1928 (1) TMI 4

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..... hildren. They sue now for dissolution of partnership and for an account. 2. The defence was a denial of the alleged new partnership and a contention that the plaintiffs were entitled only to a half share of the mill as it was at the time of Hashim Acha's death and to reasonable compensation for the use of the mill since that time. Alternatively the plaintiffs claimed, as heirs of Hashim Acha, their one-half share of the property and an account of and their share in the profits made from it since his death. Plaintiff 1 claimed a share of the profits only for three years before the suit, while the other plaintiffs claimed for the whole of the period. The defendant's reply to that was that the plaintiffs could not join such an alterna .....

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..... that Section 247, Contract Act is sufficient to make the, agreement a binding contract. I do not think that it is. That section lays down that when a minor is admitted to the benefits of partnership he is not personally liable for the obligations of the firm, but that "his share of the property of the firm" is so liable. The question then arises: How can the minor's share be made so liable? Certainly not by the agreement of the minor himself or of any person not qualified to contract on his behalf. The necessary conditions which might have made liable the share of the minors in the mill and the other capital (if any) of the former firm were not present in this case and therefore the general rule laid down in Section 11 applies fully an .....

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..... aims put forward. And I do not think that any misjoinder of parties that there may be is more than a mere technical error not affecting the merits of the case in any way. In my view there is no such misjoinder as would justify interference in any sense. 9. Coming to the appeal of plaintiff 1, Amina Bi: the District Judge held that her suit for dissolution was time barred under Article 114, Lim. Act. I am unable to agree that that article applies. The dissolution of a partnership is not a rescission of a contract. There appears to be no article specifically dealing with a suit for dissolution. That being so, I think that Article 120 would apply, thus giving a period of six years. And the starting point would be the time when the defendant r .....

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