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TMI Blog1922 (2) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case there can be no doubt that he deliberately took part in he 'hartal' of the Pleaders. We have, however, been informed that R.K. Bose has ceased to practice as a Pleader and has not taken out a certificate this year. 10. Consequently, in cur judgment, it is not necessary for us at present to enquire further into the case of R.K. Bose, or to take any steps in connection with this reference. Reference No. 7 of 1921. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. 11. This is a reference by the learned District Judge of Noakhali forwarding a report made by the Officiating Subordinate Judge under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, with respect to two. Pleaders of that Court, Rajani Kanta Nag and Preo Nath Roy Chaudhuri. 12. The Subordinate Judge reported that the Pleaders committed grossly improper conduct in the discharge of their professional duty by not attending Court on the date in question and neglecting to do the necessary work on behalf of their client in the suit mentioned in the report on the 25th May 1921 though asked by their client, he further reported that they were guilty of misconduct within the meaning of Section 13(f) of the Legal Practitioners Act, The learned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... looked after the case. 6. That in the matter of not attending Courts during hartal there was no combination or common object amongst the members of the Bar, that I did not, with a view to the furtherance of the alleged common object of the hartal or non-co-operation movement, absent myself from Court from 23rd May 1921 to 3rd June 1921. No such hartal or non-co-operation movement was started by me or the Local Bar; non-cooperation movement was started long before the period in question and it has no connection with my absence from Court. 9. That consequent upon the cooly affairs at Chandpur, public feeling in this town ran so very high that-the people, in one voice, resolved in sympathy for them, to suspend all works for a time and desired the Headers, the Mukhtears, merchants, ghariwallas and others to follow their decision under threat of social punishment and humiliation, and that it might be in obedience to this resolution that none of my clients asked me to appear in Court from 23rd May 1921 to 3rd June 1921. 10. That the resolution referred to above was enforced so strictly that no gentlemen could dare disobey it with impunity, that men of position and honour h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o. 2 did not even inform me that his suit was fixed for hearing on 25th May 1921, he himself making tadbir in his cases and having not entered this case in my sherista. 16. These two Pleaders and two others accepted a vakalatnama from the defendant No. 2 in a Suit No. 1083 of 1920, on the nth January 1921. The hearing of the suit was fixed for the 25th May 1921. Neither of the Pleaders attended the Court on that day, and the defendant No. 2 filed a petition asking for a month's adjournment on account of the hartal which had begun on the 23rd May 1921 and which continued until the 3rd June 1921, and in consequence of which the Pleaders did not attend the Courts. 17. The petition is as follows: To-day is the date of the abovementioned sirit. To-day I went to Pleader's basha with copy of issue to file list of witnesses: making hartal in the course of non-co-operation no Pleader looked into any papers. I pray for one month's adjournment in order to enable my Pleaders to consult with reference to suit papers as to what evidence should be adduced on ray behalf and to file list of witnesses. Be it known that for the reasons stated above none of the Pleaders not havin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sked or that there was any arrangement that a fee should be paid before the Pleaders would attend Court. In the absence of such proof the mere fact that no fee was tendered or paid is, in my judgment, no justification for this refusal to attend to their clients' interests. 24 Further, having regard to the facts of the case and the statements in the written explanations of the two Pleaders, I have no doubt that even if a fee had been offered, they would not have accepted it or attended the Court. 25. It was then argued that there was no evidence of the common object alleged in the charge. 26. I agree that it has not been strictly proved that the Pleaders took part in what has come to be called the non-co-operation movement. 27. In my judgment, however, it has been proved that the Pleaders did join in the hartal, one object of which was to boycott the Courts. 28. The excuses put forward in the written explanations of the Pleaders, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. In the one case, the Pleader stated that he did not attend the Court for fear of being put to great inconvenience and humiliation by the irritated public. In the other case the Pleader stated that he c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd acting to the prejudice of his interest (Section 13(6)) and you have further been 'guilty of misconduct by joining the said movement started to boycott Courts and paralyse the work of the Courts and absenting yourself from the Court on those dates (23rd May, 1921 to 3rd June 1921) without any lawful excuse ((Section 13(f)) 32. The report of the Subordinate Judge was that the Pleader was guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within the meaning of Clause (6) of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act and of misconduct within Clause (f) of the said section. 