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TMI Blog1985 (12) TMI 365X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nce has been necessitated by a frontal challenge to the correctness of the recent Division Bench judgment in Keshri Mal Jain v. State of Bihar, AIR 1985 Pat 114. 2. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the facts herein are similar and the issues of law virtually identical. The matrix of relevant facts giving rise to the pristinely legal questions aforesaid may be noticed with brevity from C.WJ.C. 472 of 1985(R) (The Tata Iron Steel Company Limited and another v. State of Bihar) despite the large volume of pleadings on the record. 3. The 1st petitioner-Messrs Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited -- owns and is possessed of various captive mines in the districts of Hazaribagh and Dhanbad meant primarily for the consumption of its well-known steel factory in the town of Jamshedpur. These coal-mines and collieries are commonly known as West Bokaro Collieries and there are two coal washeries belonging to the petitioner company, which are part and parcel of the aforementioned West Bokaro Collieries. The history of the original lease in favour of Messrs Bokaro and Ramgarh Ltd. is traced to a grant in 1946 by Maharaja Kamakhya Narain Singh of Ramgarh. Subsequently there w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itioner. It is claimed that the leases executed or sought to be executed in favour of respondents 5 and 6 are mining leases in contravention of the statutory provisions and in any case the State of Bihar has no claim over the same. Equally, it is averred that the collection and removal of slurry from the river bed or raiyati land would amount to winning a mineral and thus constitute a mining operation and, therefore, the leases in favour of the private party respondents would be mining leases. Without prejudice to other claims, it is stated that the petitioners are ready and willing to take settlement of surface lands from the State of Bihar and grievance is made that notice should have been given to them before entertaining the applications filed by respondents 5 and 6. It is averred that the approval for the grant of mining leases in favour of respondents 5 and 6 is wholly illegal, without jurisdiction, arbitrary and unconstitutional. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 4 the basic stand is that the writ petition is based on a misconception of facts as well as law and the petitioner company has no locus standi to file this writ petition in respect o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nical language from the virtually admitted pleadings of the parties. In the coal washery the raw coal mined from the colliery is first brought and broken into graded pieces and thereafter undergoes a wide variety of processes with the principal object of reducing its ash content to the minimum. In the west Bokaro Coal Washery this chemical process, on the petitioners' own showing, is what is called the froth floatation process . This, inter alia, involves that the graded coal is mixed with the diesel oil, pine oil and many other chemical ingredients and is thereafter washed with lacs of gallons of water. The end product is the washed coal with minimal reduced quantity of ash content fit for high graded metallurgical process including the manufacture of steel. 7. The residual waste of the aforesaid process constituted of water, mud, oily and chemical substances, fine particles of coal and carbonaceous materials, which is commonly called slurry, is then put into a series of slurry pumps within the colliery premises. Nevertheless the surplus waste in the form of sludge/slurry is thereafter discharged as an effluent from the washery into the Bokaro river. Depending upon the wea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e that slurry is not coal and further that it was not even otherwise a mineral and, consequently, the leases given by the State are not mining leases and, therefore, do not have to conform to the provisions of the Act. 11. In order to truly appreciate the rival arguments, it is necessary to focus on the true nature and the essence of the product commonly known as slurry. As a matter of history, it is not in dispute that in the earlier decades slurry had been allowed to go waste and was a pollutant which had to in-painstakingly thrown in the rivers or stream in order to be washed away. It is common ground that some of the old coal washeries go back to the forties and fiftees (indeed, it is the petitioners' claim that one of the coal washeries in the present case is the oldest in the counuy) when slurry had no commercial value and was a mere polluting waste or a reject material. Undoubtedly, inflation and abnormal rise in the prices of coal and fuel have rendered slurry deposit to be of substantial commercial value, for which rival claims are now being raised. This by itself, however, cannot alter the basic nature of slurry as an industrial effluent or an industrial waste. Our ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... herefore, cannot be raised to the pedestal of being coal itself for the processing of which they are the consequential wastes. It, thus, seems plain that the true nature of slurry is that it is a residue, reject or waste of an industrial process consisting of mud, ash, oily substances, water and carbonaceous ingredients. Therefore, intrinsically to label this industrial effluent as coal itself would, indeed, be far-fetched, if not absurd. 12. In order to buttress the argument that slurry was a rejected or waste product of coal washery, the learned Advocate-General forcefully argued that this was indeed an abandoned material. Relying on the pleadings of the petitioners themselves and the specific averments of the Tata Iron and Steel Co. it was pointed out that they discharge this effluent into the river Bokaro. Obviously enough thereafter they can exercise no possible control over the same. It was submitted with patent plausibility that the classic example of abandonment is the voluntary throwing of an article into a river or sea or the ocean. The facile claim that even thereafter the petitioners have any control or ownership over the said material is self-serving and farcical. R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... into briquettes or somewhat simpler fuel balls and is thus something distinct and separate from coal or coke. On the anvil of the market yard test itself also, one cannot even remotely confuse coal and slurry. 