9911796707
TMI Blog1997 (3) TMI 632X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d under the umbrella stated to have been provided by the Instrument of Accession and Articles 294 and 295 of the Constitution of India. The action of the State Legislature in enacting the laws with respect to the properties of the former ruler of Mysore has also been challenged on the grounds of inherent lack of jurisdiction under Part XI read with Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. In order to hold that the action of the State Legislature was unconstitutional, reliance is placed upon various provisions of Part III and Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. All these pleas and the contention raised are with respect to the dispute raised regarding the acquisition by legislative action of the Bangalore Palace (hereinafter called 'the Palace'), admittedly the acknowledged private property of the former ruler of Mysore. Controversy raised is with respect to the enactment of The Bangalore Palace (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996 (Karnataka Act No. 18/1996) (hereinafter called 'The Act'). 2. The petitioners have stated that the value of the Palace and the adjoining lands is ₹ 3,000 crores, approximately. It is submitted that the Palace was built in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is stated to have formally made a proclamation to the effect that the Constitution of India, after its adoption by the Constituent Assembly, shall be the Constitution for the State of Mysore (Annexure 'E'), on 23.1.1950, an agreement is stated to have been entered into between the Governor General of India and the Maharaja of Mysore regarding the privy purse, private property and rights and privileges (Annexure 'F'). Article II of the Agreement ensured that the Maharaja shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him on the date of Agreement. Under Article IV, the Government of India is stated to have guaranteed the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi of the State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Maharaja. 5. Pursuant to the Agreement, the Maharaja submitted the list of Immovable properties held by him as private properties, on 26.1.1950, which is attached with the petition as Annexure 'G'. The palace was included in the list of private properties. By a letter dated 8.1.1951, Sri V.P. Menon, the then Secretary of States, intimated the Maharaja that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... alleged that not being satisfied with the declaration filed by the heirs of the ruler and in colourable exercise of power vested in it, the State Government initiated proceedings for acquisition of land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 12.8.1986 (Annexure 'L'). It was stated that the land was intended to be acquired for a public purpose, viz., Preservation of artistic and historical heritage of the State . Objections are stated to have been filed by the petitioner and others on 17.9.1986 (Annexure 'O'). A declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is stated to have been published on 9.9.1987 and notice for taking possession and passing of the order was given on 5.9.1989 (Annexure 'Q'). Both the notification and the dedication have been challenged in Writ Petition No. 4284/1988 and five other connected Writ Petitions. This Court, while dealing with the aforesaid Writ Petitions, stayed further proceedings vide order dated 15.9.1989, initiated pursuant to the aforesaid notification and declaration. Thereafter, an ordinance by name, Bangalore Palace ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ies, which could not be brought within the Land Acquisition Proceedings. The acquisition of moveables of the palace is alleged to be tantamounting to acquisition without legal authority. The creation of the Board for the purpose of Section 7 and Chapter III of the impugned Act is intended to be used for ulterior purposes and not for the proclaimed purpose for which the Act is stated to have been enacted. As earlier noticed, the action of the respondent is stated to be contrary to the Constitutional guarantees ensured to the former rulers. The Act is stated to be the by-product of un-legislative competence, after surrendering of the State legislative powers in favour of the Union Parliament in terms of Article 252 of the Constitution. It is submitted that after surrendering the legislative power under Entry 18 List II in favour of the Parliament, the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to enact the impugned Act under Article 246(2) of the Constitution of India. It is urged that the subject covered by the impugned Act and the Ceiling Act is the same when examined by applying the principle of 'pith and substance' of the legislation. The Act is termed to be against the princi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rds securing the principles specified and constitutional mandate contained in Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India, directing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community be so distributed as best to subserve the common good. The Act is claimed to be intended to achieve the object of building a welfare state and an egalitarian social order, by fixing certain social and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a social revolution, which it is stated to fulfill the basic need of the common man and change the structure of the society, without which political democracy has no meaning. The Act is made not only for implementing the directive principles, but also to achieve the goals set forth in the preamble to the Constitution, particularly after its amendment by means of the 42nd Constitutional amendment. Article 31-C of the Constitution saves the Act from the attack of being void on the ground of inconsistency with or for allegedly taking away or abridging any of the rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. As the impugned Act fulfills the requirement of Article 31-C, it is claimed to be immune to challe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tioners upon Articles 294 and 299 of the Constitution has been seriously contested and it is pointed out that the agreement relied upon by the petitioners being pre-Constitution, could not be relied upon, in view of the specific bar imposed by Article 363 of the Constitution. The contention that once the State exercises its power of eminent domain, that power cannot be again exercised in respect of the same property, is stated to be devoid of any substance, as in prior proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, the property had not vested in the State Government, as no award had been passed against the petitioners. The reliance of the petitioners on violation of the fundamental rights as guaranteed by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution is stated to be misconceived and it is submitted in the alternative that the respondents are not quality of violation of the guarantees of any of the aforesaid Articles. The scope and purport of Section 5(c) and Section 40 of the impugned Act are disparate. It is claimed that by incorporating various provisions in the impugned Act, the Legislature has ensured proper superintendence, direction, control and management of the palace, for which a Bo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Whereas the legal representatives and heirs and transferees of late Jayachamarajendra Wadeyar have in some Writ Petitions questioned the legality of the order passed by the Appellate Authority and these Writ Petitions are pending hearing before the High Court of Karnataka, it has become necessary to pass a law different from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and to make provision for appointment of a Commissioner of payment to pass appropriate orders in conformity with the final decision in the above Writ Petitions in determining the amount payable in respect of the entire holding, and: Whereas, for the purpose herein before stated it is expedient to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the Bangalore Palace and the open space around it, by legislation. Section 1 deals with the title and commencement of the Act. Subsection 2 of Section 2 defines Bangalore Palace to mean, the Palace of Bangalore and all the vacant land attached thereto including Buildings : regalia, paintings, sculptures and all other pieces of art, whether moveable or immovable and more fully described in Schedule I. Section 3 reads: Declaration In pursuance of Article 31- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the mortgagee of any property referred to in sub-section (4) or other person holding any charge, lease, lien or other interest in or in relation, to any such property shall be entitled to claim in accordance with his rights or interest, payment of the mortgage money or other dues in whole or in part out of the amount specified in Section 8 and also out of the amount determined under Section 9, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other interest shall be enforceable against any property which has vested in the State Government. (6) If, as the appointed day, any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature, in relation to any property which has vested in the State Government under Section 4, instituted or preferred by or against the legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons, is pending, the same shall not abate, be discontinued, or in any way prejudicially affected by reason of the transfer of the Palace or anything contained in this Act, but the suit, appeal or other proceeding may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the State Government or, where the Palace is directed under Section 7 to vest in the Board by or against the Board. S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cordance with the rights and interests of the creditors of the legal representatives or heirs, or other person as the case may be. Chapter III deals with the management of the Palace. Section 10 provides that the general superintendence, direction, control and management of the Palace, the right, title and interest in relation to the Palace which is vested in the State Government, shall, where a direction has been made by the Government under sub-section (1) of Section 7 vest in the Board and thereupon the Board be entitled to exercise, to the exclusive of all other persons, all such powers and do such things as may be authorised to do in relation to the Palace. Section 11 deals with the duties of the persons incharge of the management of the Palace and Section 12 refers to the duties of persons to account for assets in their possession. Chapter IV deals with the Commissioner of Payments. It comprises of Sections 13 to 21. Section 13 reads as under: Appointment of Commissioner of payments : (1) The State Government shall, for the purpose of disbursing the amount payable under Sections 8 and 9, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commissioner of payments. