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TMI Blog1928 (1) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... never been a dissolution of the partnership between Amina Bi and the defendant. The latter's declaration in November 1921, could not amount to a dissolution, since he remained in possession of the firm's assets and continued to carry on its business. The District Judge further said that, as a Mahomedan widow, Amina Bi could have no share in the mill itself. I know of no authority for this proposition, which has not been supported. Aminal Bi asked only for her share of the profits for three years before the suit and in my view she is clearly entitled to that. The decree of the District Court is amended by declaring that the plaintiffs collectively are entitled to one-half of the assets of the firm at the time of the death of Masaji Hashi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as it was at the time of Hashim Acha's death and to reasonable compensation for the use of the mill since that time. Alternatively the plaintiffs claimed, as heirs of Hashim Acha, their one-half share of the property and an account of and their share in the profits made from it since his death. Plaintiff 1 claimed a share of the profits only for three years before the suit, while the other plaintiffs claimed for the whole of the period. The defendant's reply to that was that the plaintiffs could not join such an alternative claim with their claim based on partnership and that there was a misjoinder of parties in that plaintiff 1, Amina Bi, as administratrix of the estate, was the only person who could sue as representative of Hashi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t personally liable for the obligations of the firm, but that his share of the property of the firm is so liable. The question then arises: How can the minor's share be made so liable? Certainly not by the agreement of the minor himself or of any person not qualified to contract on his behalf. The necessary conditions which might have made liable the share of the minors in the mill and the other capital (if any) of the former firm were not present in this case and therefore the general rule laid down in Section 11 applies fully and the agreement was not a contract binding on the minors and therefore it was not a contract at all, but a mere void agreement. I have no doubt that both plaintiff 1 and the defendant at the time of making th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inder as would justify interference in any sense. 9. Coming to the appeal of plaintiff 1, Amina Bi: the District Judge held that her suit for dissolution was time barred under Article 114, Lim. Act. I am unable to agree that that article applies. The dissolution of a partnership is not a rescission of a contract. There appears to be no article specifically dealing with a suit for dissolution. That being so, I think that Article 120 would apply, thus giving a period of six years. And the starting point would be the time when the defendant refused to give the plaintiff any of the profits of the business, that is, from 1922, or at the earliest November 1921. On that basis the suit was in time. I do not consider that Article 106 can apply, b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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