAIL stating that the Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation Limited (GSPC), being a Co-Developer, it should obtain No Objection Certificate (hereinafter referred to as NOC ) from the GSPC. Thereafter, the petitioner wrote a letter dated 29.11.2017 to the respondent No.1 (Annexure-G), requesting it not to undertake any gas pipeline laying activity without seeking due permission from the Developer M/s.DSL and the Co-Developer GSPL. A similar letter was also written to the respondent no.2 on 29.11.2017 (Annexure-H). The petitioner apprehending that the respondent No.1 M/s.GAIL would make the Tap off and lay the pipeline for transportation of gas to the respondent No.2, filed the present petition on 30.11.2017 seeking afore-stated reliefs. 4. The respondent No.1 GAIL and the respondent No ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r contended that on 31.8.2017, the respondent M/s.GAIL had sought permission from the respondent No.3 M/s.DSL for laying 8 dia pipeline by Tap off from the existing respondent s DUPL 30 dia natural gas pipeline to M/s.OPAL across GIDC/SEZ area in existing Right of Use (ROU) of the respondent (Annexure-R/6). Accordingly, on 29.9.2017 the respondent No.3 had granted, in principle, approval to the respondent No.1 (Annexure-R/7). Thereafter, on 11.10.2017 the respondent No.4 - Approval Committee in its meeting decided to approve the said request of the respondent No.1 vide Item No.76.4.1. On 27.10.2017, the Development Commissioner of M/s.DSL wrote a letter to the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.2, stating that the Approval Committee in its meeting held on 11.10.2017 had decided to approve the said request. Despite the said permission and approval granted by the respondent Nos.3 and 4, the respondent No.3 M/s.DSL wrote a letter dated 24.11.2017 asking the respondent No.1 to seek NOC from the GSPC, who had no locus in the entire matter. The said letter was dispatched on 27.11.2017 and delivered at 1.30 p.m., on 29.11.2017. The petitioner, on 29.11.2017 wrote a letter to the resp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ating Tap off would not fall within the definition of infrastructure facilities contained in Section 2(p) of the SEZ Act. The facility sought to be provided by the respondent No.1 is relatable to Section 14(1) of the said Act as the respondent No.1 would be supplying gas only to the respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL and not to the entire SEZ, and therefore, there was no necessity to obtain approval from the Board. Lastly, it is contended that the action of the petitioner tantamounted to monopolistic and restrictive trade practice, defeating the purpose of SEZ Act and PNGRB Act. 7. The respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL has also filed detailed affidavit-in-reply raising number of issues and placing on record voluminous correspondences that had ensued between the parties through E-mails and letters, to show as to how the petitioner had suppressed material facts from the Court. Mainly it has been contended that the respondent No.2 is a joint venture company promoted by M/s.Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and co-Promoted by M/s.GAIL i.e. the respondent No.1, and Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (GSPC). The respondent No.2 OPAL has set up their grass root mega petrochemical project of nationa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ting reasons of being overbooked, as per the E-mail dated 13.10.2016. According to the respondent No.2, it had made several requests time and again for additional capacity, however, the petitioner had refused to provide the same. Lastly, it was refused by the petitioner as per the E-mail dated 24.4.2017. All the communications through E-mails have been produced on record by the respondent No.2 as Annexure-R/II (colly). 8. Thus, according to the respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL, the petitioner GSPL had failed to provide the transmission capacity as demanded by M/s.OPAL in terms of Clause 5.2 of GTA and thereby had created a situation for the M/s.OPAL either to close down the unit or to explore other source for booking capacity as advised by GSPL to meet with its energy requirement of gas supply. M/s.OPAL, therefore, had identified already existing 30 dia DUPL natural gas pipeline of the respondent No.1 M/s.GAIL, passing from the M/s.OPAL Plant and had decided to procure its additional requirement of gas by booking gas transmission capacity from the said existing DUPL pipeline by laying 8 dia pipeline for 0.25 meters to its plant. According to the respondent No.2, the respondent No.1 M/ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he petitioner in the petition and had created a mirage urgency for filing the petition at the eleventh hour when almost entire work of laying pipeline was already completed by M/s.GAIL, which had started in the month of October, 2017. The respondent No.2 has also alleged other various suppression of material facts as stated in the reply. According to the respondent No.2, the provisions of SEZ Act were misinterpreted by the petitioner and the Approval Committee having validly approved the request of M/s.OPAL and M/s.GAIL, there was no need to obtain any approval from the Board of Approval, the laying of pipeline being not to create infrastructure facility in the SEZ as contemplated in Section 2(p) of the SEZ Act. There was also an arbitration Clause contained in the GTA/Co-Developer Agreement executed between the parties, and therefore, alternative remedy being available to the petitioner, the petition deserved to be dismissed. 