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TMI Blog1972 (3) TMI 106X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed a notice on the defendants alleging that they were in arrears of rent and that their tenancy was terminated in accordance to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. After this notice, the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was filed. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant-appellants on various grounds. The first ground was that no title and interest passed to the plaintiff in the disputed property by the sale-deeds. The second contention was that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was invalid. The third contention was that a building stood on the land in dispute in 1950 which was an accommodation as provided under the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), and, therefore, no suit for ejectment of the defendant-appellants could be filed without complying with the provisions of section 3 of the Act. In this very connection, it was also contended that admittedly there was a building on this land which was constructed in 1959 and when the Act came into force, it was an accommodation governed by the Act. The other contention was that Smt. Nanhi Bibi had remarried another person after the death of Kanha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be an actionable claim, there was no transfer of the right of realisation of rent alone and, therefore, there was no need for a notice as required under Section 131 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. Section 131 of the Transfer of Property Act has been enacted for the benefit of the Debtor. After an actionable claim is transferred in accordance with Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Debtor may have dealing with the original owner and he is estopped from having dealing with the original owner, the moment the transferor has a notice under Section 131 of the Transfer of Property Act. Actionable claim can be transferred only by execution of an instrument in writing signed by the transferor or his duly authorised agent, whereas under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. This payment of price, in full or in part or promised is by the purchaser to the seller. The sale of a property of a value of more than ₹ 100/- has to be compulsorily registered, whereas, an actionable claim of any amount can be had only by execution of an instrument. Thus the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said that Raj Kumar Agrawal had executed the sale-deed without any consideration. Smt. Nanhi Bibi was entitled to refund the sale consideration mentioned in the sale-deed as she had no interest and title in the property. Instead of a suit being filed against Smt. Nanhi Bibi for the return of the sale-consideration which she had received. Raj Kumar Agrawal, her son, to avoid all this litigation, admitted in the sale-deed that he had received the amount mentioned in the sale-deed. The above contention has, therefore, no force in it. 9. In this very connection, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the word used is 'price' and not 'consideration'. He contended that if any thing other than cash was received as price, the document will amount to an exchange or a barter but not a sale-deed. This contention has no force in it. Raj Kumar Agrawal admitted in his sale-deed Ext. 18 that he had received the price of the sale. There is no evidence that this admission was wrong or actually Raj Kumar Agrawal had not received any consideration for executing the sale-deed Ext. 18. In this view of the matter, the abo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ked on the argument based on the interpretation of Section 131 of the Transfer of Property Act According to the learned counsel for the appellants, a reading of this section makes it clear that it was in the mind of the person who gave the notice that the provisions of Section 131 of the Transfer of Property Act had to be complied. I have read the notice myself and it has also been read over to me by the learned counsel for the appellants. I have not come across any thing in the notice from which the above inference could be drawn. It was a simple notice demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy. There is nothing in it to even indicate slightly that the person who gave this notice had in his mind the provisions of Section 131 of the Transfer of Property Act. 13. The next question which has to be decided in this case is as to what was the property which was leased out to the defendants in the year 1957. It has come in evidence that there were boundary walls on three sides of the disputed land. There is the report of the Commissioner which has been marked Ext. 14 that the building standing on the land had been fallen down and the materials had been auctioned. The Commiss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... des' in Clause (a) of Section 2. Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) includes within the definition of accommodation, gardens, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building. If compounds had been intended to be considered as accommodation without reference to any building situate in them, the word 'includes' would not have been used to bring them within the definition of Accommodation". 17. Similar views were taken in Mohd. Sami v. Shrimati Savitri Devi 1957 All LJ 435 and Narayan Chand Dass v. Panna Lal 1969 All LJ 229. 18. In Ami Chand v. Ram Sharan Dass 1969 All LJ 56, it was held that an accommodation must be inside a building having walls and a roof. Similar view was taken in Dhanwati Devi v. Khudavand Karim Jalley Jalalhu. 19. The above view that I have taken becomes all the more clear by a reading of Section 1-A of the Act which reads as below:-- "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building or part of a building which was under erection or was constructed on or after 1st January, 1951." 20. The Act was enacted for the benefit of tenants of residential and non-residential accommodation. It gives certain privile ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... facturing purposes or that after it was taken on rent, the manufacturing process has been going on in this land openly with the knowledge and connivance of the landlord. 23. In certain sales-tax cases, the word 'manufacture' has been defined and for Instance, we may quote a Division Bench decision of this court in Badri Prasad Prabha Shanker v. Sales Tax Commissioner, U. P., Lucknow (1963) 14 STC 208. In order to prove that there was a manufacturing process, it is also essential to prove that the article must change its nature and it becomes an altogether different commercial article. In the instant case, by spreading wheat partly husked and allowing it to dry on the land one neither changes husk into something different or a commodity other than what it originally was. Therefore in the eye of law, the drying of the husk on the land in dispute cannot be said to be a manufacturing process. Secondly, as discussed above, this land was never taken for manufacturing purposes. The above argument too has, therefore, no force in it. 24. The other argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the notice Ext. 23, terminated the tenancy in present and, as such, it was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erance, whereas in the latter case he remains a tenant for 30 days. But it is clear from the notice that the appellant did not intend to terminate the tenancy on the date on which he gave the notice; he did not give the respondent a right to remain in possession for 30 days as his licensee or a tenant on sufferance after the termination of this tenancy." 27. In this view of the matter, the facts of the present case appear to be similar to the facts of this Division Bench case. Therefore, in the instant case, the tenancy was not terminated in present and, as such, the notice is not invalid on that ground as well. 28. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Bill, 1970, only awaits the date to be notified in the Gazette and certain other legal formalities and, therefore, the appeal should be adjourned till such time at this Act is enforced. In support of this contention, an order passed by Hon'ble Asthana, J., in Second Appeal No. 3041 of 1968 (All) was shown to me. This order is about the adjournment of the case. The reasons given in an order for adjournment of the case cannot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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