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th regard to every payment made by the State Government or the Board after the appointed day for discharging any liability of the legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons in relation to the Palace in respect of any period prior to the appointed day. Every such claim shall have priority in accordance with the priorities attached under this Act to the matters in relation to which such liability has been discharged by the State Government or the Board. (3) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the liabilities of the legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons in relation to the Palace in respect of any transaction prior to the appointed day, which have not been discharged on or before such day shall be the liabilities of legal representatives or heirs or other interested persons, as the case may be. Section 16 reads: Claims to be made to the Commissioner : Every person having a claim with regard to any of the matters specified in Schedule II in relation to the Palace before the appointed day shall prefer such claim before the Commissioner within thirty days from the appointed day: Provided that if the Commissioner is satisfied that the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... opinion, be necessary and after giving the claimant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the nature and extent of such claims and by order in writing admit or reject the claim in whole or in part and in determining the nature and extent of the claims of the legal representatives, heirs or other persons, the Commissioner shall take into consideration, the effect of the final order passed in the Writ Petitions pending against the orders of the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, and the rights of the State Government thereunder. The Commissioner shall also decide any dispute as to the person or persons who are entitled to the amount and any dispute as to who are the legal representatives of any deceased claimant. (5) The Commissioner shall have the power to regulate his own procedure in all matters arising out of the discharge of his functions, and shall, for the purpose of making an investigation under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witn ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rd under this Act. iii) all grants and contributions made by the State Government or any other authority; iv) all contribution and donations made by any person; v) sums raised by way of loan by the Board with the previous sanction of the State Government; and vi) any other sums. Section 29 deals with the utilisation of the funds and provides: The fund may be utilised for all or any of the following purposes, namely: i) maintenance, management and administration of the Palace; ii) laying out and maintenance of public park; iii) preservation of tree growth in the premises of Palace; iv) for development of Botanical Museum and Horticulture garden in the Palace premises; v) for payment of salaries and allowances of the Executive officer and other Officers appointed under Section 24; vi) for any other purpose as may be prescribed. Section 30 deals with audit and Section 31 with budget. Section 32 provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act or in a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich is required to be or may be prescribed. Sub-section 3 of Section 38 provides : Every rule made by the State Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be, after it is made, before each House of the State Legislature, while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. Section 40 reads : Abatement of proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: On and from the appointed day all notifications issued under any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the Palace shall stand withdrawn and proceedings if any, taken in pursuance of such notification shall abate. REG. RELEVANCE OF ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rticle 31-C, as amended reads thus: 31-C : Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31, and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy: Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. Section 4 of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act is beyond the amending power of the Parliament and is void since it damages the basic or essential features of the Constitution and destroys its basic structure by a total exclusion of challenge to any law on the ground that it is . inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution, if the law i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Constitution (25th Amendment) Act, 1971 was held to be valid and constitutional by majority judgment of 9 judges. The majority of the Judges also considered the scope of Section 3 of the Constitution (25th Amendment) Act, 1971 and held that the first part of the aforesaid Section was valid and the second part, viz., and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy , shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy is invalid. Section 3 of the Amendment Act reads as follows: After Article 31-B of the Constitution, the following Article shall be inserted, namely: 31-C : Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy : ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... avananda Bharathi AIR1973SC1461 and we do not quite see how the petitioners can be permitted to go behind that decision. The Learned Counsel addressed to us an interesting argument on the principles governing the theory of precedent, and he argued that, in the welter of judgments delivered in Kesavananda Bharathi, it is impossible to discern a ratio because different learned Judges gave different reasons in support of the conclusions to which they came. It is well known that six learned Judges who were in minority in Kesavananda Bharati upheld the first part of Article 31-C, which was a logical and inevitable consequence of their view that there were no inherent or implied limitations on the parliament's power to amend the Constitution. Khanna J. did not subscribe to that view but, all the same, he upheld the first part of Article 31-C for different reasons. The question of validity of the Twenty-fifth Amendment by which the unamended Article 31-C was introduced into the Constitution was specifically raised before the Court and the arguments in that behalf were specifically considered by all the six minority Judges and by Khanna, J. It seems to us difficult, in these circumstan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t insist on fulfilment of the requirement of Article 14. It was declared that, they are different concepts and in certain circumstances, may even run counter to each other. That is why the need for the immunity afforded by Article 31-C. Indeed there are bound to be innumerable cases where the narrower concept of equality before law may frustrate the broader egalitarianism contemplated by Article 39-B. The existence of the words and figures the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39 was held to be an inseparable part of Article 31-C. 17. While considering some provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Development Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act), the Apex Court in the STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. v. BASANTIBAI MOHANLAL KHETAN AND ORS. [1986]1SCR707 , dealt with the constitutionality of the Maharasthra Act on the touch stone of Article 31-C in the light of its earlier pronouncements and held: Even granting for purposes of argument that sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 44 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, we are of the view that the said provisions receive the protection of Article 31-C of the Constitutio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e 39-B or not does not depend upon the declaration by the Legislature but depends on its contents. We have already dealt with the object of the Act, with which we are concerned in this case. In interalia makes provision for acquisition of private lands for providing sites for building houses or housing accommodation to the community. The title to the land of the private holders which are acquired first vests in the State Government. Later on, the land is developed and then distributed amongst the people as house sites. It also provides for reserving land for providing public amenities without which people cannot live there. Community centres, shopping complexes, parks, roads, drains, playgrounds, are all necessary for civic life and these amenities are enjoyed by all. That is also a kind of distribution. