TMI Blog2001 (1) TMI 1013X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... kondahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Hosakote Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, and the plans for construction of houses were approved by the Mandal Panchayat. According to the Petitioners, hakkupatras were also issued in favour of the Petitioners vide Annexure 'C' to the writ petition. The Petitioners' case is that after getting hakkupatras and having paid the tax the Petitioners made application for licence to put up construction of residential house and the licence was granted on 18.7.1991. The Petitioners' case is that after obtaining the licence from the Mandal Panchayat, the Petitioners have started laying foundation in their respective sites. When this was the state of affairs, it appears that present Respondents 4 to 13 have filed the appeal before the Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, in No. SK/96/91/92 under Section 273 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishad Act, on the grounds mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. That by order dated 3.1.1992 the Samanya Sthai Committee of Respondent-1 without considering the objections filed by the Petitioners, as well as without giving opportunity of hearing to them the appellate authority passed the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ow that the appellate authority had applied its mind to the question of limitation, nor there is nothing on record to indicate that any sufficient cause or explanation for the delay has been shown and the appellate authority condoned the delay. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the above the impugned orders are without jurisdiction, illegal null and void and the same is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel submitted that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the Petitioners. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has raised certain other contentions as well but there is no need to go into those contentions as prima facie it appears that the first contention by itself is sufficient to decide the matter. On behalf of the Respondents Smt. Suguna, Advocate, holding brief for Sri S. Channaraya Reddy, learned Counsel for Respondents 4 to 9 and 12 contended that the appellate authority when entertained the appeal and decided the same on merits it should be deemed to have condoned the delay. She further contended that the question of limitation appears to have not pressed by the other side. She contended that opportunity of hearing was given to the Petitioners and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the expression within such period as may be prescribed. The expression within such period as may be prescribed means the period as may be prescribed under the rules framed under the provisions of law. The expression 'prescribed' has been interpreted to mean as prescribed under the rules. Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats (Limitation for Appeals) Rules, 1985 appear to have been framed under Section 284 read with Section 273(1) of the Act. Rule 2 of the aforesaid rules provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act or any rule made thereunder any person affected by an original order of the Mandal Panchayat made under the Act may within a period of thirty days from the date of such order appeal to the Zilla Parishad. It further provides that where the period specified for presentation of an appeal under Rule 2 expires on a general holiday declared by the Government, the appeal may be presented on the day next following such holiday. So, Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 read with Rule 2 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishad, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats (Limitation for A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on for any suit, appeal or application which period is different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule. It further provides that in order to determine the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 inclusive shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. No section in the Act has been pointed out which may be said to exclude either expressly or by necessary implications the application of these provisions of Sections 3 to 24 of the Limitation Act. Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 is a special law and the provisions under the appeal rules framed under the Act No. 20 of 1985 no doubt can come within the category of local law framed by the State and the period has been prescribed differently, so in my opinion by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of Section 5 of the Act will apply and could be applied. The Legislature while enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... should be deemed to have been conferred on the Court only and not on other authorities. 12. The learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that the expression Court should be deemed to include by necessary implication the authorities even quasi judicial authorities or tribunals which have been given power to decide about the rights of the parties and not as Court in strict sense of the term. Though the learned Counsel for the Petitioners emphasised that the expression Court should be interpreted as Court forming the part of judicature in strict sense of term. If two interpretations are possible, then it is well settled principles of law that the interpretation which avoids, and resolves inconsistency should be followed and adopted. If two interpretations are possible and one which saves the provisions from becoming otiose or redundant, should be followed. If the term Court here is interpreted in the restricted sense as the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended then it may have the effect of rendering Section 29(2) otiose and redundant and would frustrate the purpose and the object of Section 29(2). As such when the Legislature by later enactment of Section 29(2) i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the applicant the appellate authority or tribunal has to record its finding as to establishment of sufficient cause. In the present case, though the learned Counsel for the Respondents pointed out that the application for condonation of delay had been made and objections have been filed, but the appellate authority under Section 273 of the Karnataka Act No. 20 of 1985 does not appear to have applied its mind to that question, nor has recorded any finding about sufficient cause having been established. As such, the orders of the appellate authority vide Annexures 'G' and 'H' to the writ petitions cannot be said to be within their jurisdiction and not in accordance with law and suffers from the error apparent on the face of the record as well as jurisdiction. If the impugned orders are allowed to continue in existence the Petitioners and others to whom sites have been allotted long back in 1989 would suffer irreparable loss and injustice is likely to cause them. Thus considered, in my opinion, the writ petitions deserve to be allowed and are hereby allowed. 13. The impugned order passed by the Common Standing Committee, Zilla Parishad, Bangalore Rural District, Ban ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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