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TMI Blog1959 (10) TMI 45X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y, however, add, that I have felt considerable difficulty on one aspect of the case which relates to the submission of Messrs, Pathak and Jagdish Swarup that the provisions of the U.P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as also the schedule to the Act show that it is a lax not on land but on the person who holds the land. The Act undoubtedly lays down that a person having a small area of land has to pay proportionately a small amount of tax but, if the same and is held by another person who already holds a vast area of land, that very small portion of land would be assessed to a higher amount of tax. The incidence of tax is thus not dependent entirely on characteristics of the land itself, such as its area, quality of soil or value whether rental, annual or capitalised. Such characteristics remaining common, the same parcel of land under the Act gives rise to a larger liability of tax if it happens to be held by a person who already holds other lands as compared with the liability when the land is held by a person who does not hold any other lands, IB would appear in these circumstances that the manner, in which the tax incidence has been impos ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is difficult to hold that the mere fact that the incidence of tax is made dependent on the extent of landholding of a particular landholder would convert a tax, which otherwise would be a tax on land, into a tax on the capital assets of the landholder in respect of his land-holdings. In this connection, a parallel is provided by the entry relating to taxes on income under which the Indian Income Tax Act was enacted. That entry also does not contain any provision that the tax to be imposed must be a tax on a person in respect of his income. The entry specifically permits imposition of taxes on income. In the case of the Central Legislature, the entry is No. 82 of. List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution permitting imposition of taxes on income other than agricultural income. In the case of the States, the entry is No. 46 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution permitting imposition of taxes on agricultural income. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1939, which was enacted under entry No. 54 of List I of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to entry No. 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, in prescribing the incidenc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not competent to pass the Act; (2) that there is a delegation of essential legislative functions by the U. P. Legislature and as such the impugned Act is ultra vires; and (3) that the incidence of taxation is so high that the tax is confiscatory in nature and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Jagdish Swarup has also made the same submissions but in a different way, Mr. Rama Shanker Prasad contended that the tax to be levied by the impugned Act is nothing but land revenue and inasmuch as Ss. 251 and 267 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided that the land revenue of a Bhumidar cannot be increased, the effect of the Act would be that the same would be considerably increased in the name of a tax. It is also contended by him that there cannot be two statutes for the recovery of the same tax and, in any case, the land revenue cannot be recovered twice over from the same person. In the end he has submitted that inasmuch as Section 7 of the Act gives the power of making assessment to the same person who issues the notice asking for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t be imposed by the U, P. Legislature. Mr. Pathak has also contended that it is a well known rule of interpretation of fiscal statutes that for the determination of the question as to what is the object of the tax, the charging section alone must be looked into if the language of that section is unambiguous and it is not permissible to look into the machinery sections in order to find out as to what is the subject-matter of taxation. Mr. Pathak has also submitted that even the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 should not be looked into for determining the object of the tax, because, according to him, the proviso is redundant for contradictory to the enacting clause in Section 3 (1) of the Act. I will come to the question as to whether or not it is permissible to look to the Act as a whole to find out as to what is the object of taxation and also to the effect of the proviso in the present case at a later stage, and for the present would content myself with the consideration of the language of Section 3 (1) of the Act without the proviso. After having carefully examined the provisions of Section 3 of the Act I have come to the conclusion that the object of the tax is not the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... each land holding", but the omission to put those words does not, in my opinion, in any way affect the correct interpretation of the sub-section and that for two reasons. In the first place, "on" is used also in the sense o[ "on the basis of. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, amongst the meanings given to the word "on" the following also appear; "Indicating non-material basis, ground or footing -- Indicating the ground, basis or reason of action, opinion etc. . . . indicating that which forms the basis of income, taxation, borrowing, betting, profit, or loss". In my opinion the word "on" here has been used in the sense of footing or basis. Therefore even though the words "on the basis of" or "on the footing of" have not been used in the sub-section that does not in any way restrict the meaning of the word "on" in the present context and it must be held that the expression "on the annual value of each land holding" in the context must mean "on the basis of the annual value of each land holding". The word "on" is also frequently used like "upon" (see Strou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oviso is riot enacted by means of a sub-section to Section 3 but is a part of Sub-section (1) itself, and after the main clause there is a colon and thereafter the proviso finds its place in the following words: "Provided that no such tax shall be charged on any land holding the area whereof does not exceed thirty acres." 