33. The learned District Judge concluded his reference as follows: The opposite party, as such Pleader, is liable to some punishment, however light, under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act; as he, in my opinion, has brought himself within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court and his misconduct which falls within Clause (f) of Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act; is grave enough to deserve it. But I cannot say that his conduct deserves severe punishment. 34. Notice of the charge was given to the Pleader on the 12th July 1921, and on the 30th July 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In the course of the argument, the learned Vakil for the Pleader informed us that hartal meant strike . 43. This conclusion is not based upon the statements in the petition only. There is other evidence in this case. 44. It appears that on the 22nd May 1921, a, meeting was held in the town and resolutions were passed, one of which was that Pleaders and Mukhiears should not attend the Courts. This meeting was held to show sympathy in respect of an incident which had occurred at Chandpur. The object of such a resolution could only be to: boycott the Courts and so interfere with the administration of justice. On the 23rd May 1921 the Pleaders in a body with the exception of the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, abstained from attending the Courts. This abstention lasted until the 3rd June 1921. There was an informal gathering of some, Pleaders in the Bar library called by the Pleader Annada Charan Roy, whose conduct is now under consideration, at which meeting the opinion was expressed by the majority that as the public feeling is very high it is not safe to disobey. 45. These facts show conclusively that it was in consequence of the hartal that Annada Charan Roy d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the Pleader must have known that it was impossible for his client to obtain such assistance on the 2nd June 1921; all the Pleaders were observing the hartal except the Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, and the client had no option except to bow to the inevitable and to present his petition himself. 53. It was then urged that although the Pleader absented himself from Court, and although his absence was in consequence of the hartal, there was no evidence of his joining the hartal. 54. I put aside the question of the non-cooperation movement as there is no evidence against the Pleader in this respect. I am satisfied, however, that there was a hartal; one of the objects of that hartal was to boycott the Courts; there is no evidence that the Pleader took part in promoting the hartal: but to my mind it is clear that he abstained from going to the Court on the 2nd June in consequence of the hartal; he took part in the discussion in the Bar library, and he acquiesced in the hartal, the result of which was that not a single Pleader, except the two already mentioned, attended the Courts. He must have known that the observance of the hartal would result in a boycott of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s would bring his case within the meaning of Clause (f) of the said section. Reference No. 9 of 1921. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. 59. This is a reference by the learned District Judge of Noakhali under Section 1.4 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. 60. The learned Judge forwarded with his reference a report of the learned Munsif of the Third Court. 61. The charge was: Whereas you being enrolled as a Pleader and authorised to act as such in this Court, absented yourself from Court, contrary to the Mis. Case No. 419 wishes of your client and to the prejudice, of his interests, of 1920. on 28th and 50th May 1921 when the case noted in the margin, (Order XXI, Rule 90, C.P.C.) in which you were engaged for the Petitioner was called on, Azam-ud-din-Peti you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of tioner v. Md. Ibrahim your professional duties within the meaning of Section 13 of the Bhuiya--Opp.-Party. Legal Practitioners Act and have rendered yourself liable to be reported to the High Court under Section 14 of the said Act. 62. The learned Munsif held that the charge had been established and reported the case to the High Court. 53. The learn ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ag acted as Pleader for Azam-ud-Din in connection with that application-. The 28th May 1921 was fixed for the hearing of that application. On the morning of that day Azam-ud-Din went to Noakhali and to the house of S.K. Nag and asked him to sign and move a petition in Court on his behalf. 70. The evidence of Azam-ud-Din is that The Pleader said he would not come to Court or sign my petition or a hajirah. His clerk said he would not write my petition. I am an illiterate man, I could not write a petition or a hajirah. They told me to come to Court. I came to Court but could not take any steps. I found no Pleader or Pleader's clerk in Court that day. I had engaged no other Pleader in my case except Surendra Babu. I had requested my Pleader to come to Court. I could not know the result that day. 71. It appears that Azam-ud-Din went to the Court and waited about until 3-30 P.M. He asked the peshkar to give him the adjourned date of the case. The peshkar wanted the number of the case and said he could not find the case without the number; this Azam-ud-Din was not able to supply: the number was noted in the diary of the Pleader's clerk, but neither the Pleader nor his cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er (Azam-ud-Din) had sustained a heavy loss, and, secondly, that the cause of this heavy loss' was that hartal prevailed at the time and Pleaders and clerks did not attend Courts, and that as the petitioner could neither read nor write he could not take any step. I am not aware whether the matter was set right as neither side was able to inform the Court what had been the result of the petition. 