9911796707
TMI Blog1998 (11) TMI 689X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r the lessee of minor mineral has finished his operations. 2. Avtar Singh was issued a show cause notice dated 10th March 1983 requiring him to remedy the breaches mentioned in the show cause notice within 60 days from the receipt of the notice and report compliance to the State Government. The said show cause notice was issued under Rule 27(5) read with clause 2 of Part IX of the lease deed. This notice also stipulated that in case the lessee fails to remedy the breaches within the stipulated period the State Government will determine the lease and forfeit the whole of the security deposited by the lessee. According to this notice Avtar Singh had been advised by Director of Industries, Haryana by Memo dated 10th February 1982 and again by Memo dated 27th May 1982 to install boundary pillars in the leased area and submit monthly production reports regularly and to ensure that payments slips were issued from the proper books of accounts maintained in Lessee's mining office but the lessee had failed to do so; a joint inspection of the area under the lease was carried out by the officers of the Directorate General of Mines safety and the General Manager DC, Faridabad, Governmen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tter to Supreme Court by filing the Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1017/85 under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The said SLP was, however, dismissed on 19th February 1985. 7. A review petition was then filed by Avtar Singh which was dismissed as not maintainable by the Central Government. 8. After the dismissal of review petition C.W. No. 1485/85 was filed in this Court by Avtar Singh which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to him to file a fresh petition. Thereafter, the writ petition (C.W.P. No. 2566/85) out of which the present appeals have arisen was filed by Avtar Singh impleading Union of India and State of Haryana as respondents. 9. Sahi Ram made an application for being impleaded as a party in C.W.P. No. 2566/85, inter alia, pleading that after determination of the mining lease of Avtar Singh he had applied for grant of mining lease of the said area and the same was granted to him on 31 st October 1985 for 3 years and possession had been handed over to him on 11th November 1985 by State of Haryana. The lease of Sahi Ram had also been terminated on 14th July 1986 under Section 4A of the Act but possession was restored to him by the State Governm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he whole or part of the security deposit.' 14. It is correct that there is no statutory requirement of granting opportunity of personal hearing on the language of aforesaid Rule. However, for the proposition that on the facts and circumstances of the case grant of personal hearing is necessary and the same having not been granted principles of natural justice and fair play have been violated thus invalidating the termination of the lease, reliance has been placed on the decision of Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ram Krishan, [1988]3SCR1015 , Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India , [1990]1SCR983 and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dharamvir v. Union of India, AIR1989Delhi227 and various other decisions. In these cases the question involved was regarding the premature termination of the lease under Section 4A of the Act. It further appears that the Act was amended in 1986 and Subsection (3) to Section 4A was inserted thereby incorporating statutory requirement of grant of a reasonable opportunity of being heard before making an order for premature termination of a prospective license or mining lease. A mining lease can be terminated premature ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e before passing an order, there are strong reasons for grant of such an opportunity before taking action for determination of lease in exercise of power under Rule 27(5). The Full Bench decision of Punjab High Court in the case of Bhikhan Bobla v. The Punjab State has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Applying the ratio of Supreme Court's decision in Ram Krishan's case, it has to be held that grant of an opportunity of hearing before determination of lease under Rule 27(5) is necessary. The decision in the case of M/s. Shrikrishnadas Tikara v. State of M.P. AIR1977SC1691 has also no applicability to the present case. The observations made in para 8 of the cited decision relied upon by Mr. Kathuria to the effect that the failure to personally hear the petitioner does not amount to contravention of the canon of natural justice, have been taken out of context. In fact, the said decision does not advance the case of the appellant on the question of grant of an opportunity of personal hearing. If at all the said decision supports the view taken by the learned single Judge regarding the necessity to grant an opportunity of oral hearing. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ave been challenged by filing the writ petition which was incompetent and not maintainable. On detailed examination of various decisions of the Supreme Court, the objection about maintainability of the writ petition on this score was rejected by learned single Judge. We do not find any infirmity in the approach of learned single Judge. There can be various reasons for dismissal of a special leave petition under Article 136. The question stands squarely settled by Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 SC 1780. Reversing the decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court on the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of dismissal of the special leave petition by a non speaking order, the Supreme Court observed that (at page 1781):-- We are clearly of opinion that the view taken by the High Court was not right and that the High Court should have gone into the merits of the writ petition without dismissing it on the preliminary ground. As observed by this Court in Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust (1978)IILLJ161SC , the effect of a non speaking order of dismis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to restrict the intake of fresh cases by strictly following the criteria aforementioned, it has very often been the practice of this Court to grant special leave in cases where the party cannot claim effective relief by approaching the concerned High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases also the special leave petitions are quite often dismissed only by passing a non speaking order especially in view of the rulings already given by this Court in the two decisions afore cited, that such dismissal of the special leave petition will not preclude the party from moving the High Court for seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases it would work extreme hardship and injustice if the High Court were to close its doors to the petitioner and refuse him relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the sole ground of dismissal of the special leave petition. 19. In view of the aforesaid, the dismissal by Supreme Court of special leave petition by a non speaking order could not operate as a bar against the respondent in filing the writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the State of Haryana, howev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Article 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in liming and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar; if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches or that he had an alternative remedy it would not be a bar, except in cases which we have already indicated. If the petition is dismissed in liming without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in liming even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all; but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