7. The proviso clearly shows that it is the land holding and not the annual value of the holding which is the subject-matter of taxation. It is not possible to read the proviso detached from the main clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 because, as I 'have said above, the proviso is not contained in a separate sub-section but forms part of Sub-section (1) itself and after the words "at the rates specified in the schedule" there is no full stop but only a colon. Therefore, according to the ordinary rules of grammar the whole of Sub-section (1) including the proviso has got to be read together. In Jennings v. Kelly 1940 AC 206, the House of Lords say that there is no rule that the first or enacting part is to be construed without reference to the proviso. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction which is that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot;Lord Macmillan in M. and S. M. Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality laid down the sphere of a proviso as follows : The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. Where, as in the present case, the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no re- percussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly says "unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect' (vide also Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Attorney General for Canada, 1946 AC 32.)" (underlined by me here in "..... .). The facts of the Privy Coun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... slation." 10. In the case of Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna: AIR 1947 PC 60, while considering the validity of the Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1940, the Privy Council examined not only Section 13 which was the main section but also Ss. 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34 and 36 in order to determine the true nature of the legislation. 11. In (1937 AC 863) it was observed as follows : "It is well established that you are to look at the 'true nature and character of the legislation' 1882 AC 829, the pith and substance of the legislation. If, on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field." This judgment was noticed by Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. F. N. Balasara AIR 1951 SC 318. The pith and substance of a particular Act can be gathered only after perusing the Act as a whole, In fact Mr. Pathak's argument that it is a tax on the capital value of land cannot be complete unless he takes the aid of Section 5 of the Act and the relevant rules. Section 3 of the Act only ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erence under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 1936 AC 352, which has been quoted by the Federal Court in their judgment in the case of Ralla Ram v. Province of East Punjab, which says : "It is the essential character of the particular tax charged that is to be regarded, and the nature of the machinery -- often complicated -- by which the tax is to be assessed is not of assistance, except in so far as it may throw light on the general character of the tax." 12. I have looked carefully into the case reported in 1936 AC 352. In my opinion there is nothing in that case which would justify the conclusion that for gathering the pith and substance of a tax it is not open to a Court to have a general review of the entire Act. 13. The learned counsel has placed reliance upon the following passage from the judgment of Broomfield, J., in Sir Byramjee v. Province of Bombay. "We have to discover what is the 'essential character' of the tax, what it is in pith and substance,' apart from the mere machinery by which it is assessed, and we are to look mainly at the charging Sections of the Act for this purpose." The learned counsel also relied upon the fol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he tax. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on the point but it may be stated without any fear of contradiction that the general judicial practice has been to look into the various provisions of an Act in order to determine its pith and substance and that is so even with regard to fiscal statutes, 16. Looking to the whole of the Act it appears to me that it is clearly a tax on the holding and not on the annual value and the annual value is only the measure of the tax. This conclusion finds full support from the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 which is a part of the charging section itself as also from Ss. 7, 11, 15 and 17 of the Act and also from a perusal of the preamble and the long title to the Act. I have already given above what Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides. Section 7 provides for the publication of a notice requiring every land holder to furnish a return in connection with the payment of the "Holding tax'. Section 11 provides for an appeal against an assessment in respect of 'land holding*. Section 15 empowers the assessing authority to issue a notice when in its opinion any land holding has not been assessed or has been assessed at t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... That case in fact supports the view that I have taken and not the one which Mr. Pathak has propounded as the following observations of their Lord ships of the Privy Council will show : "The preamble describes that to have been the object of the Statute; and there can be no doubt that we must consider the preamble as a key to the construction of the Statute, though it would not, of course, control every provision, for we very often find that the subsequent provisions of a statute extend beyond the limits of the preamble." 20. The third case cited by Mr. Pathak is Omrao Begum v. Government of India 10 Ind App 39 (PC). That case is an authority for the proposition that the provisions of a section in the statute, cannot be controlled by any words in the preamble.' That case is distinguishable on the facts of the case before us. In our case the preamble is not sought to control the provisions of the Act. It is being considered along with the various provisions of the Act and I have already said above that it is not inconsistent either with the charging section or with the other sections in the Act. This case can, therefore, be of no help to the learned counsel, 21. Mr. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... able to point out any entry in the Union List (List I) which would cover the present legislation. Entry No. 86 in List I reads as follows : "Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies." This is a verbatim reproduction of entry No. 55 of List I of the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the 1935 Act). Entry No. 49 of List II reads as follows : "Taxes on lands and buildings." In the 1935 Act its counterpart was Item No. 42 which reads as follows : "Taxes on lands and buildings, hearths and windows." , Under the Government of India Act, 1919, the Provincial Legislatures had authority to law a tax on land as also on buildings but not to implement the revenues of the province and only for the benefit of the local authorities. As is well known there were no lists in the 1919 Act. Till then India did not come to have a federal form of Government and that being so there could be no question of two sovereign spheres of legislation. However, the Provincial Legislative Council were given some powers by way of administrative convenience and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an: [1955]2SCR303 , and United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, where very wide interpretation was given to the entries). The words 'Tax on land' must be given their widest connotation and it has got to be held that it is open to the State Legislature under the sanction of Entry No. 49 of List II to impose any kind of tax on land. I have already held above that the charging section as also other sections in the Act make it abundantly clear that the 'impugned Act only purports to tax land or land holding. It thus appears to me that it was within the competence of the State Legislature to have enacted the present Act. Once it is found that the subject matter of the impugned Act is within the competence of the State Legislature nothing can prevent them from legislating about it, there being no prohibition in the Constitution against it. (See Jagannath Baksh v. United Provinces, , which was affirmed by the Privy Council in Jagannath Baksh v. United Provinces AIR 1948 PC 127). It may also be mentioned that there is nothing in Entry No. 49 of List II or in any provision in the body of the Constitution to justify the argument that the State Legislature cannot impose a tax on capita ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ban Immovable Property Tax Act 1940, fall within item 42 of the Provincial List of the 1935 Act (equivalent to Entry 49 of List II of the Constitution). Their Lordships answered by saying that it was a tax which fell under Entry 42 of the Provincial List. The Punjab Act was in some respects like our Act. The charging section there provided for charging, levying and paying of an annual tax on buildings and lands at the rate of not exceeding 20 per cent of the annual value of such buildings and land. The annual value of the land and the buildings was to be determined under Section 5 of that Act. The argument was that the basis of the tax was the annual value of the building and land and inasmuch as annual value was the fairest standard for measuring income it was a tax on income which would fall under Entry No. 54 of List I and could not fall under Entry No. 42 of List II. Their Lordships held that the broad contention that whenever the annual value is the basis of a tax the tax became one on income was not correct and that other factors had to be taken into consideration. It was further held that the charging section spoke of a tax on land and buildings and not one on income and th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the U. P. Municipalities Act, and observed that under both these Acts tax on land or buildings or on both could be imposed by some of the Indian Municipalities on the basis of capital valuation of the land or buildings which were sought to be taxed. The learned Judges further held that considering the provisions of the two Acts mentioned above it could be said that the legislative practice prevailing in the country was to permit a tax on land or building or on both an the basis of its capital value and, therefore, further held that the Parliament while enacting the 1935 Act must have been aware of this legislative practice and must have intended to permit under entry No. 42 of List II a tax on land or building or on both on the basis of its capitalised value. Having said that, they held the Bombay rule to be intra vires. 29. The considerations which governed the learned Judges of the Federal Court as also of the Bombay High Court in the two cases mentioned above are also present in the case before us and even if it be assumed in our case that the annual value is the capitalised value of land, the capitalised value is only the basis and' not the object of taxation. In this vie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed that that would be taxing the capital value of non-agricultural land. In other words the submission is that the State Legislature is not competent to impose a tax on the capitalised value of non- agricultural, land. It is further submitted that under entry No. 49 of List II the extent of the power of the State Legislature in respect of agricultural and non-agricultural land is the same and inasmuch as considering the effect of entry No. 86 of List I there can be levied no tax on the capitalised value of non-agricultural land under entry No. 49 of the State List, it must be held that the State Legislature is not competent to levy a tax on the capitalised value of agricultural land also under the cover of that entry. Entry No. 86 of List I speaks of taxes on capital assets. The question is whether the words 'capital assets' mean the total assets of all the properties in the hands of a person or even the value of one unit of a person's property. In the case of, Kania, J., (as he then was) expressed his clear opinion that under entry No. 55 of List I of the 1935 Act (equivalent to entry No. 86 of the Union List of the Constitution) the tax contemplated by that entry was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... directly called upon to consider the proper construction of the said Entry at all. Therefore, the attention of the learned Chief Justice was not drawn to the legislative history on the topic and it was not pointed out to him that in many Provincial Municipal Acts power has been expressly given to the Municipalities to impose a tax on lands after adopting the basis of the capital value of the said lands. As I have already pointed out, I have come to the conclusion that even if the capital value of lands is taken into consideration by the Municipal Corporation in determining the amount of tax to be levied on the open land, the tax does not become a tax on the capital value of the assets. But, with respect, I do not read these observations of the learned Chief Justice as expressing his considered decision that under Entry 42 in List II it would not be competent to the local Legislature to consider the capital value of lands at all. Therefore, I must hold that the learned trial Judge was wrong in coming to the conclusion that Rule 350A framed by the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad was 'ultra vires'." Vyas, J., who was the other learned Judge sitting with Gajendragadk ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lined to agree with Kania, J., (as he then was) that "assets" in Entry 86 mean all the assets. 