9911796707
TMI Blog1955 (1) TMI 40X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -wishers that he should execute in favour of his wife and his mother jointly what is called a settlement deed which is Ex. A-1, in the case. Under that deed, the first defendant's share in the joint family properties was settled on the plaintiff and her mother-in-law for life subject to the condition that he should receive a sum of ₹ 200 per annum for his maintenance. It was also provided therein that the properties should, after their death, pass to the male issue that might be born to the first defendant. This deed was executed on 17th November 1932. About four years later, there was a partition in the family evidenced by Ex. A-4, a registered partition deed, dated 20th October 1936. The first defendant's mother, Seethamma, had died in the meanwhile and the plaintiff was treated by the other sharers as the person entitled to the whole of the share of the first defendant in the family properties. She was thus assigned the specific properties described in Ex. A-4 as the third 'C' share . The first defendant was not a party to the partition and he made no complaint at any time thereafter that his rights were not recognised thereunder. Nearly five years later, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... self directly to this principle question. Without going into the evidence as regards the reality or otherwise of the transactions evidenced by Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-4, he proceeded to consider what he calls the validity of Ex. A-1 (a) as a contract supported by consideration and (b) as a gift. He held that, as Ex. A-1 evidences a contract imposing a liability on a minor who is incompetent to contract it is void ab initio. He also held that, in any event, Ex. A-1 conveyed only a half interest in the suit properties to the plaintiff while the other half vested in the deceased mother of the first defendant. He therefore thought that, as the plaintiff was not the heir of her mother-in-law she would, at the most, be entitled to recover only a half share in the suit properties. Looking at Ex. A-1 as a deed of gift, in the alternative, he was of the opinion that as no individual member of a Hindu family could alienate his undivided share by way of gift, Ex. A-1 was void from that standpoint also. He proceeded therefore to record a finding in these terms: If under Ex. A-1, the plaintiff gets no rights Ex. A-1 being a void transaction, Ex. A-4 also automatically falls. 4. The reason ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roper way of looking at it is as a gift deed. Strictly speaking, in a case like this, it is not only permissible but very reasonable to construe the transaction as a gift to the minor for life of the whole of the income of the property minus the money payable by way of maintenance to the donor. We cannot see how a minor is incapacitated by law from receiving a gift of that nature. Alternatively, it would be treated as a gift deed with a condition attached. Section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with an onerous gift in favour of a minor. The third paragraph of that section runs thus: A donee not competent to contract and accepting property burdened by any obligation is not bound by his acceptance. But, if after becoming competent to contract and being aware of the obligation, he retains the property given, he becomes so bound. 6. Applying the terms of that section to the present case, it has to be considered whether the plaintiff had repudiated the gift after she had attained majority, a question which has not been considered by the Court below and which, in our opinion, needs no consideration in the circumstances of this case because it was not only not conte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law. It is true that joint tenancy as such is unknown to Hindu Law. It cannot therefore be contended that the plaintiff obtained by survivorship the other half share on the death of the co-grantee. It is to be noted however that the other members of the family proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff became entitled to the whole of the estate on the death of Seethamma and that the share which the first defendant should have otherwise got, was allotted by them to the plaintiff. We think they were right in doing so. As we read Ex. A-1, the remainder in the properties is to pass to the male issue of the donor only after both the lives of the grantees. It seems to us that neither the donor nor his sons could reduce the properties to possession and enjoyment until after Seethamma as well as the plaintiff had died. We therefore hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the whole of the properties for her life. 9. The findings recorded by the learned Subordinate Judge as regards the payment of consideration by the several alienees have in our judgment no real bearing upon the plaintiff's right to recover the properties. If the first defendant had no title to convey, surely the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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