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TMI Blog1964 (1) TMI 74X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o is a voter on the rolls of the said Constituency filed an Election Petition before the Election Commission on April 11, 1962 under s. 81 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, which we shall refer to as the Act. There was no formal defect in the petition, it was accompanied by the requisite number of copies provided for by the Act and also by the treasury receipt evidencing the deposit of the requisite sum for security as provided by s. 117 of the Act. The grounds on which the election was sought to be set aside were various and included inter alia allegations of corrupt practices against the returned candidate as well as his election agent, as also several irregularities in the polling by having the votes of dead voters recorded as well as by double voting. The petition was received by the Commission, who after satisfying itself that it was in conformity with the Act had a copy of the petition published in the Official Gazette on May 17, 1962 as provided by s. 86 of the Act. In due course, an Election Tribunal was constituted and the petition was referred to the Tribunal for trial. The returned candidate - Brahmananda Reddy - filed his Written Statement on September 15, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... election petitioner and fixed a date for the trial of the petition on the merits. 6. Brahmananda Reddy thereupon moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and prayed for the issue of the Writ quashing this decision of the Tribunal and sought the dismissal of the election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. The learned Judges of the High Court disallowed the other technical objections raised, but held that the petition did not comply with the requirements of s. 81(3) of the Act and for this reason they directed the dismissal of the Election Petition. The appellant thereafter has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court. 7. The subject of controversy in this appeal lies in a very narrow compass. But before we deal with it, it will be convenient to specify the precise defect which the learned Judges have held to be fatal to the maintainability of the Election Petition. As stated earlier, the Election Petition filed was accompanied by the number of copies required to accompany the petition under s. 81(3). The Election Petition was type-written and the copies which accompanied the petition were carbon copies of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission :- (a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf - (i) by the person making the petition, or (ii) by a person authorised in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition; or (b) when it is sent by registered post and is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or the officer so appointed. (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. 11. Before proceeding further it is necessary to advert to the history of the provision in sub-section (3) for learned counsel for the respondents laid some store by the object with which the provision was introduced. As enacted in 1951, s. 81 contained only two sub-sections, the first dealing with the time within which a petition had to be filed and the second with the person or authority ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the number of copies specified there, and equally so that the copies so accompanying shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition . There was, of course, the signature of the petitioner on the copies, but there was no attestation by him that it was a true copy . This constituted a non-compliance with the requirements of s. 81 which brought into play the terms of s. 90(3) of the Act which required the Tribunal to dismiss a petition which did not comply with the provisions of s. 81. 17. Though the learned counsel for the appellant made several submissions, we propose to deal with only one, as the same is sufficient for the disposal of this appeal. This was that in the circumstances of the case there had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of s. 81(3). Before, however, dealing with it, it will be convenient to refer to some of the submissions made to us by the learned Solicitor-General appearing for the contesting respondents. He submitted to us certain propositions which however we consider really unexceptionable. He said that an election petition was not to be equated to an action at law or in equity, but that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such a non-compliance with the requirement of sub-section (3) not merely the Election Commission under s. 85 but the Election Tribunal under s. 90(3) would prima facie not merely be justified but would be required to dismiss the election petition. 20. This takes us to the point as to whether the requirement of s. 81(3) has been complied with or not. The principal submission of the learned Solicitor-General was based on the language employed in s. 81(3) of the Act read in the light of the direction contained in s. 90(3) which cast on the Tribunal the duty to dismiss an election petition which did not conform to the requirements of the former. In particular, he laid stress on the use of the imperative 'shall' in s. 81(3) when denoting the requirement of attestation under the petitioner's signature of the copy bearing the signature being a true copy . It was in this connection that he pointed out that the provision for properly attested copies of the petition accompanying the petition was introduced by the amendment effected in 1961, and the object of Parliament was two-fold; first to save the time and inconvenience which the previous procedure cast on the Elect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 39; which differs in material particular from the original is not a 'copy' within the Act. In this connection we might make a reference to the decision of this Court in Murarka v. Roop Singh [1964] 3 SCR 573 where the question as to what is a copy is elaborately discussed and some of the English decisions touching this matter have been set out. We shall have occasion to refer to Murarka's case later, but for the present we need only add that the decision relied on by the Solicitor-General is not at variance with what this Court has laid down in Murarka's case. 23. The next matter to be considered stems from the submission as regards the object of Parliament in enacting sub-section (3) of s. 81 and that expeditious disposal of election petitions which was the object would be frustrated if substantial compliance with the provision was held sufficient. 24. We are not impressed with this argument. While we are conscious of the need for expeditious disposal of election petitions, and for the strict enforcement of provisions designed to achieve this purpose, we cannot be oblivious to the circumstance that to read every requirement literally might equally defea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) but what was urged was as regards certain defects in the copies filed. These defects fell into two types. First there were two matters which it was stated rendered the copies filed not 'true copies'. If the expressions 'copy' or 'true copy' were read as exact copies of the original, the copies filed did not satisfy that test. The two defects were : (1) The original petition contained the signature of the petitioner at the foot of the petition as required by s. 81(3)(c) of the Act. In the copy filed there was no copy of this signature. To that extent therefore the copy was not an exact copy. 28. The second matter under this head was that the verification in the copy served on the appellant did not exactly correspond to that in the original in that in the latter one of the paragraphs was stated to be true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner while in the former that paragraph was omitted from this group. 29. The other type of defect which was claimed to constitute non-compliance with s. 81(3) was that the words 'true copy' with the signature of the petitioner underneath were not put down in one of the annexures to the petition, copie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... petitioner. 32. If the signature of the petitioner whose name is set out in the body of the petition is appended at the end, surely it authenticates the contents of the document. Now in regard to this the learned Judges of the High Court themselves observed after referring to the terms of s. 81(3) : No doubt, what is necessary is a substantial compliance with the requirement of attestation. For instance, if it is proved that the election petitioner has signed animo attestendi, and omitted the words 'true copy' by mistake or inadvertently, there is a substantial requirement of the compliance of s. 81(3). The same may be said if the relative positions of the words 'true copy' and of the signature one below the other are not correct. 33. They however held that as there was no evidence of the signature having been appended animo attestendi, there was non-compliance with s. 81(3). The learned Solicitor-General while not disputing the correctness of the observations of the learned Judges just extracted pressed upon us that the signature at the end of the copy was meant only as a copy of that in the original petition and could not satisfy the requirement ..... 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