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TMI Blog1972 (1) TMI 117X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for his detention at the time when his arrest was effected. On May 17, 1971, the State Government approved the said order. On the same day the State Government reported the fact of the passing of the said order and its approval to the Central Government. The petitioner made his representation which he was entitled to make by virtue of Section 8(i). That was received by the State Government on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971, that is within 30 days from the date of detention, the petitioner's case was placed before the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 of the Act. The State Government considered that representation, but rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971, the Board reported that there was, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the petitioner's detention. Thereupon, the State Government, by its order dated July 29, 1971, confirmed the detention order under Section 12. 2. The grounds for detention served on the petitioner stated that the order was passed in view of his acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars given below . These particulars were: 1. On 1.12.1970 after midnight ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elating to the illegal and anti-social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that it was after careful examination of that material that the impugned order was passed. 4. The allegations made by the petitioner were, in our view, vague and indefinite and not backed by any material or particulars, and therefore cannot be accepted. Besides, the detenu's case was placed before the Advisory Board together with his representation and other relevant materials, and according to the report of the Board, there was sufficient material justifying the order. In the absence of any definite material before us, it is not possible to accept the extremely vague allegations made by the petitioner. 5. But Mr. Dinghra, who appeared amicus curiae for the petitioner, raised two additional grounds. Neither of them was, however, raised in the petition but since this was a habeas corpus petition, and furthermore, made by the petitioner from jail, he was allowed to take them though ordinarily he would not have been permitted to do so as they did not find any place in the petition. 6. The two additional grounds were (1) that the grounds furnished to the detenu did n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... distinction was also drawn in Pushkar Mukherjee v. West Bengal 1970 CriLJ 852, where Ramaswami, J., observed that the expression public order in Section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not take in every kind of infraction of law. An assault by one on another in a house or even in a public street might create disorder but not public disorder, for the latter was one which affected the community or the public at large. Therefore, a line of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder was, thus, not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which would affect public order fell within the scope of the Act. 9. But in Arun Ghosh v. West Bengal 1970 CriLJ 1136, it was pointed out that the true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order was one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in questi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hief by fire or explosive substance upon property of one of the specified categories and such mischief upon any such properties which disturbs or is likely to disturb public order. The former, however reprehensible, would be taken care of by the Penal Code, and it is only in respect of the latter that the drastic power of detention without trial conferred by the first Sub-section can be validly exercised. But to the extent that the expression public order is not defined here also, decisions under Act IV of 1950 delineating the sphere of public order from those of maintenance of law and order and the security of the State would still be of utility. 11. The Acts alleged against the petitioner in the grounds for detention are acts which fall under Section 3(2)(b), in that, they constitute mischief by fire and by explosive substance on property of an educational institution. But the question is whether these acts disturbed or were likely to disturb public order; in the words of Hidayatullah, C.J., in Arun Ghosh v. West Bengal 1970 CriLJ 1136, disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality. The distinction drawn by Clause (b) of Section 3(2) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at is to say. after a lapse of 34 days. Like Section 7(i) of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950, the present Act also provides by Section 8(1) that the detaining authority shall provide to the detenu not later than five days from the date of detention the grounds on which the detention order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. In Jayanarayan Sukul v. West Bengal 1970 CriLJ 743 where also a point as to undue delay in the light of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950 was raised, Ray, J., speaking for the Court, laid down four principles. These were: 1. that the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation as early as possible; 2. that such a consideration of the representation is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including consideration by it of the detenu's such representation; 3. that there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration, though no hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case and his representation to the Advisory Board. As soon as the representation was returned to it, Government considered it and rejected it but that was before the Board made its report and sent it to Government. But Counsel urged that this fact may explain the lapse of time from the date that the records were sent and the date when they were returned, but not the delay between May 27, 1971 and June 7, 1971 during which Government could have arrived at its decision. That argument has not much force, because in a given case Government may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a short time, especially, in a case where another authority, in this case the District Magistrate, has passed the questioned order. It might have to make inquiries as to the situation in the locality, the nature of and the circumstances in which detention was found necessary, the previous history of the person detained etc. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with Counsel that Government should have reached its conclusion during the said period. No doubt, the delay in deciding the representation was of 34 days, but part of it was due to the fact that the representation and the record remained ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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