9911796707
TMI Blog1988 (7) TMI 30X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as the "COFEPOSA Act") on October 30, 1976, and his subsequent release on the revocation of the Emergency on March 21, 1977. The Competent Authority, later on, considering the reply of the appellant and the material placed before him, found that the properties mentioned at S. Nos. (1) and (2) had been purchased by the appellant's father when he was minor, and that he had come to possess them under a partition effected in the family on January 19, 1978, by a registered deed. His father had earlier died in 1966. Even with respect to the property at S. No. (3), the Competent Authority was satisfied that of the total cost involved in the purchase of the property by the appellant on October 23, 1978, viz., Rs. 31,380, his explanation as to the source of Rs. 15,050 was acceptable. The matter thereafter proceeded with regard to the balance amount of Rs. 16,330, and the appellant was required to show the source thereof. By the impugned order, the learned Competent Authority concluded that the source of a further amount of Rs. 11,330 could be treated as explained, while Rs. 5,000 only remained unexplained. Since this amo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Emergency and thereafter at intervals not exceeding four months each, and if it appeared to the appropriate Government that the detention of the person was no longer necessary, that the Government revoked the declaration. It, therefore, appears that since the detention continued for more than four months, the said review had been carried out within those four months by the appropriate Government and his detention, therefore, was upheld and not revoked as envisaged by subsection (3) of section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act. Now, a perusal of section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA Act shows that every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the COFEPOSA Act, comes within the ambit of the term "person" against whom proceedings under the SAFEMA Act can be taken. Proviso (iii) of course lays down that such detention, if made under section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act, should not have been revoked before the expiry of the time or on the basis of the review under sub-section (3) of that section. As already discussed above, the revocation in the appellant's case did not come about within four months of the said first review. The benefit of this proviso, therefore, is not av ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... port of the conclusions arrived at does not matter as no appellate court is required to reassess or weigh them again. Under the SAFEMA Act, a regular appeal is provided, and the Tribunal is entitled to probe into the evidence, and reassess the reasons which prevailed with the Competent Authority for arriving at his conclusions, and in their absence, the Tribunal is entirely handicapped. In fact, both the parties appearing before us were at bay in supporting or assailing the amounts which were treated by the Competent Authority as proved or unexplained. The order, according to them, was more a sort of applying the rule of thumb and Moghul in nature. That could hardly be what should be expected from a quasi-judicial body, exercising such vast and vital powers as forfeiture of a person's property, while ensuring to give effect to major socio-economic measure. During the course of arguments before us, it came to be revealed what appeared to have led to the making of this perfunctory order. An application was moved by the appellant on August 26, 1987, before the Competent Authority in which it was stated as under: "... With reference to the above letter and discussion I had with y ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as well in putting the blame on his then counsel. We do not accept that this application dated August 26, 1986, was moved without the approval of the appellant. The enclosing therewith of the bank draft clinches the matter that the amount thereof had been supplied by the appellant himself and not that the counsel was doing so from his own pocket. A mere change of counsel at the appellate stage would not permit shifting of the stand categorically .taken earlier on facts. It is not shown that it was mistaken or under pressure. It seems that the appellant having led the Competent Authority to believe that he was standing by what was stated in the application, he made a slipshod order of summarily accepting most of the investments, and disallowing the small amount for levy of fine. Since arguments have been addressed before us on the merits of the different sources of investments, we find, as already observed above, that several of the amounts accepted as explained would probably not withstand a judicious scrutiny independently. A gift or a loan on the basis of promissory note, does not on its own basis, per se call for acceptance. It can also be considered whether the donor or th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