15. On principle and in the light of the aforesaid discussion, there seems no option but to conclude that slurry is not coal either under the Act or the Rules or otherwise. 16. One must now advert to the alternative argument that slurry is independently a mineral in its own right. Inevitably, one must first advert to the statute in the context of this submission. In the Act the relevant 3 3. Definitions. -- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -- x x x x (a) 'minerals' includes all minerals except mineral oil; x x x x (c) 'mining lease' means a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations, and includes a sub-lease granted for such purpose; (d) 'mining operations' means any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral; x x x Now, apart from the above, the expression 'mine' has been given a widely extended meaning in the Mines Act, 1952, which is as follows : 2. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a term of art but a common English word which has no fixed connotation. In holding so, I am merely following, on principle, a view which seems to have gained universal legal acceptance and has so long and so unbroken a chain of precedent that it is futile now to entertain a contrary opinion. As early as in the authoritative pronouncement of the House of Lords in Lord Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow v. Farle (1888) 13 AC 657 Lord Watson observed as follows : -- 'Mines and Minerals'are not definite terms; they are susceptible of limitation or expansion, according to the intention with which they are used. Then in Scott v. Midland Rly. Co. (1901) 1KB 317, Kennedy, J., observed as follows : -- The word 'mineral' is one which at different times has been used with very different meanings. In some statutes it has a very restricted meaning, in other a very wide one. In order to determine in each case whether the word is used in a wide or narrow sense we must, as Lord Herschell said in Glasgow v. Farie (1888) 13 AC 657 look at the object which the Legislature had in view. 18. Again Lord Loreburn in Caledonian Rly. Co. v. Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. 1911 A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the earth, Nor do we approximate much more closely to the meaning of the word by treating minerals as substances which are 'mined', as distinguished from those which are 'quarried', since many valuable deposits of gold, copper, iron, and coal lie upon or near the surface of the earth, and some of the most valuable building stone, such, for instance, as the Caen-stone in France, is excavated from mines running far beneath the surface. This distinction between underground mines and open workings was expressly repudiated in Midland R. Co. v. Haunchwood Brick and Tile Co. (1882) 20 Ch D 552 and in Hext v. Gill,(1872) 7 Ch699. The settled judicial view noticed above is tersely laid in Halsbury's Laws of England as follows : There is no general definition of the word 'mineral'. The word is susceptible of expansion or limitation in meaning according to the intention with which it is used; and the variety of meanings of which it admits is the source of all the difficulty in the attempt to frame any general definition. It is in the aforesaid context of the nebulousness and the ambiguity of the word 'mineral' that the question -- whether slu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tap-cinder are not a natural formation and, therefore, such mounds and like wastes would not be mineral. Later, in Rogers v. Longsdon, (1966) 2 All ER 49 a similar view was again expressed. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, highlighted that on the petitioners' own showing slurry was a deposit resulting from the effluence of the industrial wastes and rejects from a coal washery. It is thus plainly artificial or, it may be said, a man-made deposit. Consequently, it lacks one of the fundamental pre-requisites that to be a mineral it must be a natural deposit on the surface or in the bowels of the earth. Reliance was placed on the observations in Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Cal 143 that in order to be a mine there must be a natural deposit of minerals and a dump of mineral by human agency at a place would not convert that place into a mine. 22. It thus seems plain that slurry would not satisfy the two basic tests for a mineral that it must at least come from a mine in the bowels of the earth or, if found on the surface, it must be a natural deposit therein. Therefore, it must be held that slurry is not even otherwise a mineral. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... treme contention that a coal washery is also a mine strictu sensu. Similar attempts were made to fall back on the provisions of the Colliery Control Order in an argument of desperation. Reliance was sought to be placed on Commr. of Sales-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh (1967) 19 STC 469 : (AIR 1967 SC 1454) and District Co-operative Development Federation Ltd. v. Commr., Sales-tax, U.P. Lucknow (1970) 26 STC 464 (All), wherein on the particular provisions of State statutes on sales-tax it has been held that coal includes charcoal or coal dust. 26. The submission of Mr. Gupta seems to forget the hallowed rule that it is not only impermissible but, indeed, dangerous whilst interpreting one Act, to travel beyond the same and apply definitions of other Acts except those of the General Clauses Act or to seek the meaning of a word used in an Act in the definition clauses of another statute even though dealing with cognate matter by the same legislature. It has been so held authoritatively way back in Laurence Arthur Adamson v. Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, AIR 1929 PC 181 and Jainarayan Ramkisan v. Motiram Gangaram, AIR 1949 Nag 34 and to my mind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . He has sought to draw our attention to the grades of coal specified therein which included a certain percentage of ash content. However, it was forcefully pointed out on behalf of the respondents that in the said Order the lowest grade of coal could, at the highest, have an ash content of 35 per cent, whereas admittedly slurry would have a much higher ash content rising up to 75 per cent, and is thus nearer to ash than coal. What, on the other hand, clinches the issue is that the Colliery Control Order, which could not have been unaware of slurry, does not even remotely mention slurry as coal nor does it pretend to specify any grades therefor, as has been done in the case of coal therein. Lastly, the Sales-tax Cases relied upon by Mr. Gupta are plainly distinguished and could not in any way advance his stand. 28. Inevitably one must now advert to Industrial Fuel Marketing Company's case AIR 1985 Cal 143 which is one of the sheet-anchors of the respondents. Therein on an identical issue the Division Bench whilst reversing the earlier single Bench view of Industrial Fuel Marketing Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1983 Cal 253 unequivocally concluded as follows : -- In our opin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the matter therein had turned primarily on the facts which were disputed and the Bench rightly declined to enter the thicket of tangled controversy. Indeed, it was observed by the Bench itself -- The writ petition could have been disposed of on this finding alone. But as Mr. Sahay Sinha strenuously contended that slurry was not coal, in the fitness of things, I may also give my finding on this question. It is plain from the above that it was only as an additional ancillary proposition that the matter was considered even after finding that there was no merit in the writ petition. It is noticed in the judgment itself that the Bench did not think it necessary to hear the counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 18 and 19 who were to advocate a contrary view. Consequently the matter being not adequately canvassed before the Bench, the conclusion was arrived at almost in the shape of dictum that slurry is a coal and, therefore, is a mineral and all minerals belong to the State. It is plain that the matter was not considered in all its wide ranging ramifications which have been exhaustively discussed above. Neither principle nor precedent has been cited for arriving at the conc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd of some of the private respondents clearly is that the agreements arrived at with regard to slurry are not mining leases. This again is a matter which can only be determined by construing individual documents, appraising evidence and resorting' to all other means for determination of questions of facts. If it were to be held that the said leases are not mining leases then a substantial part of the argument rested on such an assumption would fall to the ground. This is further buttressed by the fact that prima facie the leases executed by the State are not, in terms, stated to be one under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act and, consequently, the submissions on the assumption that these are mining leases and beyond the respondent-State's competence would also lose significance. Equally, the inter se disputes of some of the 'respondents as betwixt respondents 4 and 5 in C.W.J.C. 1133 call for notice. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Basudeva Prasad on behalf of respondent 5 in the said writ petition that if the petition fails, he has no independent right of his own and as regards the dispute with the other private respondents he would have to seek his ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly contended that slurry was not coal, in the fitness of things, I am also giving my finding on this question . Since that writ petition was bound to be dismissed and was dismissed in the view the Bench had taken in last part of para 6 of the judgment, all that has followed thereafter in paras 8 and 9 thereof cannot be said to be based on any meticulous examination of the question involved in the cases before us. I personally had agreed with the view that the writ petition be dismissed but had not deeply gone into the matter or meticulously examined this question in that case. At best, it can be said to be an obiter dictum. That case could have been distinguished by any other Division Bench on this ground alone. But since judicial decorum contemplates that even an obiter dictum or obiter dicta of the cases decided by a Division Bench lends them some weight, these cases have rightly been, if I may say so with great respect to the learned Chief Justice, placed before a larger Bench to test the correctness of the obiter dictum in para 9 of the judgment in Jain's case (supra). 35. The matter has been deeply gone into and discussed threadbare by my Lord the Chief Justice in his j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Definitely, not. It would bear repetition -- and I think it worthwhile so -- that in the absence of any statutory definition either in express terms or by legal fiction if or by necessary intendment if the term 'coal' or 'mineral' is made conterminous with the term either 'slurry' or 'sludge', they cannot be understood in the same sense either by the layman or even in commercial parlance irrespective of the fact whether they are strictu sensu so or not. Reliance made on the definition of the term 'sludge' or 'slurry' in the Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 9 p. 277 as giving an instance of the coal itself having been made liquid paste and conveyed through large underground pipes to distant places for the sake of convenience in carriage or transportation where at the point of its destination the liquid coal is again dried up and turned into solid coal is of no use to use in the instant cases. Coal whether as a solid block or turned into its liquid form for the purpose of transportation to distant places through underground pipes cannot make the liquid coal the same substance as sludge or slurry. It 'still remains and as at par with t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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