11. The respondent No.3 has filed affidavit-inreply in cursory manner without dealing with any of the issues raised in the petition or the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the other respondents. The petitioner GSPL has filed the affidavit-in-rejoinder to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stand the issue in better manner. 13. According to the petitioner, to overcome the issue of lower pressure at the delivery point, the petitioner GSPL had requested Petronet LNG Ltd (PLL) to provide separate header to GSPL at the PLL, Dahej terminal and accordingly separate header has been provided in September 2017, and therefore, the supply pressure issues are not likely to arise now. It is also stated that the spur-line laid by the petitioner for the supply of gas to M/s.OPAL is capable of transporting 3.4 MMSCMD gas volumes and now the petitioner GSPL is in a position to supply and meet with all the gas volume requirements of M/s.OPAL. While denying the claim of M/s.OPAL that the GSPL had not met with the M/s.OPAL s requirement of gas transportation, it has been stated that during the period from 1.2.2017 to 30.11.2017 on a average 1.43 MMSCMD was transported to M/s.OPAL. To meet with the balance requirement, M/s.OPAL used to invite tenders for short term gas supply on delivered basis, and used to enter into Delivered Contracts with the supplier of Gas. Relying upon Clause 4.5 of the land lease agreement dated 27.12.2011 entered into between M/s.OPAL and M/s.DSL, it ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to the matters enlisted in Subsection (2) thereof and the present dispute can not fall within any of the matters contained therein. Even otherwise, existence of alternative remedy could not be said to be an absolute bar against preferring writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Supreme Court in case of Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Officer, Companies District and Anr., reported in AIR 1961 SC 372 and in case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar o Trade Marks, Mumbai, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 15.2 As regards suppression of material facts it has been submitted that all the relevant facts for challenging the decision of the approval committee were disclosed in the petition. The GTA entered into between the respondent No.2 and the petitioner was produced by the petitioner upon the observation made by the Court that the GTA should have been filed by the petitioner. Though GTA would throw light on the contractual relationship between the petitioner and the respondent No.2, it was not necessary for deciding the core issue raised by the petitioner in the petition. The communications re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... referred to as the Regulations 2008), the schedule-J thereof does not apply to the respondent No.1. 15.6 Under the GTA, the petitioner has executed various capacity tranches from time to time, according to which the respondent No.2 has the obligation to supply gas at entry point at PLL-Dahej terminal at a particular pressure range, which the respondent No.2 had failed to provide at the said pressure. The meaning of alternative arrangement referred to in the E-mail dated 12.10.2016 was to off take gas at different entry points and the same was understood to be so by the respondent No.2. The additional capacity could also have been booked from Hazira L T terminal but the same was never sought from that source by the respondent No.2. 15.7 Denying the allegations of monopolistic and restrictive trade practice, it has been submitted that the petitioner is booking capacity in its pipeline on non-discriminatory basis as per the provision of PNGRB Regulations. However, there were pressure issues due to which the petitioner could not book additional capacity for the respondent No.2. The entities, who had already booked capacities in the petitioner s pipeline were in a position to t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rtaken in October-November, 2017, however, the petitioner approached the Court after a long time and that too, seeking hearing on urgent basis at the eleventh hour on 13.11.2017. f approached the Court with clean hands and had suppressed gas transmission agreement between itself and M/s.OPAL, NOC dated 12.10.2016, the in-principle approval granted by the respondent No.3 on 29.9.2017 and other correspondences. The conduct of the petitioner in trying to promote its holding company GSPC for supply of gas and seeking monopoly for transmission and supply of gas itself dis-entitles the petitioner from claiming any relief. The letter dated 24.11.2017 issued by the CEO of DSL was received by M/s.GAIL on 29.11.2017 and on the same day, the petitioner wrote a letter dated 29.11.2017 refusing NOC to M/s.GAIL, though the letter dated 24.11.2017 was not addressed to the petitioner and though no such NOC was sought by M/s.GAIL or M/s.OPAL from the petitioner, which smacked of mala fide intention of the petitioner. 