9911796707
TMI Blog1988 (3) TMI 55X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cer, Group "A ", in July, 1951, and, in fact, he joined the post at Calcutta on July 24, 1951. It has been stated by him that on the basis of the results in the All India Civil Services and Central Civil Services Examinations held in the year 1950, he was placed in serial No. 19, out of the other successful candidates and his allegation was that, without considering the seniority list duly and without considering the satisfactory services rendered by him, the authorities concerned promoted other members of the service, who were junior to him, as a result whereof he suffered financial loss and irreparable damage. He has given the other particulars of his services as rendered by him which, according to him, were satisfactory. The applicant, in fact, himself issued a temporary injunction in his own case and in his own favour against the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, restraining them by his order dated October 22, 1981, from executing an order of his transfer to Bangalore, under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the said Board had no jurisdiction, legal or otherwise, to pass the transfer order in his case and he has alleged that such order of in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... assigned any reason. In fact, by the said order, the Chief Commissioner concerned directed that one Shri K. Chowdhury, A.A.C., Range XVI, Calcutta, with effect from the afternoon of December 31, 1984, will hold charge of the applicant's office and he will perform such duties in addition to his own duties until further orders. That order was certainly passed with a view to relieve the applicant from his post who, as mentioned hereinbefore, was due to retire. The order, as mentioned above, was admittedly served on the applicant on the afternoon of December 31, 1984, in his office. Against the order in question, the applicant moved a writ application, whereupon C.O. No. 2851(W) 1985 as issued, was rejected by Umesh Chandra Banerjee J. on October 7, 1985, The said order of rejection was claimed by the applicant to be improper, as the same, according to him, was made without considering the several decisions referred to by him in his writ application and also because the learned judge failed to consider that the respondents before him did not duly consider the effect and impact of the Fundamental Rules 56(a) and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Admittedly, against such orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... applicant, the application was directed to go out of the list. Thereafter, another review application, bearing No. 3693 of 1986, was presented by the applicant on December 4, 1986, and this time, the report of the stamp reporter was that the said application was filed after 164 days' delay. The stamp reporter has also pointed out that the application for review as filed was also accompanied by an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. It should, be noted that under the practice and procedure on the appellate side, the applicant should have taken back his review application, as filed out of time, from the stamp reporter, in terms of his report and should have also presented the same along with his application under section 5, before the appropriate Bench. This was admittedly not done. Here also we must keep it on record that even though there is no such specific order, the applicant, at the time of hearing before us, alleged that the present review application along with the necessary application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was filed pursuant to the liberty granted to him by the court. There is also no evidence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and furthermore, he was not informed by his learned advocates that he was required to pay Rs. 100. In any event, he has stated that since a sum of Rs. 95 has been paid subsequently, his review application should have been considered for the condonation of delay and the Bench presided over by Anil Kumar Sen J. (as his Lordship then was), was not right and justified in rejecting the concerned review application on September 16, 1986. Unfortunately for us, at this stage, we cannot reopen the reasons which are shown now for condonation of the said delay and really, in this application, we are only required to consider whether the subsequent delay in filing the second application in Review Tender No. 3693 of 1986 should be condoned. We have indicated the facts of this case, which, in our view, is peculiar and perhaps a singular one. However, since we are not required to say anything on the merits of the initial grievances of the applicant in the concerned civil order proceedings as mentioned hereinbefore, we are not making any consideration on the merits or otherwise of the case of the applicant or the facts of the case. We must, of course, keep it on record that the applicant strenuou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... there being no such expression in section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code, the courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39, Civil Procedure Code, if the court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction. The applicant, on being asked by us, could not establish that any lis was pending before him as Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, on the basis whereof such injunctions as were issued in his own case, could be issued. The effect of the submissions of the applicant, if accepted, would mean that a court will be authorised to pass an order of injunction in its own case. The applicant in this case was really and duly pursuing his own case and he really intended to act as a judge of his own case. Secondly, Mr. Islam referred to the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47, where the point for determination was really whether the High Court can exercise its inherent power to quash an interlocutory order and amongst ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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