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TMI Blog1982 (8) TMI 228X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the appellants on the allegation that the said land had been mortgaged by their father Lachman Singh. The mortgagee inducted the appellants as his tenants thereon. The said mortgage was redeemed later and it was the case that the appellants were continuing in possession of the land as trespassers. Upon these premises a decree for possession of the land detailed in the suit was prayed for which was ultimately granted on the 31st of August, 1959, against all the appellants excepting Megha defendant. 3. The respondent-decree-holders thereafter applied for the execution of the aforesaid decree by means of an execution petition preferred in Court on the 5th of April, 1969. It was mentioned in the execution application that the land described therein had been allotted in lieu of the land in respect of which the decree was passed and hence the decree-holders' claim to be put in possession of an area measuring 391 Kanals 1 Marla. The appellants filed an objection petition to contest the execution proceedings. Therein inter alia they pleaded that the decree-holders were big landowners and that in any case the redemption of the mortgage of the suit land by the decree-holders amount t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. On the plain language of the aforesaid provision when a mortgage is created by the landowner, he transfers an interest in the land in question. It is more so in the case of a mortgage with possession, because then landowner not only transfers the interest in the immovable property but also transfers the possession thereof. Consequently when such a mortgage is redeemed, the mortgagor must necessarily take back the interest which he had earlier transferred and in essence it would amount to retransfer to him. Once it is so held, it would follow that the redemption of a mortgage with possession would involve the transfer of the same legal right back to the mortgagor and would amount to acquisition by transfer within the meaning of S. 19-A of the Act. This is so on the ratio of both Labh Singh's case 1971 CriLJ 719 as also the case of Godhu 1979 PLJ 496(supra). 6. Again learned counsel for the parties do not dispute the proposition that whether such a transfer is made voluntarily by the act of the parties, or involuntarily by operation of law, the result would be the same, and that it would amount to a transf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r tenant shall acquire or possess by transfer, exchange lease, agreement or settlement any land which, with or without the land already owned or held by him, shall in the aggregate exceed the permissible area : Proviso : xx xx xx (2) Any transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or settlement made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (I) shall be null and void. Pepsu Act 32-L : Ceiling on future acquisition of land : (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, custom, usage, contract, or agreement from and after the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, no person whether as landowner or tenant, shall acquire or possess by transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or settlement any land which with or without the land already owned or held by him, shall in the aggregate exceed the permissible limit. (2) Any transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or settlement made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be null and void. 19-B Future acquisition of land by inheritance, in excess of permissible area : Subject to the provisions of Section 10-A, if, after the commencement of this Act, any person, whethe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d 32-M of the Pepsu Act. After consideration, the Bench arrived at the following categoric conclusion :-- We are no hesitation in holding that the acquisition made by Labh Singh of 7.4 standard acres of land by redemption does amount to acquisition within the meaning of Section 32-L of the Pepsu Act. That begin the case, under sub-section (2) of the said section, this transfer by which Labh Singh has acquired interest in land and its possession, must be deemed to be null and void and, therefore non-existent. The transfer being non-existent, there is no acquisition in the eye of law and, consequently, this transfer has to be ignored and not to be taken into consideration. This effect has to take place, because Section 32-L of the Pepsu Act applies notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, custom or agreement. And again : It is not necessary for us to go into the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that such a transfer would be void only to the extent to which the aggregate area exceeds the permissible limit and not in its entirety. That is a question which shall have to be determined in a proper case if there is a dispute between the mortg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... le and a harmonious meaning in consonance with the other provisions has to be given to each section. In Labh Singh's case 1971 CriLJ 719 the Bench seems to have not even chosen to read the closely connected and contiguous Ss. 32-L and 32-M together for their consideration against the broader canvass of the scheme of the Pepsu Act. 15. Again the precise and the finer issue which is now before us---namely whether sub-section (2) of S. 19-A is absolute in its terms or circumscribed by S. 19-B---does not seem to have been even considered by the Bench in Labh Singh's case. The distinction that in order to subserve to larger purpose of the Pepsu Act, the acquisition by way of transfer may be void qua the State and thus not in the least affecting the utilisation of the surplus area, without continuing to bind the parties inter se to the transfer was neither pointed raised before the Bench, nor adjudicated by it. 16. Equally the attention of the Bench was not drawn to the startlingly anomalous effects resulting from an overly literal and categoric construction which they placed one categoric construction which they placed on sub-section (2) of S. 32-L of the Pepsu Act. This b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... initio or non-est, no question of the applicability of S. 32-M could arise and there would be no occasion for filing of subsequent returns by the said landowner and the declaration of surplus area in his hands. It is a hoary principle that a construction of the provision which renders some of its other provisions redundant and unworkable is to be avoided. Therefore, because of the all pervading consideration of harmonious construction, Ss. 32-L and 32-M would have to be construed together and this can only be done by placing a slight limitation on the otherwise categoric language used in sub-section (2) of S. 32-L of the Pepsu Act. 18. For the aforesaid reasons we are constrained to hold that on the aforesaid specific point the decision of the Bench in Labh Singh's case 1971 CriLJ 719 does not lay down the law correctly and is hereby overruled. 19. The view we are inclined to take is totally synonymous with that in Godhu's case 1979 PLJ 496(supra). This decision directly covers the issue in so far as it specifically construes Ss. 19-A and 19-B of the Punjab Act. It is true that the counsel were rather remiss in not bringing the earlier view in Labh Singh's case t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the purposes of the determination of the surplus areas in the hand of big landowners. Though undoubtedly the language of S. 10-A is different yet the subsequent insertion of Ss. 19-A and 19-B appears to be only a continuation of the pervading spirit of the statute that whilst there should be no leakage of surplus land for utilisation for the purposes of resettlement of tenants under the Act yet the binding effect of such a transfer between private parties inter se be maintained. 23. To conclude it must be held that even though the language of sub-section (2) of S. 19-A is absolute; yet for the reasons of sound interpretation it must be given a slightly constricted meaning in order to harmonise it with S. 19-B of the Punjab Act. The answer to the question posed at the outset is that a transfer in contravention of Section 19-A(1) would be void only qua the State for the purposes of the Punjab Act, but would be valid and binding between the parties inter se. The view in Labh Singh's case 1971 Cri LJ 719(supra) in this context, is hereby overruled, whilst that in Godhu's case 1979 PLJ 496(supra) is approved and affirmed. 24. This matter would now go back to the learne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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