16.3 The petitioner had waived its rights in the light of the fact that in May 2016 and February 2017 using GSPC pipeline infrastructure, M/s.GAIL had supplied natural gas to M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9 (Annexure-B) granting approval to the agreement dated 27.7.2009 conferring exclusivity in favour of the petitioner in the matter of providing gas transmission pipeline infrastructure would not make the said agreement statutory one. 16.7 The power to grant approval dated 1.10.2017 by the Approval Committee to M/s.GAIL and communicated by the Development Commissioner vide the communication dated 27.10.2017 could be traced to Section 14(1)(c) of the SEZ Act, or at the best an administrative decision of the approval committee. Such decision could not be said to be without jurisdiction. 16.8 Alternatively, it has been submitted that the requirement of obtaining NOC from petitioner was beyond the purview of the said Act and once DSL having given the permission, the CEO, DSL had no power to issue letter dated 24.11.2017. Invoking the principles of interim relief, it has been submitted that the respondent M/s.GAIL has spent huge amount of ₹ 20 crore for various works for laying down 25 mtr long pipeline for the purpose of supplying/selling gas to M/s.OPAL and therefore, apart from prima facie case being in favour of M/s.GAIL, balance of convenience is also in favour of M/s. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... how the petitioner had tried to use monopolistic structure against M/s.OPAL by not confirming the transmission through its network on firm basis. 17.3 Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 , it was sought to be submitted that the words means and includes used in definition clause gives hard and fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned. Hence, the definition of infrastructure facilities as contained in Section 2(p) read with Rule 2(1)(s) is required to be construed strictly. In the instant case, the pipeline is laid by M/s.GAIL to provide gas only to M/s.OPAL and to no other units, and therefore, could not be said to have created infrastructure facility for SEZ. 17.4 As gas is raw-material required for the M/s.OPAL s plant, the power to grant approval for import and to monitor the utilization of gas and services or warehousing or trading in SEZ, would be with the Approval Committee under Section 14(a) and (c) of the SEZ Act. Hence, approval granted by the Approval Committee in its meeting held on 11.10.2017 was within its powers and agenda. 17.5 All manufacturing u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ( p) infrastructure facilities means industrial, commercial or social infrastructure or other facilities necessary for the development of a Special Economic Zone or such other facilities which may be prescribed; Section 3 pertains to the procedure for making proposal to establish Special Economic Zone. Subsections (11) and (12) thereof read as under: ( 11) Any person who, or a State Government which, intends to provide any infrastructure facilities in the identified area referred to in subsection (2) to (4), or undertake any authorised operation may, after entering into an agreement with the Developer referred to in subsection (10), make a proposal for the same to the Board for its approval and the provisions of subsection (5) and subsections (7) to (10) shall, as far as may be, apply to the said proposal made by such person or State Government. ( 12) Every person or a State Government referred to in subsection (11), whose proposal has been approved by the Board and who, or which, has been granted letter of approval by the Central Government, shall be considered as a CoDeveloper of the Special Economic Zone. Section 8 pertains to constitution of B ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... telecommunication, data transmission network, information technology network, hospitals, hotels, educational institutions, leisure, recreational and entertainment facilities, residential and business complex, water supply, including desalination plant, sanitation facility; 20. It is beyond any cavil that the provisions of the statute must receive strict interpretation and that scrupulous compliance thereof is imperative. However, before appreciating the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties in the light of the provisions of the SEZ Act and PNGRB Act, the conduct of the petitioner GSPL before and after approaching this Court needs to be highlighted. It can not be gainsaid that the writ jurisdiction is an extraordinary equitable jurisdiction. It is a rule of equity as well as of law that a suppresio veri is equivalent to a suggestio falsi. Suppression of truth is the suggestion of what is false. The first and foremost preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocates for the respondents is that the petition was filed with oblique motive and ulterior purpose suppressing material facts from the Court. According to them, the petitioner had not disclose ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctive affidavits-in-reply in detail, raising various contentions, including the contention that the petition suffered from the vice of suppression of material facts. The petitioner thereafter filed three affidavits-in-rejoinder one after the other, from which it has been found by the Court that the petitioner had not made true and correct disclosure of material facts and suppressed very relevant and important documents and the correspondences that had ensued between the parties, more particularly with the respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL with regard to the subject matter of the petition. 