33. Though it is really not necessary to decide the question as to by which entry would a tax on the capitalised value of non-agricultural land be covered, that being not the question before us, it may be said in answer to the argument of the learned counsel which has been very seriously pressed that it appears to me that even such a tax would fall under entry No. 49 of List II and not under entry No. 86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. It was held by the Federal Court in the case of Subrahmanyan v. Muttuswami, relying upon the case of Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King AIR 1921 PC 148, that the rule of construction is that the general language in the items of the Federal Legislative List in Section 100(1) of the 1935 Act yields to particular expressions in the Provincial Legislative List. The Supreme Court in the case of Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan: [1955]2SCR303 , observed as follows : "It was argued that the heads of legislation mentioned in the Entries should receive a liberal construction, and the decision in AIR 1941 FC 10 , was quoted in support of it. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t;. In my opinion it is permissible on the authority of these cases to restrict the meaning of the: word "assets" in entry No. 86 by excluding land,. both agricultural as well as non-agricultural, from, its ambit in order to give full scope to the expression "Taxes on land" occurring in entry No. 49 of List II. 35. If we examined the three lists carefully we find that in the present Constitution land, both agricultural and non-agricultural, is the exclusive preserve of the State Legislature and there are no entries in List I directly dealing with land. On the basis of the rule that in case of doubt all the entries in the three Lists must be carefully scanned to see as to in which particular entry the impugned legislation fits in or in which List that subject falls, it would appear that even with regard to a tax on the capitalised value of non-agricultural land the only relevant entry would be No. 49 of List II and not entry No. 86 of List I. I have already said above that it is really riot necessary for us to decide as to under what head would a legislation taxing the capitalised value of non-agricultural land fall because that is not the point which we have to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore elaborate and the chances of leaving anything for residuary legislation eliminated as far as human ingenuity could devise. It may be stated that in List I of the Constitution there are 97 entries against 59 in List I of the 1935 Act. Similarly in List II of the Constitution there are 66 entries as against 54 in List II of the 1935 Act, and in List II of the Constitution there are 47 entries as against 36 in the 1935 Act. It cannot be supposed for a moment that the Constitution makers could not conceive the idea of a tax on capitalised value of agricultural land, because, as will appear from entry No. 86 of List I itself, while providing for taxation on the assets of other forms of properly they excluded the assets or capitalised value of agricultural land from its operation expressly. The tax on the capitalised value of agricultural land was, therefore, within the conception of the Constituent Assembly. The possibility therefore, of its falling under the residuary powers has got to be completely excluded. 37. If the present Act cannot fall under the residuary powers then it must' fall under some entry in one of the three lists, and the only entry under which it can fall i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and a restriction of the powers cannot be inferred from a supposed omission in the Lists, because the Lists are not the source of power, the source being Article 246 of the Constitution of India. 39. In Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada (1912) AC 571 it was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council as follows : "In the interpretation of a completely self-governing Constitution founded upon a written organic instrument..... if the text is explicit, the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids. When the test is ambiguous, as, for example, when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had to the context and scheme of the Act. Again, if the text says nothing expressly, then it is not to be presumed that the Constitution with-holds the power altogether. 'On the contrary, it is to be taken for granted that the power is bestowed in some quarter' unless it be extraneous to the statute itself (as, for example, a power to make laws for some part of His Majesty's dominions outside of Canada) or otherwise is clearly repugnan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 1877 and was followed in course of time by other states," 41. This would show that taxes on land in a graded scale are one of the recognized methods of taxation. Again in Vol. 21 of the same book, same edition, at p. 839 it has been stated as follows : "The pervading objective of taxation, in concert with other Government policies, is to minimize the general welfare. Ideally, taxes promote this end in both a passive and an active manner. Passively, their role is to underwrite the substantive functions of Government by providing the necessary funds as equitably, conveniently and economically as possible, and with the minimum restrictive effect pa production. Actively, they have become an engine of social and economic betterment, capable of reducing extreme inequalities of wealth of checking inflation and profiteering in wartime, and of contributing Jo stable employment at high levels in peace time ...... The sense of social responsibility and, with