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TMI Blog1928 (12) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his own personal working is barred by the Statute of Limitation, and (2) that, as to workings by his lessees, he has wrongly been held to be jointly liable with them, whereas in this respect the plaintiffs' suit ought to have been dismissed as against him. 3. The plaintiffs' claim alleged fraud as against all the defendants, but this issue was found against the plaintiff's by the trial Judge, and this finding is not questioned now. 4. On the first of the two points of law referred to above, the trial Judge decided against the defendant Pugh, holding that the case fell within Article 48 in the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and accordingly the period of limitation began to run not from the time when the pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under the above-mentioned sannad of September 16, 1913. 9. By an indenture dated September 3, 1919, the interest of Bagchi in Parthargarda was assigned by him to the defendants, Pilcher & Co., Ltd. 10. To return now to the sannad of September 16, 1913, and the story connected with it. By that document the Rajah for value promised to grant to the Kohinoor Company above-mentioned settlement of twenty bighas of coal within Gaurigram within four months of its date and that the Company should have a lease similar to its Pathargarda lease. The sannad contained the following condition:- If the mining lease is not executed and registered within the said four months you shall not be competent to make any claim for obtaining this settlement. I s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 39;s workings in Gaurigram ceased in January, 1917. The suit was begun on June 26, 1920. 15. On the question whether the Courts in India were right in holding that the appellant was jointly liable with Bagchi and pilcher & Co. Ltd. respectively, for their workings in Gaurigram, it is necessary to mention a few further facts. 16. The deed of September 3, 1917, was, in their Lordships' opinion, an assignment of the appellant's rights and interests under his conveyance of February 5, 1915, and not a mere underlease. It is true that the appellant is therein described as "lessor" and Bagchi as "less." but the grant is of the whole of his interest. No sub-term is created and, therefore, no reversion expectant on a su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lief that he had obtained or would obtain sufficient authority for what he did. The conversion, therefore, was not dishonest. 22. The Schedule to the Act contains two material articles:- Description of suit, Article 44-For specific movable property lost or acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion or for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same." Article 49.-For other specifies movable property or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same. In each case the period of limitation is three years. 23. Under Article 48 the time from which the period begins to run is "when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. On this point their Lordships agree with the careful judgment of Das J. in the Lodna Colliery Co., Ltd. v. Bepin Behary Bose (1920) 55 Ind, Cas 113 he says :- ...Article 48 deals only with specific moveable property which falls under one of the classes, namely, (1) such property as has been lost or (2) as has been acquired by (a) theft, (b) dishonest misappropriation or (c) conversion. No other kind of moveable property is affected by this article. 26. It is true, he goes on to say, that in his opinion the defendant's conduct was equivalent to theft, but he adds a passage which shows clearly that he would have come to the same conclusion in a case of simple conversion (p. 134):- Its (the plaintiff's) complaint is that the de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s in both Courts have misapprehended the question they had to try, viz., whether the appellant was a joint tort-feasor with Bagchi and Pilcher & Co., Ltd., respectively. Neither the fact that he was their lessor -assuming contrary to their Lordships' view, that he was a lessor in the proper sense of the term-nor that he encouraged" the wrongdoers, whatever this may mean, would be sufficient by itself to support a finding that he was a joint tort-feasor. 32. Doe v. Harlow (supra) is certainly no authority for the view expressed in the Courts below. It established no principle at all. The question there was whether there was some evidence against one of two persons charged as tort-feasor with having wrongfully kept the plaintiff out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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