22. It is pertinent to note that though the petitioner had entered into Gas transmission agreement with the respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL on 12.8.2014 agreeing to make necessary arrangements for transportation of gas for the respondent No.2 M/s.OPAL from time to time, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein, and had also entered into various capacity tranches under the said agreement from time to time, and had entered into number of correspondences with the respondent No.2 through E-mails and letters with regard to the transportation of the additional supply and also lastly entered into the GTA ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. 34. The object underlying the above principle has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in R v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136], in the following words: It has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should made a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it. The Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside, any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement . 35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent. 46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 38 the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the Court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said: 21. The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. 1. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rea being an infrastructure facility within the meaning of Section 2(p) of SEZ Act, the necessary permission was required to be obtained by the GAIL from the Board of approval constituted under Section 8, and that the approval granted by the Approval Committee constituted under Section 13 was dehors the provisions of the said Act. The said submission made by Mr. Thkore though sounds very attractive and impressive, on the close reading of the provisions of the Act, the Court does not find any substance in the same. 4. It is significant to note that Section 3 of the said Act pertains to the procedure for making proposal to establish Special Economic Zone. Sub-section (11) thereof provides inter alia that any person, who, or a State Government, which intends to provide any infrastructure facility in the identified area referred to in Sub-section (2) to (4) or undertake any authorized operation made, after entering into an agreement with the developer referred to in Sub-section (10) make a proposal for the same to the Board for its approval. As per Sub-section (12) thereof, the person whose proposal has been approved by the Board and who has been granted letter of approval by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the provisions of a statute. In the field of interpretation of statutes, the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof with a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. It may not be correct to say that a word or words used in a statute are either unnecessary or without any purpose to serve, unless there are compelling reasons to say so looking to the scheme of the statute and having regard to the object and purpose sought to be achieved by it. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Bank Ltd. Vikas vs. Shri Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. [JT 2002 (1) SC 182] while interpreting and considering the effect of proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in para 13 observed:(SCC pp. 25253) 13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b) as can be seen from its very unambiguous and clear language, is mandatory........... Taking a contrary view that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by an employer in contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso does not render such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very purpose of the proviso and it b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any doubt in the matter of interpreting the proviso, the Ordinance that has been promulgated on 27th February, 2001, called the Maharashtra Ordinance No. X of 2001, after the first proviso to subsection (3), a second proviso had been inserted, has removed any doubt or controversy in as much as it has been indicated therein that the first proviso will not apply to the member society which has invested any part of its fund in the share of the federal society before the commencement of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2000 dated 20th August, 2000. The aforesaid Ordinance also has been given a retrospective effect, to be effective from 23rd August, 2000. The Ordinance having been held to be valid by us as stated above, the socalled prohibition contained in the first proviso to subsection (3) of Section 27 will not apply to all those societies which have already become members of the federal society prior to 2382000. 