it, the role of Government have steadily grown. In response to these changes, it was inevitable that the functions of taxation should be broadened and its standards recast ....... Equality in taxation is now generally con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... azette to delegate to any officer or authority any of the powers conferred by the Act to be exercised subject to any restrictions or conditions as may be specified in the notification, even the rule-making power can be delegated to any officer or authority. It is further submitted that inasmuch as the officers and the authorities have not been specified in Section 25 it is open to the State Government to delegate the rule-making power to the Inferior most officer and to the lowest of authorities. Learned counsel has strenuously contended that if an Act allows the State Government to delegate the power of laying down principles it would amount to delegation of essential legislative functions. While examining this argument it will be noticed that the, multiple contemplated by Sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been fixed by the State Government itself as 121/2 times for the whole of the State. That power has not been delegated to any one. As regards the principles which have got to be adopted in cases where there are no hereditary rate the Legislature has left it to be prescribed as to what should be the basis of fixing the amount which is to be multiplied by the multiple mentioned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lature and inasmuch as the Legislature has kept in itself the control to change them it must be held that there is no excessive delegation of essential legislative functions. 43. In the case of D. S. Garewal v. State of Punjab: AIR1959SC512 , their Lordships were considering the effect of Sections 3 and 4 of the All India Services Act, 1951. In that Act also there was a provision similar to Section 29 (3) of the Act. Their Lordships observed as follows : "At the same time Parliament took care to see that these rules were laid on the table of Parliament for fourteen days before they were to come into force and they were subject to modification, whether by way of repeal or amendment on a motion made by Parliament during the session in which they are so laid. This makes it perfectly clear that Parliament has in no way abdicated its authority, but is keeping strict vigilance and control over its delegate. Therefore, reading Section 4 along with Section 3(2) of the Act it cannot be said in the special circumstances of this case that there was excessive delegation to the Central Government by Section 3 (1). We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the g ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Ramji Lal v. Income Tax Officer: [1951]19ITR174(SC) and Laxmanappa v. Union of India: [1954]26ITR754(SC) , it was not possible to urge that the petitioners were deprived of any property and complain of the infringement of Article 31 of the Constitution because it has been held by their Lordships in the above two cases that inasmuch as there is a special provision under Article 265 of the Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law Clause (1) of Article 31 must be regarded as concerned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or collection of tax. He has, however, contended that the amount of tax assessed at least on the petitioners would be excessive and inasmuch as in addition to the payment of the tax the petitioners will have to pay the land revenue also, the total sums made payable would amount to the value of the land itself. He has relied upon the case of Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras: AIR1959SC300 , and has placed before us the following observations of their Lordships : "Before we scrutinize the provisions of the Act, the law on the subject may be briefly noticed. lender Article 19(1)(g) of the Consti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... thus there will be clear violation of the I two sections mentioned above. In this connection it may be stated that the learned counsel has not challenged the competence of the U. P. Legislature to pass the impugned Act because even if the tax is nothing but land revenue it was within the competence of the State Legislature to have passed it. In my opinion, however, the present tax is a tax on land and not land revenue. The land revenue may in a very wide sense be a tax on land but for the purpose of the Constitution the two have been considered as quite separate and totally different. Whereas Entry No. 49 of List II provides for a tax on land, Entry No. 45 provides for land revenue. In the face of there being two clear and distinctly different entries in List II it cannot be assumed that they relate to the same tax. Whereas the land revenue is the share of the Government or the sovereign power in the surplus profit after defraying the expenses of cultivation of the land, a tax on land is not a tax on profits and has got nothing to do with it. That being so the argument of the learned counsel that the tax is nothing but land revenue fails. Apart from it, even if it be assumed tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... facts and I am bound by that decision. In my opinion, therefore, there is no substance in this submission, of the learned counsel either. 47. The only submission that now remains to be considered is the one made by Mr. S. C. Khare that the impugned Act is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that there is a discrimination between large and small holdings and between agricultural and non-agricultural land as also land and other forms of property. In my opinion the argument has only got to be mentioned in order to be rejected. The agricultural land is a class by itself. If the Legislature did not think it proper to tax non-agricultural land but only agricultural land the Act cannot be said to be discriminatory. It is a matter of policy which is not justiciable. Similarly, the mere fact that there is a graded I scale of tax and the large land holdings are assessed to a larger tax does not make the provisions of the Act discriminatory. There is, in my opinion, a clear classification and that is based on a reasonable basis. I am also of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention that whereas the agricultural land is made the object of taxation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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