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [1978]1SCR641 dealing with the question whether nationalisation of bus transport was covered by Article 39-B, Justice Krishna Iyer has observed thus: The next question is whether nationalisation can have nexus with distribution. Should we assign a narrow or spacious sense to this concept? Doubtless, the latter, for reasons so apparent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r taking away or abridging any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. There is no substance in the argument that Article 31-C is unworkable, non-existent and inoperative. The reliance of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners on an order of reference made by two-Bench judgment in PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION AND ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. 1992(1)BomCR152 would not change the settled position of law, unless the larger Bench of the Supreme Court takes a contrary view. Even in the Property Owners Association's case cited supra, the two-Bench judgment of the Supreme Court has not taken any contrary view. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties, the Judges forming the Bench formed a tentative opinion and recommended for a reference to a larger Bench with the observations: Having heard Learned Counsel for sometime, we. have formed the opinion that it would be more appropriate for a Bench of not less than five Judges to consider and decide these questions for an authoritative pronouncement of the same. The decisions in Minerva Mills, Waman Rao and Sanjeev Coke are all by Bench of five Judges. The question in the form it is raised by Sri F. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d 19. 21. The object of Clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 has been declared to be the breaking-up of concentration of wealth and the distribution of material resources with the intention to achieve the building of a Welfare State and an egalitarian Social Order. The provisions have been incorporated ensure dispensation of social justice and economic justice . H.M. Seervai in Constitutional Law of India referred to the objects sought to be achieved by Articles 38 and 39 and on the basis of various judicial pronouncements observed: Article 38 provides that the State shall endeavor to promote the welfare of the people by effectively securing and protecting a social order in which social, economic and political justice shall inform all the institutions of national life. This Article gives content to that part of the preamble of our Constitution which refers to social, economic and political justice. Having laid down the principle which should inform all institutions of national life, Article 39 particularises certain objectives. It provides that the State should direct its policy towards securing the right of citizens, men and women, to an adequate means of livelihood, that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nging about a non-violent social revolution to fulfill the basic need of the common man and to change the structure of the society without which political democracy had no meaning. If the impugned statute is found to be aiming at securing any of the objectives mentioned in Article 39(b) (c) of the Constitution the protective umbrella of Article 31C would shield the such law from the onslaught of the rigour of Articles 14 19 of the Constitution. What would be important in this regard is to ascertain as to whether the impugned legislation dealt with the material resources of the community which were intended to be distributed to subserve the common good. 24. Mrs. Chidambaram who led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the shield of Article 31C of the Constitution was being used as a sword against her clients. It was submitted that the Palace and the adjoining lands could not be termed to be the material resources of the community within the meaning of Article 39(b) and the scheme of the impugned Act did not reveal that the properties sought to, be acquired under the Act were in any way intended to be distributed for the purposes of the common good of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... merely public possessions. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra) the 'material resources' were explained as:- The next question for consideration is whether the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act is a law directing the policy of the State towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, Coal is, of course, one of the most important known sources of energy, and, therefore, a vital national resource. Shri Sen argued that material resources had first to be acquired by the State before they could be distributed. A law providing for acquisition was not a law for distribution. We are unable to appreciate the submission of Shri Sen. To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court in STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. L.ABU KAVUR BAI. [1984]1SCR725 Land was acknowledged to be a material resource of the community for the common good of the entire community by the Supreme Court in H.S, SRINIVAS RAGHAVACHAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [1987]2SCR1189 . In State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai, [1986]1SCR707 , the Supreme Court while considering the Constitut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e concept and must be broadly interpreted to bring within its sweep all resources, natural or physical resources, moveable, immovable, corporeal and incorporeal, tangible or intangible properties etc. Private sources or property are part of material resources of the community. All things that produce wealth for the community are material resources. The word distribution equally must be construed broadly to include not only allotment of resources to public use but also dispensation of largess 1o the poor to provide access to equal opportunity; In other words it is a broad based concept and it should not be confined within narrow confines. Mines, minerals and quarries embedded in the land are material resources of the community amenable to public use or for distribution. 26. It was argued that the key and genesis of the Article is the 'distribution of the material' resources and in the absence of the intended 'distribution' the shield of Article 31C could not be utilized to protect the impugned statute from the vice of the discrimination and violation of provisions of Articles 14 and 19. Distribution as contemplated by Article 39(b) does not mean, 'to give e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Constitutional system. It is well settled by the Apex Court that when protection of Article 31-C is sought as a shield to a particular statute, the Court examining the constitutionality of the offending enactment is entitled to examine whether the impugned enactment really seeks to give effect to the public policy underlying the Article 39(b) or (c) regardless of any legislation having been made by the legislature which made the enactment. In our country, the rule of law prevails which has been guaranteed by the Constitution. In a State which has a written Constitution and where pattern of government is democratic as we have in our country, the one outstanding feature of it is the supremacy of law in the realm commonly known as rule of law. The term 'rule of law' connotes the undisputed supremacy of law and envisages state of things in which everyone respects of law and where a law has to be followed by everyone collectively and individually. The supremacy of law is designed to give security to the rights of individuals, who are the citizens of an independent democratic country. The law has to be followed and cannot be transgressed by anyone whether the State or the indiv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her the impugned statute is entitled to the protective umbrella and the shield provided to it by Article 31C read with 39(b) of the Constitution. If upon analysis it is found that the impugned Act has been enacted in furtherance of the directive principle of the State Policy declared under Article 39(b) the statutes shall be held to be protected for the limited purposes as enshrined in Article 31C but if it is found that the purpose declared in Section 3 of the impugned Act is merely a cloak, such protection may not be granted and the impugned Act, in that event, shall have to be decided on the touch-stone of Articles 14 19 of the Constitution. To arrive at the right conclusions the Court shall be entitled to pierce the cloak if needed but would not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the legislature. In other words if the statue is found not to be the result of colorable exercise or malafides or beyond the scope of Article 39(b), this Court would not venture to find out the sufficiency of the material justifying its enactment. 