9911796707
TMI Blog1993 (4) TMI 56X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rtificate No. 20 issued by Machinery Premises Co-operative Society Ltd. As per the statement, the apparent consideration for transfer of the said immovable property is Rs. 24,51,000. After receipt of the statement in Form No. 37-1, on February 26, 1992, the appropriate authority passed an order under section 269UD(1) of the Act in respect of the above property. The said order was challenged by the petitioner before this court by filing a writ petition which was numbered as Writ Petition No. 633 of 1992. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in C. B. Gautam v. Union of India in Transferred Case No. 26 of 1987 (reported in [1993] 199 ITR 530 [1993] 1 SCC 78), the said writ petition was disposed of by this court by order dated December 16, 1992. By the above order of this court, the matter was remanded to the appropriate authority to decide it afresh in the light of the directions contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in C. B. Gautam's case [1993] 199 ITR 530. In terms of the directions of the Supreme Court contained in the said decision, it was also made clear by this court that the statement in Form No. 37-1 submitted by the petitioner on December 31, 1991, shall be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt in Form No. 37-I. It was the order passed under section 269UD(1) of the Act which has been set aside on the ground that no adequate opportunity had been given to the assessee before passing the same. It was in that view of the matter that the case was remanded to the appropriate authority to decide it afresh after giving proper opportunity to the aggrieved parties in the light of the observations made by it. The direction that the statement in Form No. 37-1 originally filed should be treated as having been filed on the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court and in cases pending before the High Courts from the date of disposal of the cases by the High Courts was intended only to get over the hurdle of the period of limitation of two months prescribed in section 269UD(1) for the purpose of passing an order under that section and for no other purpose. It is clear from the following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 41 of the judgment [1993] 1 SCC 110 (see [1993] 199 ITR 530, 561) : " The next question is as to the consequence to follow. In view of the fact that the object of the provisions of Chapter XX-C is a laudable object, namely, to counter evasion of tax in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order been held to be valid. But on the other hand, however, he would have retained the possession of the property in question. Taking into account these factors and taking note of the fact that the immovable properties in urban areas have gone up steeply in value during the last few years, we direct that in case an order for compulsory purchase is made, the Central Government shall pay to the intending seller the amount of the apparent consideration plus interest at nine per cent. per annum from the date the impugned order was made." It is thus clear that the Supreme Court itself has taken note of the impugned order and taken the date of that order as the relevant date for the purpose of paying interest to the owner of that property at nine per cent. per annum in addition to the apparent consideration. Had the Supreme Court taken a mechanical view in the matter, there was no question of directing the Central Government to pay interest from the date of the impugned order inasmuch as the consideration would have become payable only if passed after the fresh order of pre-emptive purchase, if any, and not from the date of the impugned earlier order which had been set aside by the co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bserved that under section 269UK of the Act, there is a specific restriction on the revocation or alteration of the agreements for the transfer of the immovable property in respect of which a statement has been furnished under section 269UC except in the conditions mentioned therein. It is not the case of the petitioner that its case falls in any of those exceptions. Under such circumstances, the petitioner cannot get out of the legal restriction contained in section 269UK of the Act by adopting the device of rescinding the agreement during the pendency of the writ petition. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the first submission of the petitioner. As regards the second submission, which relates to the loft area being part of the property which is the subject-matter of sale, we find that this matter has been discussed at length by the appropriate authority and all relevant facts related to it have been set out in detail in its order dated February 17, 1993, passed under section 269UD of the Act. The appropriate authority has considered all aspects of the matter and only on a careful consideration of the same has come to the conclusion that the loft a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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