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TMI Blog2019 (12) TMI 1293X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating sufficient cause to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation - However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days is twofold, i.e. the non availability of the Vice Chancellor due to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said process had caused the delay. The reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the situation was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hes but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified - appeal dismissed. - Civil Appeal Nos. 9488, 9489 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.5581, 5582 of 2019) - - - Dated:- 17-12-2019 - R. Banumathi, A.S. Bopanna And Hrishikesh Roy, JJ JUDGMENT A.S. Bopanna, Leave granted. 2. These appeals have been preferred by the appellant University of Delhi through its Registrar to challenge the common judgment and order dated 29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined to condone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to challenge the judgment dated 27.04.2015 where under, the learned Single Judge had dismissed the W.P (C) No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi. 3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to the decision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the, DDA for short) who had allowed respondent no.13 M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd. to construct a high rise multistory group housing society in the control zone of Zone C in the University campus, without any height restriction. The construction permission was allowed on th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o entertain the writ petition of the University including on the ground of delay and laches. In the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Court however observed that DDA is the master of the formulation and implementation of the Master Plan and, necessary approvals have been taken from various statutory authorities for the housing project. It was also observed that the change in the land use from public to residential is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High Court s Division Bench Judgment in Adil Singh vs. Union of India (2010) 171 DLT 748. According to the Writ court, since it was a policy decision taken by the Government body and since the appellant University has failed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide in the decision making by the authority, interference of the Court with the policy decision, would not be justified. 7. It is the case of the appellant that following the dismissal of the writ petition and being concerned about the future use of the subject land, the University Authorities constituted a Committee to recommend the appropriate course of action to be taken by the University. The Committee s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated to have be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ving regard to all the issues decided and connotations thereof. The issue could not be taken up for consideration as the post of Vice Chancellor had fallen vacant w.e.f. 28.10.2015 and could be considered only after the new Vice Chancellor had assumed office and taken stock of things. On 10.03.2016, the new Vice Chancellor joined the office and in order to ensure democratic functioning of the University, he decided to constitute a Committee comprising of senior faculty persons representing different sections of the University. The terms of reference of the Five member Committee were, to recommend the course of action to the University in the light of the dismissal of the Writ Petition filed by the University in the DMRC matter. (iii) On 11.11.2016, the above constituted Committee gave its Report. Based on the Report of the five member Committee, it was decided by the Competent Authority that the subject matter of the present case be referred to the Executive Council of the University for its final decision. In the Executive Council meeting held on 28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item was again discussed in the Executive Council meeting held on 7.3.2017 (continued meeti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion was prepared which was thereafter got vetted and settled by the Senior Counsel. The finalized Appeal was thereafter again considered at the highest level at the University to take the final decision, which entailed some time. On 01.03.2018, the LPA was filed before the Delhi High Court. 10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was however not accepted and the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay without considering the merits of the appeal. Thus, aggrieved the appellant University has filed this appeal. 11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the implication of the rejection of the writ petition and the LPA without considering the substantial contention raised by the University on merits would cause grave injury to the public institution. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the University Authorities have been pursuing the issue with due diligence but decision had to be taken after consultation with all the stakeholders and therefore, the delay in preferring the LPA should not be attributed to any inaction, much less a deliberate inaction. The endeavor of the Courts acco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed Senior Counsel for the appellant has referred to the merits of the case, keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay and laches, that aspect of the matter would require consideration at the threshold. He would assert that the delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay of more than two and a half years and in such event the principle of applying the usual test for sufficient cause would not arise as it is not merely the number of days requiring condonation but also amounts to laches in filing the writ petition, as well as the LPA. Mere contention that the proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest would not advance the case inasmuch as the learned Single Judge having adverted to all these aspects has arrived at the conclusion that the petition suffers from laches in addition to there being no merit and in such circumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by 916 days the Division Bench was justified in its conclusion. It is pointed out that the said delay of 916 days is as against the period of 30 days which is allowed in law for filing the LPA. It is contended that the cause of action if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... land which has been put to use to generate resources for the project and in that regard when there is a contractual relationship with respondent No.13 if the much belated petition is entertained at this stage, there would be a great financial impact which is also a loss to the public exchequer and in such event the public interest would be better served by not condoning the delay in such matters. Moreover, it is not a case of mere delay in filing the LPA but is a serious case of laches. It is also noticed by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition itself was filed after 7 8 years and in such event if the discretionary orders passed in the writ jurisdiction is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court, it would set a bad precedent. 15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor General would also refer to the aspect of delay and laches and supplement the arguments advanced by the learned Solicitor General. He would further contend that the Union of India being the owner of the land which was acquired does not have objection for the project and in such event interference at the instance of the appellant herein would not be justified. Ms. Binu Tamta, lea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits . The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in ameritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. 18. Further the decision in the case of M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. Vs. District Board, Bhojpur Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 is relied upon, wherein this Court has indicated the real test to determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. 19. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on the other hand, has relied upon the decision in the case of Postmaster General Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited Anr. 1992 (3) SCC 563 wherein it is held as hereunder: 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or delibe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instant facts not only the delay and laches in filing the appeal is contended on behalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but it is also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal had arisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to those aspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made in the writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the High Court was justified. 22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day s delay need not be explained with such precision but the fact remains that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very much necessary. The Division Bench apart from noticing these aspects had also noted that the learned Single Judge too found the writ petition to be hit by delay and laches. 24. In that backdrop, a perusal of the order dated 27.04.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge would indicate that the learned Single Judge in para 65 of the order with reference to his earlier observation has arrived at the categorical conclusion that the petition suffers from laches and has been filed with delay of 7 8 years. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant while seeking to dispel such conclusion by the learned Single Judge contended that the respondent No. 13 themselves had filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the restricted FAR and the said writ petition was disposed only on 18.05.2011 and the need for the appellant herein to file the writ petition arose only thereafter. The said contention is also not acceptable if the entire sequence is noticed. 25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact that the Respon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e nature of the proceedings that have taken place thus far would indicate that the matter has been examined at different stages in the earlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant was assailing the action of the respondents were to be examined on merits, they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the matter before the Court. 28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note is the manner in which the respondent No.11 DMRC has proceeded in the matter. The respondent No.11 DMRC is engaged in providing the public transport and for the said purpose the Government through policy decision has granted approval to generate resources through property development and in that regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up. Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a sum of ₹ 218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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