29. The preamble of the Act declares the Palace to be Karnataka's unique historical and architectural heritage which is singularly suited wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lace is e.g. is provided out of the civil list with a guard of honour and a chaplain, and the monarch has a pew in its chapel, and the gardens and vineries are kept in order at the royal expense and partly for the royal enjoyment-that is strong evidence that it is still a royal palace, but it is insufficient to constitute it a royal residence, which means a palace to which the monarch could immediately return and reside in his own person, if he were pleased to do so (per Ellenborough C.J., Winter v. Miles, 10 East 580); 30. The castles of the feudal lords and the palaces of the monarchs were alleged to be not made of mud and bricks but raised on the human skeletons and built with their flesh and blood. The palaces were stated to be the by-product of the exploitation of the poor and down-trodden people. The wealth acquired by the feudal lords or the monarchs was stated to have been sucked from the veins of the poor and oppressed. The prevalent antagonism in the society between the have's and have not's led to various confrontations resulting in blood-shed on account of the insurgency, belligerency and the revolutionary movements carried on to get rid of the exploitatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... used as the lung space and the park areas. The preservation of the palace as a monument, development of the open space into botanical museum, horticulture garden, tree park and preservation of the land as lung space and park areas clearly, unambiguously and categorically lead to the conclusion that the property, the subject matter of the Act, is intended to be distributed by providing an access to the common citizen which would admittedly sub-serve the common good. The definition of Bangalore palace in Section 2(2) of the Act also indicates that the palace is nothing but a material resource of the community which comprises of not only the palace and land but includes the buildings, regalia, paintings, sculptures and other pieces of art. Providing access to the common man to the palace which is admittedly the part of history and repository of cultural heritage of State of Karnataka, attracts the provisions of Article 39(b) and thus protected by the protective umbrella and shield provided by Article 31C of the Constitution. REG. PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 299: 31. Invoking the provisions of part XII Chapter III, particularly Articles 294 and 299 of the Constitution, it has bee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the states of the marriage expenses of the brothers and sisters of the rulers, immunity from some processes of Courts of law, immunity from requisitioning of the private properties of the rulers and their families, etc. Under Section 6 of the Provincial Constitution Order, 1947, the Maharaja of Mysore executed an Instrument of Accession which was followed by supplementary Instrument of Accession on 23.1.1949. On 25.11.1949, the Maharaja promulgated a proclamation, under which he surrendered his sovereign powers and accepted the Constitution of India by adopting it for the State of Mysore. After this proclamation, the Government of India entered into an agreement with the Maharaja on 23.1.1950. This agreement has been termed to be a Quid Pro Quo being in the nature of consideration for the surrender of sovereignty and power to the Dominion of India. The relevant portion of the said agreement, necessary for the purposes of determining the controversy in these petitions are as follows: Article 2:- (1) The Maharaja shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties ( as distinctive from State properties ) belonging to him on the date of this a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lop according to the needs of the Society and the mandate of the people. The various amendments made in the Constitution include the 42nd amendment, by which a revolutionary change by legislative means was made in the preamble of the Constitution, declaring that India was to be a Socialist Republic, besides being a secular, sovereign and a democratic Republic. Socialism has not been defined in the Constitution, but is commonly understood to mean, from each according to his ability, to each according to his need . Even if such a definition is not accepted, it can safely be said that by introduction of the word socialism in the preamble of the Constitution the Union Parliament aimed at to eliminate inequality of income and status and standards of life with the object of providing decent standards of life to the working people of the country. The preamble has been termed to be the flood-light illuminating the path to be pursued by the State to set up a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic. In the statement of object and Reasons of the 42nd Amendment Act, amongst other things, ushering in of socio-economic revolution was promised. In that revolutionary call, it was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ife and exploitation in any form shall be eschewed. There will be equitable distribution of national cake and the worst off shall be treated in such a manner as to push them up the ladder. Then comes the old age in the life of every one, be he a monarch or a mahatma, a worker or a pariah. The old age overtakes each one, death being the fulfilment of life providing freedom from bondage. But here socialism aims at providing an economic security to those who have rendered unto society what they were capable of doing when they were fully equipped with their mental and physical prowess. In the fall of life the State shall ensure to the citizens a reasonably decent standard of life, medical aid, freedom from want, freedom from fear and the enjoyable leisure, relieving the boredom and the humility of dependence in old age. This is what Article 41 aims when it enjoins the State to secure public assistance in old age, sickness and disablement. It was such a socialist State which the Preamble directs the centers of power Legislative, Executive and Judiciary to strive to set up. From a wholly feudal exploited slave society to a vibrant, throbbing socialist welfare society is a long march but ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ses abolition case . In that case, as per majority, it was held that the recognition of the status of the rulers and their rights was not a temporary measure and was not liable to be varied or repudiated in accordance with state policy . The agreements were held to have been recognised and were not political agreements, which could be set at naught by a unilateral act of the Union of India. By the merger agreements, the princes had seized to retain any vestige of sovereign rights or authority quo their former status. The plea of the Union of India that the dispute in respect of the right to privy purses under Article 222(1) of the Constitution was born under Article 363 of the Constitution was not accepted. It was further held that the structure of Article 362 was different from Article 291, which imposed restrictions upon the exercise of legislative and executive functions. Recognition of personal rights and privileges of the rulers, arising out of covenants, was not explicit. The Constitution formed the binding force of the guarantees and assurances under the covenants of personal rights, privileges and dignities. In that case, challenge was made to the Presidential Order dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... claimed to be to facilitate stabilisation of the new order and ensure organic unity of India. The deletion of Article 291 was stated to be amounting to a gross breach of the principle of political justice enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution. The privy purses and other privileges were claimed to have been conferred upon the former rulers as consideration for surrendering all their sovereign rights and contributing to the unity and integrity of the country. It was further submitted that but for the co-operation of the rulers, Bharath would have been fundamentally different from the Bharath that came into being on account of accession and merger of the states. 41. Appearing for the Maharaja of Mysore, Sri A.K. Ganguly, Senior Counsel, had referred to the history of merger of the states with the Dominion of India and had stated that the privileges granted in lieu thereof, including the privy purses could not be taken away by the Union Parliament. The court, in that case dealt with pre-Constitutional Instrument of Accession, the merger agreement and the covenants which guaranteed the payment of privy purses and the recognition of the personal privileges etc., and which ult ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this Amendment. We feel that this contention need not detain us any more, and, therefore, we shall pass on to the next point in debate. 42. Referring to the plea that the ground of privy purses and the privileges was a just quid pro quo of the rulers of the Indian states for surrendering their sovereignty and rights over their territories, the Court declared : This argument based on the ground of breaking of solemn pledges and breach of promise cannot stand much scrutiny. To say that without voluntary accession, India, i.e. Bharat would be fundamentally different from that Bharat that came into being prior to the accession is untenable much less inconceivable. We have already dealt with the necessity of the Rulers to accede for the integration of States with the Dominion of India in the earlier part of this judgment and, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to reiterate in this context, except saying that the integration could have been achieved even otherwise. One should not lose sight of the fact that neither because of their antipathy towards the Rulers nor due to any xenophobia, did the Indian Government entertain the idea of integration but because of the will of the pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... liament, it has been seriously opposed by the learned Attorney General that this argument based on immorality has only to be stated to be rejected and that it is an elementary principle of jurisprudence that a law cannot be interpreted on the basis of moral principles. In this connection, reference may be made to the following passage in. Dias's Jurisprudence, Fifth Edition, at pages 355 and 356. It reads thus: As a positivist, Prof. Hart excludes morality from the concept of law, for he says that the positivists are concerned to promote 'clarity and honesty in the formulation of the theoretical and moral issues raised by the existence of particular laws which were morally iniquitous but were enacted in proper form, clear in meaning, and satisfied