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TMI Blog1976 (3) TMI 249X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Broach on March 17, 1973, that is to say well within the, period of limitation. It appears that the petitioner had engaged a junior advocate of less than seven years' standing to take various preliminary steps in the proceedings and that a senior advocate practicing at Baroda was to appear on her behalf at the hearing of the matter. However, when the said petition came on for hearing before the Tribunal on .June 18, 1974, the advocate from Baroda could not remain present and the petitioner was represented by the junior advocate. The petitioner herself was also not present because she was ill. During the course of the hearing of the said petition in the chamber of the presiding officer of the Tribunal, several objections were raised on behalf of the second opponent as to the maintainability of the petition on certain technical grounds. It appears that at that stage it was suggested by the Tribunal to the advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the petition might be withdrawn with permission to file a fresh petition as the defects were formal, The advocate of the petitioner, however, expressed his apprehension that in that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e that I was ill during the last month prior to the filing of this application. I had gone to Baroda to inquire about my application -pending in this Court. I have not taken any medical treatment. I had not fallen sick during the period of about one mouth prior to the filing of this application. The Tribunal then heard the parties and rejected the application for condonation of delay and dismissed the claim petition. It is this order refusing to condone delay in filing the second petition, which is under challenge in the present petition. 4. Now, the Tribunal has held that the petitioner was bound to explain the whole of the period of delay and that since that was not done, it had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in this case. In this connection, it might be noted that the Tribunal accepted the contention of the petitioner that the delay up to June 18, 1974 was satisfactorily explained because till that date the original petition was pending in the Court. The Tribunal, however, found that there was no material on record to satisfactorily explain the delay between the period June 18, .1974 and July 19, 1974, that is, the period between the date of withdrawal of the orig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by every public authority, more particularly such public authorities like the second opponent who have been held to be State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The injunction contained in the first part of these observations which were made in a purely commercial cause applies with still greater force, in a case like the present. The law relating to compensation in motor accident cases has been enacted by the State for the benefit of the dependants of the unfortunate victims and it is surprising that when it comes to the implementation of the said law, the limbs of the State should try to defeat a claim not on merits but on technical pleas such as narrow limitation . One could only hope that bearing in mind the injunction of the Supreme Court in the abovementioned case, the second opponent would desist from raising such pleas in future at least in cases' where the delay is not inordinate. But that is not all. The thrust of the sharp criticism contained in the second part of those observations relating to the conduct of public authorities, who lure an unwary litigant into a particular belief and then turn round and take up such defences as limitation, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing in manifest injustice and this Court will have both the power and duty to interfere by reviewing the exercise of such discretion even in a proceeding under S. 115, Civil Procedure Code or Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. The statutory perspective of the power of the Court to condone delay in institution of proceedings on sufficient cause being shown and the principles regulating the exercise of such power are also well settled. In Sarpanch Lonad Gram Panchayat's case (1967)IILLJ870SC (supra) in the context of proviso to S. 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Supreme Court observed as follows (in Para 3): This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, commonsense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through. law what is just, see Keighley's case (1609) 10 CR 139 : 77 ER 1136. was further observed that the words Sufficient cause which occurred in S. 5 of the Limitation Act had received liberal construction and that similar interpretation should be placed upon those words in cognate statutory provisions like the one under construction in that case. In this connection ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... own certain guidelines in the matter of condonation of delay. It was there observed that Courts must always bear in mind that whereas refusal to condone delay might result in injustice by a meritorious matter being thrown out without trial, condonation of delay would at the highest result in decision of the matter on merits. Furthermore, no litigant ordinarily stands to berifit by instituting a proceeding beyond time and there is no presumption that the delay has been occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or that there was want of bona fides. The presumption, if any, would be just the other way round. It is true that in Ramlal's case (supra) it was held that a party seeking condonation of delay will have to show sufficient cause not only for not instituting the proceeding on the last day but also to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. However, as pointed out in Karim's case (supra) pedantic and unpragmatic approach should not be made to the matter and, as observed in Rameharan's case (supra), the Court need not be over strict in expecting proof of the suggested sufficient cause. It is of paramount importance that the Courts should be awa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d, found that the petitioner had made a wrong statement in her affidavit to the effect that from 18-6-1974 to 19-7-1974 she was ill. This finding was arrived at be. cause, in the opinion of the Tribunal, her version in the cross-examination was different, namely, that she was not ill during the last one month prior to the filing of the second petition and had not taken any medical treatment. Now, if we read the affidavit of the petitioner, it would appear that her case therein set out in substance was that she was extremely weak on account of illness during the relevant period and that she could not, therefore file the second petition up to July 19, 1974. It has to be borne in mind that the fact that the petitioner was ill on June 18, 1974 is borne out even from the deposition of her advocate and that fact has not been challenged even in her cross-examination. The possibility cannot be ruled out, therefore, that she might be suffering from extreme weakness for sometime after that illness. She might not have been actually ill but might have been suffering from the aftereffect of her illness and that is really what she has stated in her affidavit. I fail to appreciate as to how this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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