TMI Blog1949 (10) TMI 5X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the courts below erred in the view that the suit is not barred by limitation by reason of the endorsement dated 7-9-1940 in as much as Sections 19 and 20, Limitation Act do not apply to the periods of limitation prescribed for agriculturists entitled to relief under the Mysore Agriculturists' Reliefs Act. It is conceded that the law as laid down in 22 Mysore Law Journal 27 is against this contention of the appellant. It is argued, however, that as the decision in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath on which the decision in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 is based, has been overruled by a later Full Bench decision in Janardhan Eknath v. Ganesh Sadashiv the point raised needs some considered and it was urged that in case we are satisfied that the decision in 22 Mys. LJ 27 is not correct, the point might be referred to a Full Bench. 4. In this case the suit is based on a pronote dated 3rd September 1937. The suit was field only on 6th September 1946 more than three years after 7th September 1940, the date of the endorsement of payment of interest, but within six years from the date. If the defendant was not an agriculturists within the meaning of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act, it is c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ribed a period of limitation different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act. But in a subsequent decision in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, Wadia and Sen JJ., held that: Decan Agriculturists' Relief Act merely substituted in the schedule to the Limitation Act a special period of limitation and does not lay down as independent self-contained provision as regards limitation applicable to such suits. Of the two conflicting views, the view taken in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath was preferred by Venkataramana Rao C.J. and Venkata Ranga Iyengar J. in the case reported in 22 Mys. L.J. 27. What is now to be considered is whether there is any point raised in the Full Bench decision reported in Janardan v. Ganesh has overruled Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath that justifies a change in view taken by this Court in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 following Kishore Lal Stores v. jagannath. The decisions in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath and 22 Mys., L.J. 27 give two reasons for holding that all the provisions of the Limitation Act including Section 20 are applicable to suits to which the provisions of Agriculturists' Relief Act are applicable except to the extent modified by that Act. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is evident on a perusal of the various sections of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act that it dose not provide a separate or self-contained body of provisions with regard to the limitation of suits and therefore it cannot be said that there is any means by which we can determine the period of limitation within the meaning of S. 29, Limitation Act. 9. The above distinction made between special or local laws which are complete codes as regards limitation and those which are not complete codes as regards limitation in considering the applicability of general provisions of Limitation acts per Section 29 (2) of that Act, is based on decision like Srinivasa v. Secy. of State 38 Mad. 92: AIR 1916 Mad. 1093 relied on in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, followed in 22 Mys.L.J. 27. Such a distinction does not arise, it has to be stated with respect after the amendment of Section 29(2), Limitation Act, Section 29(2) originally stood as follows: Nothing in this Act shall affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now a hereafter in force in British India. Section 6, Limitation Act, 1877, was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1916 mad. 1093 which are based on such a distinction. Section 29(2), Limitation Act as it now stands is applicable only if the special or local Act prescribes a period of limitation different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act. In such cases i states that certain sections of the Limitation act are applicable unless excluded and that other section are not applicable (unless included). This is so whether the special or local laws provide or do not provide a separate or self-contained body of provisions with regard to limitation of suits, appeals or applications. If the Agriculturists' Relief Act prescribed for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from that prescribed therefore by the Limitation Act the mere fact that it does not provide a separate or self-contained body of provisions with regard to the limitation of suits does not entitle the plaintiff in such a suit to the benefit of Section 20. Section 29 as it stands after amendment makes it clear that in such a case only Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 are applicable unless excluded by such an enactment and that other provisions like Section 20 shall not apply. It has to be stated with respect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eriod prescribed therefore by the first schedule of Limitation Act. How is a period of Limitation prescribed in any enactment? 12. Periods of limitation are prescribed for instance in the Schedule I, Limitation Act, and in fact it is clear that Section 29, Limitation Act, uses the word prescribed in the sense it is used when it is said that a period of limitation is prescribed in Schedule I of that Act. Supposing the period of limitation alone or the periods of limitation and of the nature of suit, appeal or application alone were stated in appropriate columns in the Schedule I to Limitation Act and not also 'the time from which the period begins to run', can it be said that the period of limitation is prescribed? The nature of the suit, application, or appeal and the period of limitation are no doubt stated in such a case but before it could be said that the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation, it has also to state 'the time from which the period begins to run'. It would not have been possible to apply to any case Section 3, Limitation Act referred to in Section 29(2) of Limitation Act if in prescribing the period of limitation the Act had n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iction though six years is not mentioned in Col 2 of the said Article 67 you must read that article as though six years re there. The said article so read will apply to the case. Thus, it is the Mysore Limitation Act that governs the case with the statutory fiction imposed thereon. Once the Limitation Act applies, Section 20 of the Act is attracted and the suit claim is not barred by limitation having been instituted within six years from the date of the last endorsement. This conclusion follows from the plain meaning of the language of Section 24, Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act . We would like to add one other reason for being reluctant to change the view already taken by this Court. As observed by Reilly C.J. in 40 Mys. H.C.R. 435: When there is nothing in the view of the law adopted in such a case which is in itself unjust or opposed to the public interest, and the case was decided many years ago so that it is to improbable that many transactions have been made in the light of that decision, it would be improper to re-open such a question by a reference to a Full Bench and so possibly create confusion and unsettlement . Thus the principle of stare decisis stares ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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