all the acknowledged criteria of validity of a system. Their view was that, in thinking about such laws, both the theorist and the unfortunate official or private citizen who was called on to apply or obey them, could only be confused by an invitation to refuse the title of law' or 'valid' to them. They thought that, to confront these problems, simpler, more can did resources were available, which would bring into ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ame center with morals, but it has not the same circumference. Reference may also be made to Krishna Kumar v. Union of India (1991)ILLJ191SC . The above passages remind us of the distinction between law and morality and the line of demarcation which separate morals from legislation. The sum and substance of it is that a moral obligation cannot be converted into a legal obligation. In the light of the above principle, the Attorney General is right in saying that Courts are seldom concerned with the morality which is the concern of the law makers. According to him, there is no unreasonableness, unfairness and dishonesty in bringing this amendment in any way injuring the basic feature of the Constitution and this amendment has not caused any damage to the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervading the entire Constitutional scheme. On a deep consideration of the entire scheme and content of the Constitution, we do not see any force in the above submissions. In the present case, there is no question of change of identity on account of the Twenty Sixth Amendment. The removal of Articles 291 and 362 has not made any change in the personality of the Constitut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Assuming, but not holding that such agreements amounted to contracts, the violation of the terms of such contract may be enforced by way of suit or claim of damages in accordance with law. The fetter of limitation upon the plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of the legislative heads specified in the VII Schedule of the Constitution could only be imposed by the Constitution itself and not by any obligation which had been undertaken by either the Domination Government or the Provincial or a State Government. Powers conferred upon the State Legislature under Article 226 cannot be subjected to any alleged contractual obligations. In MAHARAJ UMEG SINGH and ORS v. STATE OF BOMBAY AND ORS. [1955]2SCR164 , the petitioners, who were the relations of the rulers or Jagirdars of the erstwhile states of Idar, Chhota Udaipur, Devgad Baria, Rajpipla, Bansda, Lunawada, Mohanpur etc., challenged the vires of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954, by which the State Legislature of Bombay had abolished the Jagirs, mainly relying upon the agreements of merger entered into by the rulers of the respective states with the Dominion of Ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itself and if there was no such fetter or limitation to be found there, the State Legislature had full competence to enact the impugned Act no matter whether such enactment was contrary to the guarantee given, or the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay. The Petitioners would have a legitimate grievance in the matter of the deprivation of their rights of ownership of the jagir lands in so far as the States and their subjects were discriminated against, but they would not be able to have their grievance redressed by this Court for the simple reason that the State Legislature at all events competent to enact the impugned Act not being fettered at all by the terms of Clause 5 of the letters of guarantee. The provisions of Article 294(b) of the Constitution which is said to have transferred the obligations of the Government of the Province to the State of Bombay would not by involving the transference of the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government in Clause 5 of the letters of guarantee to the State Government impose a fetter or limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact legis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... operation after its commencement. The Supreme Court considered the scope of Article 363(1) in the case of STATE OF SERAIKELLA v. UNION OF INDIA [1951]2SCR474 (C) and held: The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler. The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make, having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and are wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them under the Instrument of Accession. The whole plaint is nothing else except the claim to enforce the plaintiff's right under the Instrument of Accession, The dispute therefore in my opinion clearly is in respect of this Instrument of Accession and is covered by Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India. The question of the validity of the different enactments and orders is also based on the rights claimed under the Instrument of Accession so far as the plaintiff is concerned. 47. In SUDHANSU SEKHAR SINGH DEO HIRUDAYA CHANDRA DEB BIRABAR' HARICHANDRAN v. STATE O ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onsistency. Inconsistency is alleged to be writ large in the whole of the enactment rendering it to be declared unconstitutional and beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 49. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties it is relevant to have a reference to various provisions of the constitution applicable in the case. Part-XI of the Constitution governs the relations between the Union and the States and Chapter-1 thereof deals with the legislative relations. The scheme of the Constitution shows that there is a three-fold distribution of legislative powers between Union and the States made by three legislative lists in the VII Schedule of the Constitution, The powers of the Parliament and the State Legislature to make Laws are conferred by Article 245, 246 and 248. Article 252 authorises the Parliament to legislate for two or more States by consent and adoption of such legislation by any other State. Article 254 deals with the inconsistency between laws made by the Parliament and laws made by the Legislature of the States. For a ready-reference the relevant Articles are reproduced hereunder Article 245 : Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or, where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State. (2) Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act or Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that State. Article 254: Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States: (1) If any provisions of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fied in part-XI of the Constitution. In the exercise of such a power it will be competent of the Legislature to enact a law which is either prospective or retrospective. Within the frame work or Article 246 the Parliament and State Legislature have respectively exclusive powers to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in the list in the VII Schedule for which specific provision is made under Part-XI of the Constitution. When a question is raised as to whether a State Legislature was competent to enact a law, the Court is required to find-out whether the topic of legislation is covered by one of the items of the State list relating to the power of the State Legislature to legislate. The scheme of distribution of the legislative powers indicates that the object is only to distribute the legislative powers between Union and the State Legislatures and not to exempt them from any of the limitations which are imposed by the other provisions of the Legislature than their legislative powers. The plenary powers of the Legislature are limited by the fundamental rights, the limitation imposed in the legislative list in the VII schedule, other mandatory provisions of the Constitutio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the entries in the different Lists or in the same Lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other, it is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. When the question arose about reconciling entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of the Government of India Act, 1935, Gwyer, C.J., in Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Sprit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, In the matter of MANU/FE/0001/1938MANU/FE/0001/1938, observed: A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implication of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act. The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state: ...an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to the Context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ifferent Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory . 54. In STATE OF BIHAR v. SIR KAMESHWAR SINGH MANU/SC/0103/1959MANU/SC/0103/1959 : [1959]37ITR388(SC) the Apex Court held that the entries in the Lists I, II and III were designed to define and delimit the respective areas of the Legislative competence of the Legislatures and do not impose any implied restriction on the legislative power conferred by Article 246. The entries also do not prescribe any duty to exercise the legislative power in any particular manner. It is settled that in interpreting the various entries, the language of those entries should be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable. Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. In RAI RAMAKRISHNA AND ORS. ETC., v. STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1952 SC 25, it was held that the entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution conferring legislative power on the Legislature must receive the widest denotation. It has however to be kept in mind that the Court shoul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n S.K. Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor, Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1964, D/-4.5.1964(SC). The question for consideration in that case was whether the State Government had power under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act as introduced by the Bihar Amendment to deal with a revision in relation to an Inter-State permit. The High Court had taken the view that it had no such power, as, such a provision falls within Item 42 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, namely, Inter-State trade and Commerce and not Entry 35 of List III, namely, mechanically propelled vehicles. This Court following the principle laid down in the case of Narayanappa v. State of Mysore [1960]3SCR742 reveresed the view of the High Court and held that the impugned section fell within the legislative power of the State under Entry 20 of List III of Schedule Seven of the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding to Entry 35 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The said decision has been followed by this Court in Tansukh Rao Jain's. Nilratan Prasad Shaw [1965]2SCR6 Mr. Sen submitted that the portion of the Statute providing for acquisition of contract carriages running on Inter-State ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Act. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was enacted under Entry 20 of List III of Schedule Seven of the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding to Entry 35 of List HI of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The subject being in the Concurrent List and the Act having received the assent of the President, even the repugnancy, if any, between the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act stands cured and cannot be a ground to invalidate the Act. Entry 42 of List III deals with acquisition of property. The State has enacted the Act mainly under this entry. It does not in any way violate or militate against the provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act either, as argued by Mr. Sen. 55. While agreeing with the majority judgment Krishna Iyer, J., observed that legalism has to yield when spacious issues arise. Where the Administration is found to be sliding back from the progressive Constitutional values to protect the private interest, then the Court is required to activate the welfare jurisprudence of the Constitution by appropriate commands. 56. The Learned Counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the decision in UNION OF INDIA V. VALLURI BASAVAIAH CHOUWDHARY AND ORS. ETC., ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Constitution would be valid unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any such law made by the Union Parliament. The reliance of the petitioners on this Judgment is therefore of no help to them. Similarly, the reliance of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners on MAHARAO SAHEB SHRi BHIM SINGHJI, ANANTALAKSHMI PATHABI-RAMASHARMA YETHURI AND ORS.; ETC., ETC., V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1981 SC 234 , is of no help to them in as much as in that case the Court examined the Constitutional validity of the Urban land (Ceiling Regulation) Act, 1976 and held that the entire Act was valid save and except Section 27(1) in so far as it imposed restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or of a portion of such building, within the ceiling area. It was observed that taking over of the large conglomeration of the vacant land was a National necessity if the Article 39 was the Constitutional reality, It was held that law can never be higher than the economic order and the cultural development of the society brought to pass by that economic order. 58. In KRISHNA BHIMARAO DESHPANDE v. LAND TRIBUNAL, DHARWAD AND ORS. AIR1993SC883 , the Apex Court considered legislat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate, it is. also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same Lists may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them 8. It is well settled that the legislative power of the State has to be reconciled with that of the Parliament and that in their respective fields each is supreme. Even assuming that the state enactment has same effect on the subject-matter falling within the Parliament's legislative competence, that by itself will not render such law invalid or inoperative. In Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala this Court held as under: (SCC p.229, para 28). It seems to us clear that the State has legislative competence to legislate on Entry 18, List II and Entry 42, List III. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52, List I. Effect is not the same thing as subject-matter. If a State Act, otherw ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... competence of the State Legislature. In the instant case there is no such conflict between the field of legislations covered by List I and II of the VII Schedule. The effect of the State legislation will have to be examined in the light of the provisions of Articles 246, and 252 r/w 254. 60. The mere fact that the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the impugned Act deal with the lands and buildings cannot be made a basis to urge that there existed a conflict and for that reason the State Legislature has to yield before the law made by the Union Legislature. The use of the words 'land' and 'building' in the two enactmen'ts is not the determining factor for the purposes of ascertaining inconsistency. It is the subject and the filed of legislation for which the Act has been enacted which would decide its fate on the touchstone of the alleged inconsistency. The entries in the Lists of VII Schedule of Constitution demarcate the area over which appropriate Legislature can operate. Widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. Some of the Entries in different Lists or in the same List may overlap and some times may also appear to be in direct conflict wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , yet the principle underlying Article 254 would be applicable, by reason of the words, any such Act so passed shall apply to such State in Article 252(1) and the bar of its amendment are repelled by any State Legislature under Article 252(2). Dealing with such a situation a Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh in TUMATI RANGAYYA ETC. v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. AIR1978AP106 , held: If Article 254 does not apply, we must look to Article 252 to resolve the problem, for we cannot assume a lacuna in the Constitution. In fact, the language of the Article, 'any Act so passed shall apply to such States', is peremptory enough to suggest that the Act so passed shall prevail over any other State law. The position is further clarified by the 2nd clause of Article 252 which bars the amendment or repeal of the Act by any Act of a State Legislature. Even Parliament is not empowered to amend or repeal the Act except after following, again, the procedure prescribed by Article 252(1). Thus a law made by Parliament pursuant to the power surrendered to it by the Legislatures of two or more States holds a very special position under the Constitution and must be held to prevail over ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons were held applicable in determining the rights and obligations of the parties in respect of retrenchment compensation. We are of the firm belief that the field of legislation covered by the Act pertains to a matter regarding which no resolution was passed in terms of Article 252 of the Constitution. As the Act deals with a distinct field of legislation, there is no question of looking at the alleged repugnancy or overlapping, as argued on behalf of the petitioners. To come to this conclusion, we have perused the various provisions of the Ceiling Act purported to have been passed by the Union Parliament in consequence of the resolution of the State Legislature, in terms of Article 252 of the Constitution and the impugned Act passed in pursuance of the legislative powers vesting in the State under Article 246 read with Schedule VII of the Constitution. The preamble of the Ceiling Act indicates the purpose for which the Act was enacted by the Parliament. The said Act is shown to have been passed to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of build ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the persons interested in the vacant land, the competent authority is required to determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit. Under Section 11, payment of the amount for vacant land acquired has to be made to the person or persons having interest in the land, which is deemed to have been acquired in terms of Section 11 of the Act. Under Section 12, the constitution of the Urban Land Tribunal for the purposes of hearing the appeals is dealt with. Second appeals are maintainable in the High Court. Section 14 deals with the mode of payment of the amount and Section 17 provides that the competent authority or any person acting under the orders of the competent authority may, enter upon any vacant land or any other land on which there is a building with such assistance as the competent authority or such person considering it necessary and make survey to take measurements thereof and do any other act that the competent authority or such person considers necessary for the purpose of carrying out the Act. Penalties for concealment of particulars of any vacant land are provided under Section 18 of the Act. Sections 23 and 24 deal with the disposal of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... served for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. Article 254(1) is subject to the provisions of Clause (2) and if a statute passed the test of Clause (2), it will make Clause (1) inapplicable to it. Clause (2) is intended to cure the repugnancy