7. In the light of afore-stated proposition of law, the words necessary for the development of a Special Economic Zone contained in Section 2(p), and the words needed for development, operation and maintenance of a Special Economic Zone conta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... missioner vide letter dated 27.10.2017 is required to be construed as the approval granted in respect of the matter contained in Section 14(1)(c) read with Section 12(2) of the Act. The respondent No.3 DSL had also granted in-principle approval to the respondent No.1 as per the letter dated 29.9.2017. The petitioner itself while raising objection against such approval in its letter dated 8.11.2017 had not contended that such facility being infrastructure facility, the respondent No.1 GAIL would be required to obtain approval from the Board of Approval, or that the Approval Committee had no such powers to grant approval. Such contention has been raised for the first time in the petition, which is thoroughly misconceived. 10. Placing heavy reliance on the Dahej, Co- Developer agreement dated 27.7.2009 (Annexure-A) entered into by and in between Ms.DSL and GSPL, the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Thakore would submit that the petitioner had sole and exclusive right with respect to the development, operation and maintenance of gas transmission pipeline infrastructure and distribution of gas in the SEZ. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the said agreement was entered into between ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ommissioner who, in turn, had put up the proposal before the approval committee, and the said committee in its 76th meeting held on 11.10.2017 had decided to approve the said proposal. 13. It further transpires that the petitioner after having come to know about the said approval granted by the approval Committee had raised objection by writing letter dated 8.11.2017 (Annexure-E) to the CEO of the respondent No.3 DSL. The petitioner in the said letter had referred to the Co-Developer agreement executed with Dahej SEZ and stated that the GSPL was entrusted with the sole responsibility to develop, operate and maintain complete natural gas infrastructure facilities in Dahej SEZ, and therefore, the decision to approve the proposal of M/s.GAIL and M/s.OPAL for development of natural gas pipeline for M/s.OPAL was required to be reconsidered. From the said letter, it clearly emerges that the petitioner was aware at least on 8.11.2017 about approval granted by the Approval Committee and, about the in-principle approval granted by the respondent No.3, and if it was so aggrieved, could have approached the Court, but it did not. It is further interesting to note that the CEO of the respond ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Court had directed the CEO of DSL to remain personally present with his affidavit explaining the situation. On his remaining present before the Court, a specific query was put by the Court as to what was the need for issuing the letter dated 24.11.2017 when the respondent No.3 DSL had already granted, the in- principle approval on 29.9.2017, and the approval committee had also granted approval on 11.10.2017, the CEO of the respondent No.3 was not in a position to answer the said query. The said conduct of the CEU has been recorded by the Court in the order dated 13.12.2017. 14. From the afore-stated conduct of the petitioner and the CEO of the respondent No.3 it clearly transpires that the said letters dated 24.11.2017 issued by the CEO of the respondent No.3 and the letters dated 29.11.2017 issued by the petitioner refusing to grant NOC were prepared in collusion with each other to create an artificial urgency in the matter, to file petition on 30.11.2017, though the petitioner was aware about the granting of approval by the respondent No.3 DSL and by the Approval Committee as back as on 8.11.2017, and though the work of laying 25 mtr., pipeline was already started by the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the PNGRB Act, has framed and amended the Regulations from time to time, and has amended latest as per the Amendment Regulations,2016. The learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Thakore though relied upon the provisions of both the Acts, had failed to point out any inconsistent provision contained in the PNGRB Act, which would get overridden by the SEZ Act. According to him, the respondent No.1GAIL could not be said to have an unfettered right to lay pipelines for the supply of gas in any part of the country, and that its rights and obligations are subject to the SEZ Act, if the area falls under the SEZ. There can not be any disagreement to the said proposition, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and in view of the afore-discussed legal position, the facilities or services sought to be provided by the respondent No.1 to the respondent No.2 being not the infrastructure facilities, the Court does not find any inconsistency between the provisions of the said two Acts. The issue whether Clause- 1(g) of Schedule J of the PNGRB Authorisation Regulations, 2008, as amended in 2016, is applicable to the respondent No.1 GAIL or not, also pales into insignificance, in view of the fact that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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