9911796707
TMI Blog1922 (12) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot regulated in any sense by Hindu law, but wholly by custom, which custom has no place in it for adoption, or, alternately, for the succession of an adopted son. 2. The Lachmipur Raj is situated in N.W. Bengal in the district of Bhagalpur, part of it extending into the Santhal Parganas. A point was raised in the case that by reason of Regulation 3 of 1872, relating to these Parganas, the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Bhagalpur had no jurisdiction to try it, even though the plaintiffs abandoned that part of their claim which related to the portion in the Santhal Parganas. 3. This view was taken in the High Court, and, if it be correct, is at once fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. It seemed, however, to their Lordships not so plain, on first impression, that this decision was correct, and counsel for the respondent desiring to have the matter tried upon the merits, their Lordships have heard the argument upon the merits without further discussion of the preliminary question of jurisdiction, and as upon the merits they have come to a conclusion, in accordance with that of both Courts below, that the plaintiffs have failed to make out their case, they do not deem it neces ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Koch tribe, who had begun to designate themselves as Rajbansis, and for social purposes affected to be Hindus. This Board came to the conclusion that, though they affected to be Hindus, they were not generally governed by Hindu law, but had retained and were governed by family custom, which as regards some matters was at variance with the Hindu law; and this Board held that the High Court had been wrong in holding that the question was whether the general Hindu law was modified by a family custom forbidding adoption, and that the real question was whether with respect to inheritance the family is governed by Hindu law or by customs which did not allow an adopted son to inherit. Having thus stated the question, their Lordships came to a conclusion upon the evidence agreeing in this respect with the judge of first instance, and disagreeing with the High Court, that without regarding the burden of proof the facts showed that no succession by way of adoption was admissible. They summed up their judgment by saying : Whether, if the Baikunthpur family were shown to have become Hindus out and out saving only special customs, such evidence would be sufficient to prove a special ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dis by blood relations cannot be defeated by adoption. This allegation made in para. 5 is repeated in para. 11. It should be added that in para. 3, when dealing with the rights of a widow who came into the line of succession, she is said to have come into possession with the limited rights of a Hindu widow succeeding to the property of her deceased husband under the Benares school of Hindu law. 10. In accordance with this contention, the issue framed in respect of this matter was stated as follows : Is the Lachmipur estate one of the alleged 84 Gadis called Chowrasi, as stated in paragraph 5 of the plaint, and governed by a family or clannish custom by which adoption is forbidden and which bars inheritance by an adopted son? Is such a custom valid? And upon that a large part of the evidence had been given when, on July 26, 1915, an application was made by a petition presented on behalf of the plaintiffs of which the following passages are important : 1. That the plaintiffs have within the last week come to know from a very authoritative source that the ancestors of the late Thakur Lalit Narain Deo were originally non-Hindus, and in course of time adopted only certain rules ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Hindu law, according to the school of Benares--that is, the Mitakshara--was of general application to these Chowrasi gaddis. Their Lordships listened to an analysis of such of these cases as counsel for the appellants thought could be scrutinised usefully, and they see no reason to qualify the conclusions of the High Court. 12. To sum up this part of the case, the combination of the plaintiffs' own statement, the oral evidence and the judgments in former cases is, in their Lordships' opinion, sufficient to justify the conclusion of the High Court that this clan, even supposing its origin to be not Hindu, had adopted in general, not only Hindu religion and Hindu social usages, but also the Hindu law regulating the succession of landed property, and this though, as the judges held, there were still some relics of non-Hinduism. 13. It was suggested for the appellants that this conclusion was not enough, that if it could be proved that there was a customary law of succession before these people became converted to Hinduism, that custom could not be abrogated by conversion. 14. Now this case does not deal with modern conversion, but with a conversion which is at leas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .A. 72. There is force in this contention, though there are counter observations to be made. In that case there was no single instance of adoption carrying succession whereas in the case now before the Board there were certainly some instances, though not very many, proved. And more remarkable still, the defendant was adopted with much publicity and solemnity as far back as 1885, and was installed on the gaddi with considerable pomp in February, 1902, and no protest or objection appears to have been raised. Moreover, later on he was with almost equal solemnity out-casted, in February, 1907, because he consorted with another outcaste, and in the document recording his sentence he is described every time his name is mentioned as the adopted son Pratap Narayan Deo. This document is signed by nearly all the great men of the clan. After this, it is not altogether surprising that the very eminent counsel who appeared for the appellants in the High Court felt himself, as it were, driven from his other arguments, and took up the position that adoption might indeed be permissible, but that succession to the estate did not follow from the adoption. It was open to him to take this point wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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