which would otherwise invalidate the State law, which is shown to be inconsistent with a law made by the Parliament. The Supreme Court in M. KARUNANIDHI v. UNION OF INDIA, 1979CriLJ773 while dealing with the scope of Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 254 of the Constitution held that where both the State Legislature and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by the Concurrent List, the Act passed by the Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail and the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act, The scheme of the Constitution was held to be scientific which envisaged equitable distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and the St ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore Palace (Acquisition and Transfer) Ordinance, 1992 was approved by the Cabinet, it was sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi on 13.5.1992 to obtain the previous instructions of the President. When the matter was under consideration, in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Sri Srikantadatta Wadeyar, one of the petitioners, made a representation to the President of India to withhold the consideration of the proposed Ordinance on several grounds. The Home Ministry, vide its DO letter dated 17.11.1983 requested the State Government to send its comments in respect of various points raised by Sri Srikantadatta Wadeyar. The State Government, vide its letter dated 26.5.1995, sent its reply with respect to all the contentions raised against the accord of assent. Almost all the pleas raised before us were taken before the President in the objections filed by one of the petitioners. Again on 16.4.1996, 21.5.1996, 21.6.1996, 20.7.1996 and 26.8.1996, the Ministry of Home Affairs was requested to obtain and communicate the assent of the President to the Bangalore Palace (Acquisition and Transfer) Bill, 1996. On 26.9.1996, the Director (Judicial), Ministry of Home Affairs, sought further in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 essentially comprised of two parts. While Clause (1) dealt with the guarantee of the right of property save by authority of law, Clause (2) dealt with compulsory acquisition of the property. Vide Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, Article 31 was omitted. Clause (1) of the said Article was taken away from the Chapter of the Part III of the Constitution and inserted a Article 300-A in Chapter VI. Clause (2) dealing with the compulsory acquisition of the property along with sub-clause(f) of Clause (1) of Article 19 was omitted. The effect of 44th. Amendment is that the right to hold the property has ceased to be a fundamental right and it has been left to the Legislature to deprive a citizen of his property by a legislative action. The mere fact that a person has not been paid adequate compensation would not render the law unconstitutionaf, even if it deprives a person of his property it has been held by the Supreme Court in JILUBHAI NANBHAI KHACHAR'S10 case supra, that right to property under Article 300-A is not a basic feature or structure of the Constitution; it is only a Constitutional right. A citizen can be deprived of his ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tself was omitted from the Constitution, the question arises whether payment of compensation is a sine qua non for deprivation of property under Article 300A? In any democracy governed by rule of law, Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land. Rescore Pound, a sociological jurist whose writings have virtually opened new vistas in the sphere of justice, stated that 'the justice meant not as an individual or ideal relations among men but a regime in which the adjustment of human relations and ordering of the human conduct for peaceful existence.' According to him, 'the means of satisfying human claims to have things and to do things should go around, as far as possible, with least friction and waste. In his A Survey of Social Interests , 57th, Harvard Law Review, 1 at 39(1943), he elaborated thus : Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust these overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands, either through securing them directly and immediately, or through securing certain individual interests or through delimitations or compromises of individual interests, so as to give effect to the greatest total of inter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vided for under Article 31(2) enacting that no law shall be made which takes away or abridges these safeguards, and any such law, if made, shall be void, there can be no room for implication and the words acquisition of property are required to be understood in their natural sense of the act of acquiring property, without importing into the phrase an obligation to pay compensation or a condition as to the existence of a public purpose. The express provisions in Article 31(3) provided for compensation which necessarily excluded all suggestions of an implied obligation to provide for compensation. . However, after the 44th Amendment and in the absence of express provisions for payment of compensation, no law can be held to be unconstitutional, only because adequate compensation has not been intended to be paid to the owner of the property. After referring to various judgments, the Apex Court in Kesavananda Bharati's case supra has held: The article as amended provides no norm for the Court to test the adequacy of the amount or the relevancy of the principle. Whereas the word 'compensation', even after the Fourth Amendment, was thought to give such a norm, namely, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t in the doctrine of Eminent Domain, can be imported into Entry 42 even after the vortex of constitutional amendments which have taken place since that Doctrine had been applied in Kameswar's case. But before that, we should realise that this present argument involves a patent legal fallacy : It assumes that the extra-constitutional principle of 'Eminent Domain' subsisted in India even after the adoption of provisions to the same effect in the Constitution itself, and after repeal of those provisions. If we examine the authorities in Eminent Domain together with the observations of Mahajan, J. in Kameswar's case, it would be clear that the doctrine of Eminent Domain is, primarily, a source of power of the State, such as the power of taxation or the 'police power'. The power of Eminent Domain means the power of the Sovereign to take the subject's property, without his consent , for the purposes of the State or public purposes. Even after all the Amendments, that power is contained in Entry 42 of List III, so that it is not necessary for the State, in India, to rely on anything extra-constitutional, to assert this right against its subjects. 7 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cle 31-C and the deliberated efforts of the Legislature, we are satisfied that the Act cannot be quashed on the alleged ground that some sums of money are liable to be paid out of the compensation amount to the persons and authorities mentioned in Schedule II of the Act, would not be sufficient to conclude that the petitioners have been deprived of the property without any compensation. Liquidation of debts and loans is the statutory obligation of the petitioners and if, in order to avoid litigation, the State itself has made a provision for the appointment of a Commissioner and for payment of the loans, it cannot be said that the petitioners would be deprived of their property without payment of compensation because the liquidation of the loans would be for and on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners cannot be permitted to say that they may choose not to make the payment to the authorities like the Central Government and the State Government, banks and public finance institutions. There is no substance in the argument of the petitioners that as the Act intends to deprive them of the property without payment of compensation, the same is liable to be quashed. REG. VIOLATIO ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... TOR FOR THE UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI AND ORS. [1962]2SCR125 held that a statute or rule made thereunder applying in equally to persons or things similarly situated would be a direct violation of Article 14. A classification may be reasonable, even though a single individual is treated as a class by himself, provided there are special circumstances of reasons applicable to him alone and not applicable to others. The basis of classification may be geographical, historical, according to different in time and may be based on the difference in the nature of persons, trade, dwelling or occupation which is sought to be regulated by the legislation. 74. In BUDHAN CHOUDHRY v. THE STATE OF BIHAR 1955CriLJ374 , it was held : The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India,: [1950]1SCR869 (A), State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, 1951 SCR 682 : (AIR1951 SC 318) (B), State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952CriLJ510 (C), Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, 1952CriLJ805 (D), Lachmandas Kewalram v. State of Bombay, 1952CriLJ1167 (E), and - 'Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyder ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws. A close perusal of the decisions of this Court in which the above principles have been enunciated and applied by this Court will also show that a statute which may come up for consideration on a question of its validity under Article 14 of the Constitution may be placed in one or the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny, the Court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situated and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case, the Court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (D) (supra), Dwarka Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1954]1SCR803 (M) and Dhirendra Kumar Mondal v. Superintendent Remembrancer of Legal Affaris 1955 1 SCR 2241 : (AIR 1954 SC 424). A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... shed that the petitioners and their companies had been arbitrarily singled out for the purpose of hostile and discriminatory treatment and subjected to a harassing and oppressive enquiry. It was further observed that nowhere in the petitions was there even an averment that there were other persons or companies similarly situated as the petitioners and their companies. Certain principles of law have been laid down in that decision. These principles still hold the field and are helpful in considering the constitutionality of a statute. One of these principles is that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be related as a class by himself. 