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TMI Blog1987 (9) TMI 427X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cedure, inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976, and such an application having filed later, the delay could not be condoned. 2. An appeal against a decree under the Hindu Marriage Act is provided in Section 28(1) of the said Act and the period of limitation therefore is prescribed in Section 28(4). It is neither an appeal under the general law, i.e., the Code of Civil Procedure, nor the period of limitation therefore is prescribed under the general law, i.e., the Limitation Act, for if it were so, these provisions in Section 28 would not have been necessary. The Division Bench decisions of this court in Sohhana v. Amar, AIR1959Cal455 and in Pratima v. Kamal 68 CWN 316 are clear authorities for the view that an appeal against a decree under the Hindu Marriage Act is an appeal under Section 28 of that Act and not an appeal under the general law. The Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Madhukar v. Malti AIR1973Bom141 is also to that effect. All these decisions were rendered under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act as it stood before 1976, but the present Section 28, as amended by the Amendment Act of 1976, makes the position clearer and Section 21B of the Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ood in the context and collocation it is used. This rule of interpretation is known as noscitur a sociis which is much wider than the rule of ejusdem generis, and in fact the latter rule is only an illustration or application of the former. The rule is, as Maxwell puts it (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes -- 10th Edition, P. 332), that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense and they take, as it were, their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general . As observed by Gajendragadkar J.,(as his Lordship then was), in the Supreme Court decision in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960)ILLJ251SC , associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis and that in fact the latter maxim is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim nosc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Acts, we would not like to construe the expression proceeding in Section 29(3) of the present Limitation Act to include appeal also so as to exclude all matrimonial appeals from the purview of the provisions of the Limitation Act 7. A survey of the provisions of the present Limitation Act would also demonstrate that whenever provisions have been made for appeals, the Legislature has expressly used the expression appeal as in Sections 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 29, 30 and 31 of the Act and that being the general frame of the Act, we are inclined to think that if the Legislature intended to make the provisions of Section 29(3) applicable to appeals also, it would have clearly said so in express words. The very preceding Sub-section(2) of Section 29 has also used the expression suit, appeal and application instead of the expression proceeding as that sub-section was clearly intended to apply to appeal also. Our attention, could not be drawn to any section or Article of the Limitation Act applying to appeals which has, without expressly using the expression appeal, has used the wider expression proceeding. 8. Some of the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to appeals e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e following the modern fashion, discarded the Preamble, he also thought that he would be making better draft by discarding the expression suits and other purposes in the earlier Long Title and also the expression suits, appeals and certain applications in the earlier Preamble and by substituting therefore the expression of his own coinage suits and other proceedings. But he has, in fact, demonstrated thereby the truth of the observation of Bhagwati, J., (as his Lordship then was) in Minerva Mills, [1981]1SCR206 to the effect that slovenliness in drafting is becoming rather common these days. 11. Be that as it may, Titles of Statute, whether Long or Short, are only names and though in matters relating to interpretation of Statutes, we cannot adopt the attitude of the Shakespearean Hero proclaiming what is in a name , we cannot also stretch or strain, widen or narrow the word in the body of the Statute by discarding its sensible, reasonable and contextual meaning, merely because something in the Name might indicate a wider or narrower connotation. It is true that gone are the days when it could be contended that Title was no part of the Statute and was to be excluded from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the present Limitation Act of 1963 to include appeals also, and thus make the Limitation Act of 1963 inapplicable to all matrimonial appeals, that would deprive the appellants in all such appeals from the benefit of all the beneficial and reasonable provisions of the Act providing for extension and exclusion of periods. Nay, yet more startling results. There is no provision providing for any special period of limitation for a matrimonial appeal under the Indian Divorce Act and the period is computed according to the general law as provided in the Limitation Act. That was also the position in respect of matrimonial appeals under the Hindu Marriage Act until a special period of limitation was provided in Section 28(4) as amended in 1976. Therefore, to hold that the expression other proceeding in Section 29(3) of the present Limitation Act includes appeals and the whole of the Act is thus in applicable to matrimonial appeals, is to hold that there is no period of limitation for appeals under the Indian Divorce Act and that there was also no period of limitation for appeals under the Hindu Marriage Act from 1955 till 1976. Now it is well-settled that if the language of the legislation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itation prescribed by Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as amended by the Amendment Act, 1976, would apply to any appeal arising out of a proceeding pending on the date of the commencement of the aforesaid amendment Act The Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative and as a result the appeal in that case was to be taken to have been filed beyond the period of Limitation. It was in that context that the Full Bench, while returning the case back to the Division Bench which made the reference, observed (at paragraphs 17 and 22) that the appeal being thus barred by limitation, an application for extension under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was to be dealt with and disposed of by the Division Bench and that the decision of the Full Bench on the question of limitation would not affect or prejudice the rights, if any, of the appellant to make an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act . This is, therefore, obviously no decision or declaration of law on the question as to whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to matrimonial appeals under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act in view of Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isions of the Limitation Act are not excluded by Section 29(3) in respect of matrimonial appeals, there can obviously be no doubt that Section 5 would apply thereto in view of Section 29(2). Be that as it may, on a review of these authorities we would, therefore, hold both on principle and on authority that the words other proceeding in the expression suit or other proceeding in Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would mean original proceeding in the nature of suits and would not include appeals and that the provisions of the Limitation Act, unless expressly excluded, would apply to matrimonial appeals . 18. One word more before we part with this question. The period of limitation for a matrimonial appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu, Marriage Act is now fixed by Sub-section(4) of that Section at 30 days. If the provisions of Limitation Act would not apply to a matrimonial appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, then the provision of Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandating dismissal of an appeal preferred beyond the period of limitation would not also apply and the court being thus under no mandatory obligation to dismiss a time barred appeal, can exte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ithout notice, desired to impress on the courts in India the urgent expediency of adopting, in place of this practice, a procedure which would secure at the stage of admission the final determination (after due notice to all parties) of any question of limitation affecting the competency of the appeal and the Privy Council again reiterated this view a year later in Sundara Bai v. Collector of Belgaum AIR 1918 P.C. 135 . It seems that we have taken about seven decades (and better late than never) to pay heed to this very important piece of recommendation and as would appear from the relevant Notes on Clauses in the Bill for the Amendment Act of 1976, this Rule 3A was being inserted to give effect to that recommendation. While the general power to condone the delay is still to be found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a procedure for the exercise of that power has now been provided in this Rule 3A. 21. Rule 3A, therefore, is a rule of procedure and about the proper approach to be made to such law of procedure, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, [1955]2SCR1 , speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed thus : -- A Cod ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot simultaneously but, some time after the presentation of the appeal, before the question has been decided by the court. 24. Rule 1, Order 41 also requires that the memo of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree and Rule 3 expressly authorises, the court to reject the memo if Rule 1 is not complied with. But the very succeeding Rule 3A does not in any way provide that its non-compliance will also entail such rejection and we do not think that we should take such a course to be implied when the Legislature took all the care to provide for such a course in express terms in the preceding Rule 3. 25. Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for condonation of delay applies not only to appeals but to applications also. But there being nothing analogous to Rule 3A in the Civil P. C. or any other law requiring that an application for condonation of delay to file an application must also accompany the main application, such a condonation application can very well be filed at a later stage. And in that case, if we construe Rule 3A to be so mandatory as to entail rejection of a time-barred memo of appeal unaccompanied by a condonation-application, we would ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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