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TMI Blog1928 (12) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is not questioned now. 4. On the first of the two points of law referred to above, the trial Judge decided against the defendant Pugh, holding that the case fell within Article 48 in the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and accordingly the period of limitation began to run not from the time when the property in question was wrongly taken, but from the time when the plaintiffs first learnt in whose possession the property was. This point was not raised in the appeal to the High Court, but no objection was taken to its being raised before the Board. 5. The second of the two points was decided against the appellant by both the Courts in India. There were two concurrent findings, but the appellant contends that such findings were wrong in law, inasmuch as the learned Judges misdirected themselves, and there was in truth no evidence which would justify their findings. 6. The plaintiffs have in the suit established as against the defendants their right to the coal in an area called by various names, but referred to in the appellant's case and in this judgment as Gaurigram, under a mining pattah dated April 3, 1914, grant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r the purpose of obtaining from him, if possible, an extension of the sannad. He believed that he had obtained a promise to this effect, and in this belief and still with-out notice of the plaintiffs' rights, continued the workings under twenty bighas referred to in the sanand, It was not until June 23, 1919, that the appellant heard of the grant of April 3,1 14, and then realised of the mining rights within the twenty bighas in Gaurigram could not be obtained. By this time, as mentioned above, he had parted with his interest in Pathargarda by the grant of September 3, 1917, to Bagchi. 14. The appellant's workings in Gaurigram ceased in January, 1917. The suit was begun on June 26, 1920. 15. On the question whether the Courts in India were right in holding that the appellant was jointly liable with Bagchi and pilcher Co. Ltd. respectively, for their workings in Gaurigram, it is necessary to mention a few further facts. 16. The deed of September 3, 1917, was, in their Lordships' opinion, an assignment of the appellant's rights and interests under his conveyance of February 5, 1915, and not a mere underlease. It is true t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 23. Under Article 48 the time from which the period begins to run is when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is, and under Article 49 when the property is wrongfully taken or injured or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful. 24. In their Lordships' opinion the decision of the trial Judge in this case is correct, and Article 48 is the article that applies, the two articles are the only ones that apply to claims in respect of specific movable property. Article 48 alone refers to conversion, and their Lordships can see no ground for splitting up conversion into two classes, one dishonest and the other not dishonest. If such were the intention one would have expected to find such a distinction between different classes of the same tort made clear by the express inclusion in Article 49 of the second of the two classes. The truth is that, if the article is read without the commas inserted in the print, as a Court of Law is bound to do, the meaning is reasonably clear. Conversion, a well-known legal term for a particular class of tort, is referred to as one of the modes by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r him liable, and cited Doe v. Harlow (1840) 12 Ad. E 40 as his authority. In the High Court, Adami J. did not dissent from this view, but added that in his view there were facts which established an encouragement of the wrongdoers on the part of the appellant and that this fact was sufficient to render him liable for their acts. 31. In their Lordships' opinion the learned Judges in both Courts have misapprehended the question they had to try, viz., whether the appellant was a joint tort-feasor with Bagchi and Pilcher Co., Ltd., respectively. Neither the fact that he was their lessor -assuming contrary to their Lordships' view, that he was a lessor in the proper sense of the term-nor that he encouraged the wrongdoers, whatever this may mean, would be sufficient by itself to support a finding that he was a joint tort-feasor. 32. Doe v. Harlow (supra) is certainly no authority for the view expressed in the Courts below. It established no principle at all. The question there was whether there was some evidence against one of two persons charged as tort-feasor with having wrongfully kept the plaintiff out of possession of certain premises. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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