9911796707
TMI Blog1969 (5) TMI 61X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch, 1967 the State Government constituted a Tribunal (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal) under Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Opposite party No. 2 filed another report on 22nd April, 1967 stating therein that such and such truck owned by petitioner No. 2 driven by petitioner No. 3 and insured with petitioner No. 1 had caused the aforesaid accident dated 11th September, 1966 resulting in the death of the informant's father, Amar Nath Misra. Thereafter on 8th July, 1967 a claim was filed by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 claiming a sum of ₹ 80,000/- as compensation but it was not on a prescribed form. Subsequently on 17th April, 1969 a similar claim was filed on a prescribed form. The petitioners appeared before the Tribunal and took an objection that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim in respect of an accident which took place earlier than the date of its constitution. The tribunal opposite party No. 4 rejected that objection by an order dated 12th September, 1968 a certified copy of which is filed as annexure 4 to the petition. The present petition is directed against the aforesaid order annexure 4 and the prayer is that the same be quashed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r Accidents Claims Tribunals. Reading Sections 110, 110-A and 110-F together it is obvious that there arises no occasion to resort to the remedy provided by these provisions of the Act till a Tribunal has been constituted as envisaged by Sub-section (1) of Section 110 and once that has been done, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a suit for damages preferred under Section 110-A is barred. It is to be borne in mind that Section 110-F bars jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal. The words which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal are significant. These clearly indicate that the bar provided by Section 110-F is only in respect of such matters as can be entertained by the Claims Tribunal. That being so, it cannot readily be inferred that as soon as a Claims Tribunal has been constituted under Section 110(1) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted in respect of claims for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 110, without the claim being one which can be entertained by the Claims Tribuna ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t in the sense that they must be applied to all suits filed after they came into force. This general rule has got to be read with one important qualification, and that is that if the statute of limitation, if given a retrospective effect destroys a cause of action which was vested in a party or makes it impossible for that party for the exercise of his vested right of action, then the Courts would not give retrospective effect to the statute of limitation. The reason for this qualification is that it would inflict such hardship and such injustice on parties that the Courts would hesitate to attribute to the Legislature an intention to do something which was obviously wrong. 4. In the Full Bench case of Govt. of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh the head note runs as below:-- It is not always true to say that the law of limitation is only a law of procedure and does not bar the remedy altogether so as to destroy the right. It is well-settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new law of limitation cannot be construed retrospectively so as to destroy altogether the remedy ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g the various provisions of the Act under consideration retrospective. Even in the absence of such a proviso, that power could be exercised by the Tribunal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which has been made applicable by virtue of Section 29 of the Limitation Act to all such cases for which limitation is provided by enactment other than the Limitation Act. A specific provision in the statute for delay being condoned on sufficient cause being shown which even in the absence of such a provision in the statute would be possible by virtue of Section 5 read with Section 29 of the Limitation Act does not appear to be of any consequence for the determination of the question of principle namely as to in what circumstances procedural law such as a statute crowding a period of limitation may not in the absence of express words in that behalf be given retrospective effect As stated by Maxwell in the Interpretation of Statutes Tenth Edition on page 227, A new procedure would be presumably inapplicable where Its application would prejudice rights established under the old..... It is obvious from the authorities discussed above that a statute providing a period of limitation is not to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (3) of the section is that in the context neither the body of Sub-section (3) nor the proviso will have any application to claims arising anterior to the date of the notification under Section 110(1) and constitution of a Tribunal for any area. The sub-section, for its application, contemplates the existence of a Tribunal, Time cannot run for an application which, because, the Tribunal has not been constituted, cannot be filed. The only effect then would be that claims arising before the constitution of a Tribunal will not be governed by Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A. If that be the case, as I think it is, the very basis of the argument for the petitioners will disappear. With due deference to the Hon'ble Judge who decided that case I find it difficult to subscribe to the views expressed in the paragraph reproduced above. It is difficult to maintain that an application be-fore a Tribunal constituted under Section 110(1) can be made without conforming to the rule of limitation specifically provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A. There is nothing in the language of Sections 110 to 110-F of the Act to Indicate that a distinction is to be made in the matter of limitati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estroying the vested right of action. It is no doubt true that the applicant cannot enforce such vested right of action unless the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time, but that condition would not make such vested right of action any the less enforceable. Mr. M. C. Shah, however, urged that the enforceability of the vested right of action would in such cases be dependent on the discretion of the Claims Tribunal and that surely could not have been the intention of the Legislature. But the short answer to this argument is that the discretion of the Claims Tribunal is not an arbitrary or capricious discretion but is a discretion guided and conditioned by judicial principles. It is not left to the whim and fancy of the Claims Tribunal to decide whether to entertain the application or not despite the expiration of the period of sixty days. The Claims Tribunal is bound to entertain the application when it is made out by the applicant that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time and non-constitution of the Claims Tribunal being a sufficient cause preventing the applicant from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tive effect, reliance is placed on the following observations of Sulaiman Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) in the case of Hazari Tewari v. Mt Maktula Chaubain AIR1932All30 . This is however not a point which arises directly in this case, but it may be pointed out that possibly it cannot be said that there is a vested right in a litigant to wait for a particular period of limitation before instituting his suit. Those observations of the Allahabad case are reproduced on page 105 of the report of the Punjab case. Again while meeting the argument against retrospective effect being given to the relevant provisions of the Act on the score that such a course would prejudicially affect vested rights of action it is observed on page 106 of the Punjab case:-- These contentions though specious do not have much substance. I am inclined to agree, with respect, with Sulaiman, A.C.J., that a litigant does not have a vested right to wait for a particular period of limitation before instituting his suit. In my view the above quoted observations of Sulaiman, Acting Chief Justice do not go to the whole way to cover the point. Without attempting to detract from the weight of the a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