76. In the instant case, it is alleged that as the impugned Act discriminates the legal heirs of the Maharaja of Mysore from other citizens, the same was liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The facts noted hereinabove would clearly show that the petitioners herein constitute a class in themselves and no discrimination has been made amon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nstance. It also does not refer to the cause of alleged colourable exercise of power and jurisdiction against the petitioners. In order to succeed on the ground of malafides, a petitioner is required to place before the Court circumstances, which, if not controverted, would lead to the conclusion that the action taken was not in public interest, but was for extraneous considerations. The malafides or ulterior motives attributed to a State Legislature in making a law otherwise in its competence can never make such law unconstitutional. In K. NAGARAJ v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (1985) ILLJ 444 SC it was held : The Legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. If no reasons are so stated as appears from the provisions enacted by it. Its reasons for passing a law or those that are stated in the Objects and Reasons. Even assuming that the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive cannot render the passing of the law mala fide. This kind of 'transferred malice' is unknown in the field of legislation. The same position was reiterated by the Apex Court in G.C. KANUNGO v. STATE OF ORI ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ally betray the scope and purpose of Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. While Article 39(b) refers to material resources of the community , the aims and objects of the Act refer to the material resources of the Madras Race Club . It is difficult to understand what exactly are the material resources of the race-club which are sought to be distributed so as to subserve the common good within the meaning of the Directive Principles. Equally, the reference to Article 39(c) is wholly misplaced. While Article 39(c) relates to the operation of the economic system... to the common detriment , the aims and objects of the Act refer to the economic system of the Madras Race Club . What is meant by the economic system of the Madras Race Club is not known. Even if it is assumed that betting by the punters at the totalistic and with the bookmakers is part of the economic system of the Madras Race Club, it has no relevance to the objectives specified in Article 39 (b) and (c). We are, therefore, of the view that reference to Article 39(b) and (c) in the aims and objects and in Section 2 of the Act is nothing but a mechanical reproduction of constitutional provisions in a totally inapp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mean the passing over of the ownership. The Supreme Court in THE FRUIT and VEGETABLE MERCHANTS UNION v. THE DELHI IMPROVEMENT TRUST [1957]1SCR1 held : That the word vest is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of India statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolevenly Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a Receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that such property shall thereupon vest in such Receiver . The property vests in the Receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the Receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose evenly Act and the Receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances . In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Gov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor... the proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an imperial or in a provincial Legislature, they may (In their Lordship's judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally. Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient.... Venkatarama Ayyar, J. further stated ibid, pp. 618-619: .... The reason for upholding a legislative provision authorising an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is that it must depend on the facts as they may exist at a given point of time whether the law should then be made to operate, and tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... odied in the statute. It is, however, for the Legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern the parties and transactions and require the Court to give effect to that law. The Legislature, however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly overrule, reveres or over-ride a judicial decision. It may, however, at any time, in exercise of the preliminary powers under Article 245 and 246 of the Constitution, render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. In SMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI v. SIR RAJ NARAIN [1976]2SCR347 , it was held that rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent Courts and Tribunals by changing their basis of legislative enactment is a well known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidate all actions or proceedings is not an encroachment of judicial power. In I.N. Saksena's case supra, the Court held : While, in view of this distinction between l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which was allegedly adjudicated in their favour is intended to be taken away by the Act. All the authorities have so far decided the cases against the petitioners. The mere pendency of the Writ Petitions in the Courts against the orders passed detrimental to the petitioners could not be termed to be adjudication of any right in their favour. legislation with respect to the acquisition and transfer of the Palace cannot be termed to be intended to over-ride a judicial decision allegedly made in favour of the petitioners. What is stated under Section 40 is that as the Palace has been acquired under the Act, all notification issued under any of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the Palace shall stand withdrawn and proceedings, if any, taken in pursuance of such notification shall abate. The notification issued under the Acquisition Act which was challenged by the petitioners has been declared to have been abated for which the petitioners cannot have any grievance. The impugned Act, therefore, does not, in any way, interfere with the judicial process of the Court. Rather, the Act demonstrates the sincerity of the respondents of their intention to acquire a unique ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an order on 6.6.1994 that the compromise be recorded. The parties thereafter filed a joint memo, reporting compliance. Under the compromise, the Chamaraju group was separated from the Maharaja group in the holdings of the petitioner-Company and in lieu thereof, they were held entitled to retain 45 acres of the Palace property and returned the balance 65 acres of land to the Maharaja group. The property, which is in possession of the petitioner-Company since 11.11.1974, was assessed to property tax and katha was registered in its name, which was revoked by the City Corporation in the year 1985. After the compromise on 6.6.1994, this Court directed the Bangalore City Corporation to pass appropriate orders on the basis of the compromise as to the bifurcation of the katha. 88. After the enforcement of the Ceiling Act, the petitioner-Company is stated to have filed statements under Section 6(1) of the Ceiling Act, before the Additional Deputy Commissioner and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Bangalore in 1976. The competent authority clubbed all the matters pertaining to Bangalore Palace property and passed a consolidated order on 27.7.1989. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 269-UD, in express terminology, provides that the appropriate authority may make an order for the purchase of the property for reasons to be recorded in writing . Section 269-UD(2) casts an obligation on the authority that it shall cause a copy of its order under sub-section (1) in respect of any immovable property to be served on the transferor , It is, therefore, inconceivable that the order which is required to be served by the appropriate authority under sub-section (2) would be the one which does not contain the reasons for the passing of the order or is not accompanied by the reasons recorded in writing. It may be permissible to record reasons separately that the order would be an incomplete order, unless either the reasons are incorporated therein or are served separately along with order on the affected party. We are, of the view, that reasons for the order must be communicated to the affected party. 90. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, no such statutory obligation is shown to be existing against the State for providing an opportunity of being heard. As already held, the principles of natural justice would not be applicable to a legislati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
