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TMI Blog1949 (8) TMI 22X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mortgage bond, EX. P-1 (a) dated 30th July 1920 and EX. P-1 (b) dated 29th July 1932. It is common ground that Ex. P-1 (a) is a valid acknowledgment of liability under Ex. P-1 and is fresh starting point of limitation. Exhibit P-1 (b) is in these terms: The amount of ₹ 100 paid and endorsed (sellu vaithadu) by us five persons. Then follow the names and signatures of the debtors. The appellant contends that the Tamil expression (sellu vaithadu) implies that there is an outstanding balance still due under the mortgage and that the endorsement, Ex. P-1 (b), therefore, operates as an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19, Limitation Act as held in Ramayya v. Anjayya, I. L. R. (1942) Mad. 405 : A. I. R. 1942 Mad. 146 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itation is part of the processual law of the country, that amendments to the Limitation Act are retrospective in their effect and that the law of limitation applicable to the suit is the law in force at the time it is instituted. According to him, Act XVI [16] of 1942 would, therefore, apply to the present case and the effect of Ex. P-1 has to be decided only on the language of Section 20, Limitation Act as amended in 1942. To support the last contention three decisions of Division Benches of the Patna High Court in Baleswar v. Latafat, AIR1945Pat368 , Sarab Devaprasad v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR1946Pat59 and Jagadish Prasad v. Saligram, AIR1946Pat60 are cited The first of these cases has been followed in the other two decisions and they are all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nto force. Their Lordships held that the right of redemption was barred under the Act of 1877. In so holding the Privy Council approved of the High Court's observation that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding was the law in force at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding unless there was a distinct provision to the contrary in the Act. This decision, in my opinion, affords no basis for the conclusion reached by the learned Judges of the Patna High Court that a claim barred before the Limitation Act was amended could be enforced after the amendment of the Act taking advantage of the provisions in the Amending Act when the latter does not expressly provide for such revival. The observation in the first ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... before the date of the amendment. There are some old cases which hold that even if the debt had already become barred before the new Act came into force the new method of interrupting the running of time would avail to revive debts barred before the new Act came into force, Mohesh Lal v. Busumt Kumaree, 6 cal. 340 : 7 C. L. R. 121, Valia Thamburati v.Veera Rayan, 1 Mad. 228. The learned counsel for the appellant also cited the decision in Teagaraya Mudali v. Mariappa Pillai, 1 Mad. 264, in support of the above pro-position, but in that case though limitation had commenced to run under Act XIV [14] of 1859, the remedy had not become barred on the date when Act IX [9] of 1871 came into force. I am of the opinion that the correct view is that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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