78. In my judgment it is clear that on the 28th May 1921 S.K. Nag was the sole Pleader for Azam-ud-Din in connection with the application to set aside the sale; that was the day fixed for the hearing of the sale; Azam-ud-Din requested him to go to Court and file a petition. the Pleader refused. He was asked to sign a petition, the Pleader refused: the Pleader's clerk would not even write out the petition. 79. The Pleader must have known that Azam-ud-Din was illiterate; he must have known that unless he complied-with Azam-ud-Din's request, Azam-ud-Din's application to set aside the sale would be in jeopardy, and Azam-ud-Din's interests might be seriously prejudiced; further, he must have known that as there was a hartal no other Pleader or Mukhtear would be availabl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d discharged himself on the 28th May and that the client agreed to such discharge. It is difficult to treat such an argument seriously if the Pleader wished to discharge himself, he was bound to give his client reasonable notice: his refusal to act was on the morning of the 28th May: the case was fixed for that day: the Pleader knew his client could get no other advice on that day because of the hartal, and that he was an illiterate man, who could neither read nor write: it cannot possibly be held that the notice was reasonable. 86. It is then said the client agreed to the discharge. There is no evidence of such agreement by the client: on the contrary the evidence is all the other way and it is clear that Azam-ud-Din wanted the Pleader to go to Court: when the Pleader refused Azam-ud-Din had no alternative but to go to Court himself, and to my mind there is no ground for the suggestion that he agreed to the discharge of the Pleader. 87. Then it was said that there was no evidence that the Court made any order on the 28th My that the Pleader should take action on the 30th. That is true, but, in my judgment, it is immaterial: the facts show that the Pleader's absence on th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd, it was clearly his duty to co-operate with the Court in the orderly and pure administration of justice. 95. The Pleader has failed altogether in showing any justification for his refusal to act for his client, and to attend the Court and in my judgment, he was guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty within Clause (b) of Section 13 and of such misconduct as would bring his case within Clause (f) of the same section. References Nos. 4, 7, 8 9 of 1921. J.G. Wooddroffe, J. 96. These references have been heard separately but they have certain points in common to which I address myself. The Pleaders concerned are charged with furthering a hartal or strike by abstaining from Court in breach of their duty towards their clients and the Court. The hartal was proclaimed by a public meeting as an expression of public feeling regarding the treatment of certain tea-garden coolies at Chandpur near Noakhali. There is no evidence to show that this; hartal was part of or connected with the political movement known as the non-cooperation movement, though as a method of expressing public opinion it may have had the actions of some of those who ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re such Judge, or, if he has accepted a brief or vakalatnama, by first properly discharging himself on due notice to the client and in the latter case to the Court. But concerted action by a whole body of legal practitioners to boycott a Judge or Court in protest against an alleged wrong to one of its members or in respect of its conduct of the administration of justice generally is not permissible, because the Bar in any such case cannot constitute itself the authority to adjudge on such grievance and its duty is not to impede the administration' of justice, by, collective abstention from Court, but to make its representation through (if there be one) its Association to the High Court which has superintendence in such matters. In the present case, moreover, the abstention is alleged to have been due to causes wholly extrinsic to the administration of justice, namely, the action of the civil administration in regard to some tea-garden coolies, a matter in which the Pleaders concerned and others may have been rightly interested in their personal capacity, but with which, qua Pleaders, and as a body of legal practitioners, they were not concerned. 