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TMI Blog1989 (7) TMI 11X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the gift for the year under consideration. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals) and contended that the gift deed, though registered on July 13, 1973, was executed on April 13, 1973. It was also pointed out that the assessee was maintaining the previous year as per Bengali calendar year and the gift of Rs. 1,36,242, having been made within the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1973-74, should not have been included in determining the gift for the assessment year 1974-75. The Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals) rejected the assessee's submission and upheld the action of the Gift-tax Officer. Against the said order of the Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals), the assessee preferred a second appeal before the Tribunal and learned counsel for the assessee reiterated the same contentions as were advanced before the Commissioner of Gift-tax (Appeals). The Tribunal held that the date of execution was the crucial date which should be taken into consideration as the date of transfer of the property. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the date of execution of the gift being April 13, 1973, which fell within the previous year relevant to the assessme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aw came to be made by the donor to the donee prior to the registration of the document by which the gift was made. If the donor dies before registration, the document may be presented for registration after his death. Such registration will have the same effect as registration during his lifetime. But reliance was placed on section 47 of the Registration Act which provides that registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not from the time of its registration. Under section 47, a registered document operates from the date of its execution and not from the date of its registration. The result is that if two registered documents are executed by the same person in respect of the same property to two different persons at different times, the one which was executed first has priority over the other, although the former was registered subsequent to the latter. In other words, registration of a document relates to the date of its execution. This is so between the parties to the document. But, as regards third parties, it is effective from the date of registration. Where an instrumen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the following passage (p. 87) : "Registration does not depend upon his (the donor's) consent, but is the act of an officer appointed by law for the purpose, who, if the deed is executed by or on behalf of the donor and is attested by at least two witnesses, must register it if it is presented by a person having the necessary interest within the prescribed period. Neither death, nor the express revocation by the donor, is a ground for refusing registration, if the other conditions are complied with." This case does not directly deal with the effect of section 47. The ratio of the decision is that the transaction of gift is complete if the other formalities are completed and the document of gift is executed and that the donor cannot resile from his action before the document is registered. The ratio of both the decisions of the Privy Council is to the effect that a transaction of gift made by a document which is subsequently registered becomes operative from the date on which the document of gift was executed. The true scope of section 47 has to be realised in order to comprehend its impact. A question pertaining to the scope of this provision arose before the Supreme Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by Virtue of section 47, the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. Therefore, we do not think that the sale in this case can be said, in view of section 47, to have been completed on January 31, 1946. The view that we have taken of section 47 of the Registration Act seems to have been taken in Tilakdhari Singh, v. Gour Narain, AIR 1921 Pat 150. We believe that the same view was expressed in Nareshchandra Dutta v. Girishchandra Das, ILR [1935] 62 Cal 979 ; AIR 1936 Cal 17 and Gobardhan Bar v. Gana Dhar Bar, ILR [1940] 2 Cal 270 ; AIR 1,941 Cal 78." (underlined by us.). The Supreme Court also observed (p. 1749): "With regard to the two cases on which the Attorney-General has relied, it has to be observed that they were not concerned with a right of pre-emption arising on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... deed, the transfer must be deemed to be completed on that date, and, therefore, it was not correct that the right of reconveyance had not accrued to the appellant on November 26, 1964, or that the Collector had no jurisdiction on that date to accept the said application. This contention, however, cannot be accepted in view of the decision in Ram Saran Lall v. Mst. Domini Kuer [1962] 2 SCR 474 ; AIR 1961 SC 1747, where this court rejected an identical contention. Mr. Desai tried to distinguish that case on the ground that it was based on Mahomedan law which by custom applied to the parties there. But the decision is based not on any principle of Mahomedan law but on the effect of section 47 of the Registration Act. The majority decision clearly laid down that the sale there was completed only when registration of the sale deed was completed as contemplated by section 61 of the Registration Act and, therefore, the talab-i-mowasibat made before the date of completion of registration was premature and a suit based on such demand of the right of pre-emption was premature and must, therefore, fail. Similarly, in Radhakishan L. Toshniwal v. Shridhar [1961] 1 SCR 248 ; AIR 1960 SC 1368, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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