100. The common form of defen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to charge a legal practitioner with grossly improper conduct, whatever his liability to his client might be, if he omitted to carry out his duty to his clients by reason of his genuine fear of any real and substantial injury, physical or otherwise, to himself or family. Nor, in my opinion, would it make any difference if such fear were, in fact, unfounded if, in fact, it was sincerely entertained. And this for the reason that the Courts cannot punish a legal practitioner for grossly improper conduct because his apprehensions were beside the mark or he was devoid of courage. In such a case his client might have a remedy against him for neglect of a duty which his apprehensions did not excuse. But it would not be grounds for the Court's action by way of punishment for grossly improper conduct. It might, of course, be that the apprehensions were so littli founded as to give rise to the inference that they could not have been sincerely entertained. But if sincerely entertained then no case of professional misconduct would be, in my opinion, made out. 101. The question then, which, in my opinion, we have to determine in these cases, is whether the Pleaders did not attend Court (a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ned even to sign a petition in his own house, showing that it was not in that particular instance a case of apprehension of danger in going out and attending Courts. And in other cases it seems to me that the refusal to attend was due to sympathy with the objects of the hartal and not to fear of the consequences of disobeying it. And what were these consequences in fact? One person was molested by having his bicycle taken from him in attending Court, the Government Pleader, who with the Public Prosecutor attended Court, was fined ₹ 25 by the public (whether it was paid or not does not appear) and has some night-soil thrown into his. compound, another man was fined by the public ₹ 5 and the like. Large number of people carried on, and amongst these the Municipal mehiars made more decent and mannerly disposal of night-soil, doing, as did others, their service in the ordinary way. The whole affair was over within a fortnight. On these facts the conclusions at which I arrive is, firstly, that, whatever may have been the risk involved, it was not sufficient to exempt the Pleaders from the performance of their duty, and might have been nothing at all had the whole body of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it is open to the Pleader charged to say nothing, to give no explanation, to adduce no evidence, to refuse to be examined on oath or otherwise and to say to the Court proceeding against him prove your case. This is a course legally open to him, though, seeing that the Pleader is an offer of Court, I cannot say it is a proper course and certainly not a wise one, if the Pleader has any defence. I cannot conceive that a legal practitioner who has a real defence on the merits will not disclose every fact and take every step to prove it. When there is no defence or the defence is doubtful, it may be that a legal practitioner may adopt the course taken by a guilty accused in a criminal trial. Anyhow the prosecuting party must prove its case. If, however, (as here) the Pleaders charged do offer an explanation, the Court may take, it into account in ascertaining whether the charge is made out. This is of some importance in the present case, as in deciding whether the case is made out against each Pleader the latter's statement may be considered. The onus again is undoubtedly on the party making the charge, though I think that if the Pleader does offer an explanation or evidence, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... matter specially within his knowledge, is on the Pleader. If again it is alleged that the Pleader who has accepted a vakalatnama has discharged himself, he must show that he has properly done so with sufficient notice to his client and with intimation to the Court. 108. If again a Pleader stipulates for payment of fees before he does any work he is not bound to do such work without such payment. If, however, he accepts a vakalatnama without such stipulation, that is, gives credit to his client, he must proceed to represent him, even though unpaid his fees, until either his client discharges him or he properly discharges himself. 109. Applying these genera principles to the present case, I am of opinion that the obligation to attend Court as charged is prima facie established, that no special contract affecting the general inference to be drawn from the acceptance of the vakalatnama has been established, nor any valid self-discharge. 110. I am of opinion that the Pleaders, other than D.P. Chakraburtty in Reference No. 4. who is shown to have been engaged for one application, only abstained from attendance at Court when there was a duty upon them to attend and that the abst ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... use (f) in so far as the practitioners conduct was directed against the Court by abstention from attendance on account of the hartal. In the present case the two are closely connected, because one and the same act constitutes the neglect and furtherance of the hartal. It is plain on the view of the facts here taken that one or other section applies. The matter is of no practical importance in any event, particularly having regard to the order which we are about to pass in these cases. References Nos. 4, 7, 8 9 of 192. Asutosh Mookerjee, J. 114. These are four references made by the District Judge of Noakhali under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act in respect of six Pleaders. Reference No. 4 relates to Babu Rajani Kanta Bose and Babu Burga Prosanna Chakraburtty, Reference No. 7 to Babu Rajani Kanta Nag and Babu Priya Nath Rai Chattdhuri, Reference No. 8 to Babu Annada Charan Roy, and Reference No. 9 to Babu Surendra Kumar Nag. The references raise important questions of principle, which are of first impression and affect a large section of the legal profession in this Presidency; they may be conveniently considered together, though the investigation by the Sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the Court? As regards the first question, it is essential to point out that a Pleader must be duly appointed before he can appear, act and plead in a case. Reference may be made to Rule 1 and Rule 4(1) and 4(2) of Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the patty in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a Pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf. Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. The appointment of a Pleader to make or do any appearance, application or act for any person shall be in writing, and shall be signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by power-of-attorney to act in his behalf. Every such appointment, when accepted by a Pleader, shall be filed in Court, and shall be considered to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court, by a writing signed by the client or the Pleader, as the case m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... I am bound to add, however, that the true import of the observations made by Mr. Justice Phear was not, it seems to me, correctly appreciated by Sir Richard Garth, C.J. The view indicated by Phear, J., that if once a legal practitioner accepts a brief, he is bound to plead the cause of his client, whether he is paid his fee or not, is not in conflict with the opinion maintained by Garth, C.J., that a legal practitioner may, both as a matter of right and of professional propriety, insist upon the payment of his fee before he reads his brief or pleads his client's cause. As Garth, C.J., himself points out, if a legal practitioner takes a brief without a fee and without informing his client that the fee must be paid before he attends to the case, he cannot with propriety recede from it, without due notice to his client, upon the ground that the fee is not paid. To my mind, the true position is that the acceptance of a vakalatnama with the usual terms, which is filed by the Pleader in Court, prima facie places him under an obligation to appear and act on behalf of his client; and, if he fails to perform what is thus prima facie his duty, he must be ready to justify his conduct by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ever, that this is a matter solely between the Pleader and his client. The statutory provisions on the subject leave no room for doubt that the appointment of a Pleader, when filed in Court, with his acceptance, continues in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the Pleader, as the case may be, to this rule, there are two exceptions, namely, first the death of the client or the Pleader, and, secondly, the termination of the proceedings in the suit so far as regards that client. An instance of the application of this rule is furnished by the decision of Harington, J., in Atul Chandra Ghose v. Lakshman Chunder Sen 2 Ind. Cas. 830 : 36 C. 609 : 13 C.W.N. 1172. See also Prabhu Lal v. Kumar Krishna Dutt 33 Ind. Cas. 73 : 23 C.L.J. 326 : 20 C.W.N. 437 Prabhu Lal v. Kumar Krishna Dutt 33 Ind. Cas. 78 : 23 C.L.J. 473 : 20 C.W.N. 443. The principle has been recognised for more than half a century, as is clear from Section 18 of Act VIII of 1859 and Section 39 of Act X of 1877 and Act XIV of 1882, which were applied in the cases of King v. King 6 B. 416 at p. 429 : 3 Ind. Dec. 733 and Watkins v. Fox 22 C. 943 : 11 Ind. Dec. 626. It is not di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e, so much so that it cannot be delegated without consent. The Pleader by his obligation is bound to discharge his duties to his client with the strictest fidelity and is answerable to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court for dereliction of duty. A Pleader, however, is more than a mere agent or servant of his client. He is also an officer of the Court, and as such he owes the duty of good faith and honourable dealing to the Courts before which he practises his profession. His high vocation is to inform the Court as to the law and facts of the case and to aid it to do justice by arriving at correct conclusions The practice of the law is not a business Open to all who wish to engage in it; it is a personal right or privilege limited to selected persons of good character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified: it is in the nature, of a franchise from the State conferred only for merit and may be revoked whenever misconduct renders the Pleader holding the license unfit to be entrusted with the powers and duties of his office. Generally speaking, the test to be applied is whether the misconduct is of such a description as shows him to be an unfit or unsafe pers ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jurisdiction, an appeal lies from such order to the Court of Appeal. The same principle was recognised by Lord Mansfield in Brounsall, Ex parte (1778) 2 Cowper. 829 : 98 E.R. 1385 when he over ruled an objection to disciplinary proceedings against an Attorney who had been convicted of felony, on the ground that the only misconduct imputed to him was the very offence which had formed the basis of his conviction. The same view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Randall v. Bringham (1868) 7 Wallace. 523 : 19 Law. Ed. 285 and Wall, Ex parte (1882) 17 Otto. 265. The true position appears to be that these proceedings are neither civil suits nor criminal prosecutions: Janak Kishore, In the matter of 37 Ind. Cas. 484 : 1 P.L.J. 576 : (1917) Pat. 60 : 18 Cr. L.J. 132. They are special proceedings resulting from the inherent powers of the Courts over their officers. Their object is to preserve the purity of the Courts and the proper and honest administration of the law. The purpose of suspension and disbarment is to protect the Court and the public from legal practitioners who, disregarding the sanctity of their office, pervert and abuse the privileges annexed to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as legitimately arises from its contents. To take an example, if the Pleader in his written statement seeks to justify his conduct on certain allegations of fact, it may well be inferred that the conduct was not justifiable on other hypothetical or imaginable grounds. A singular illustration of such a contingency was furnished in the course of argument in one of the cases now before us. It was urged with considerable insistence that the failure of the Pleader to appear in Court on the appointed day did not render him liable to disciplinary action, inasmuch as it had not been affirmatively, established that he had been offered his fee for the day by the client. But in answer to a question put by the Court, the reply was given that even if the fee had been tendered, it would not have been accepted, as the Pleader had decided not to attend the Court on account of the hartal. In my opinion, when in answer to a charge made against a Pleader, a written statement has been filed in a proceeding under Section 14, it is not obligatory on the Court to rule out all conceivable hypothetical grounds which could have been, but had not been, setup in answer. The justice of the case may ordinarily ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by the client for only one occasion, consequently his failure to appear on another occasion does not support the charge of professional misconduct. 122. In Reference No. 7, we are concerned with the cases of two Pleaders, Babu Rajani Kanta Nag and Babu Priyanath Rai Chaudhri. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that these Pleaders had accepted a vakalatnama and yet did not appear in Court when their case was taken up. There can be no doubt that they acted in this manner, because they were in sympathy with the hartal resolution, and it is idle for them to urge that they had no intention to boycott the Court or paralyse the administration of justice. I feel no doubt that they could have attended the Court, as the Government Pleader and the Public Prosecutor had done, and that the risk of consequent inconvenience and possible humiliation by an irritated public has been unduly magnified. I consider that their conduct in not attending to the case in which they had been engaged was unjustifiable, and they have rendered themselves liable to disciplinary action by this Court. 123. In Reference No. 8, we have to deal with the case of Babu Annada Charan Roy. In his written defence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on the appointed date. There is no foundation whatever for this contention, for it is well-settled that no fresh vakalatnama is necessary to entitle the Pleader to appear in proceedings subsequent to the decree, Shah Mukhun v. Sreekishen Singh 8 W.R. 92 Sutto Churn v. Suroop Chunder Doss 12 W.R. 465 Gopal Jayachand v. Hargovind Khushal 5 B.H.C.R. (A.C.J.) 83 Sadashiv Ganpatrao v. Vithaldas Nanchand 20 B. 198 : 10 Ind. Dec. 691. The Pleader did not, in fact, present the application for reversal of the sale, and, subsequently the petition for restoration of that application, on the strength of his appointment as Pleader in the suit; and no weight can be attached to the fact that a fresh vakalatnama was not filed. There is also no force in the contention that he was not paid his fees, he did not demand his fees and would not have attended the Court even on payment. The truth is he sympathised with the movement for boycott of the Court and considered it safe and desirable to bow down to the popular will. His conduct is, in my opinion, not capable of justification on any imaginable ground and can only be characterised as amounting to a deliberate and reckless disregard of the interest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. 4, 7, 8 9 of 1921. Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. 126. After due consideration we have decided to take no further action in respect of the References No. 4 of 1921, No. 7 of 1921, No. 8 of 1921 and No. 9 of 1921. Some of the reasons which have actuated us in coming to this conclusion, are: (1) that these are the first cases of the kind which have been brought before this Court; (2) that the Pleaders concerned, with the exception of one, who has ceased to practise, have resumed work and attended the Courts; (3) that there was undoubtedly a strong feeling in Noakhali on the occasion in question; (4) the Pleaders may have acted in haste and without due consideration of the serious nature and effect of their conduct. 127. We have therefore, decided to treat as leniently as possible the Pleaders concerned in the references now before us, in the hope and belief that the warning, which we now give, will have the effect of preventing a repetition of such conduct. 128. It must be recognised, however, that the Court takes a very serious view of this matter. 129. The Pleaders in Noakhali were a considerable body in point of numbers, and were persons whose inf ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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