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TMI Blog2007 (10) TMI 712X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , viewed that though the discretion to convert consecutive sentences into concurrent in two different offences is available but principles, method and manner of exercise of this discretion, is not clearly made out from the different judgments that were cited before the Court. Accordingly, reference was made to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Larger Bench to answer the above referred question. That is how, the present application has been a listed for being heard by Full Bench of this Court. 3. The facts needing notice to get the hang of the issues requiring decision, in brief, are that the applicant-Appellant was accused in an FIR No. 104 dated 2.7.1997 at Police Station Dharmkot under Sections 302, 201 IPC. Another FIR No. 216 dated 21.7.1997, under Sections 399, 402, 379, 411, 467, 468 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, was registered against the applicant-Appellant at Police Station, Sadar, Jalandhar. Yet another FIR No. 103 dated 2.7.1997 under Sections 302, 201, 34 IPC came to be registered against him at Police Station Shahkot. The applicant-Appellant, however, was acquitted in FIR No. 104 dated 2.7.1997 of Police Station Dharmkot on 1.10.2005, but is convi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. The general principle is that the sentence should take effect immediately on conviction and the same can not be postponed. Section 427 appears to be carving out an exception to general principle governing execution of sentences when awarded by a Court of law. Sub-section (1) of Section 427, reproduced above, provid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ; (b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. (3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the aggregate of the consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence. 7. Though Section 31, would also talk of a general principle of sentences to commence after expiration of the other but still, the Court awarding the same, has the discretion to direct that such punishments shall run concurrently. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 31 may seem to be laying down some guidelines in regard to the principle that may govern the consideration for directing the sentences to run concurrently or consecutively. Otherwise, Sections 31 and 427 Code of Criminal Procedure have made enabling provisions empowering the Courts to direct the manner of execution of the sentences but principles, method and manner of exercise of this judicial discretion cannot be discerned from the Sections as such. Since the powers have been left to the Court to direct the punishment to run concurrently under Section 31, there may not be much difficulty in such cases wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at Alia Mubarak Ali (supra) that: Thus, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the same person in two different convictions would converge into one and thereafter it would flow through one alone. Even if the sentence in one of those two cases is not imprisonment life but only a lesser term the convergence will take place and the post-convergence flow would be through the same channel. In all other cases, it is left to the Court to decide whether the sentence in two different convictions should merge into one period or not. If no order is passed by the Court the two sentences would run one after the other. No doubt Section 427 is intended to provide amelioration to the prisoner. When such amelioration is a statutory operation in cases falling under the second Sub-section, it is a matter of choice for the court when the cases fall within the first Sub-section. Nonetheless, the entire section is aimed at providing amelioration to a prisoner. Thus a penumbra of the succeeding section can be glimpsed through the former provision. 8. The decision, thus, seems to be clear so far as Sub-section (2) of the Section is concerned. From the observations as reproduced above, it would al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his Section relates to administration of justice and provides a procedure for sentencing. Accordingly, it is the sentencing Court, which is required to apply its mind and consider what would be an appropriate sentence in a given case or in other words, if the sentences should be concurrent or consecutive. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has again gone into this aspect in the case of Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Anr. 1991 (3) RCR(Cri) 470: (1991) 4 SCC 304. In this case Ranjit Singh was convicted for an offence under Section 302 IPC on 6.3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment, which had been confirmed by the High Court. He committed another murder while on parole and was convicted under Section 303 IPC, which was, however, altered to one under Section 302 IPC. Ranjit Singh, however, was sentenced to life imprisonment in the second case which was ordered not to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of life imprisonment. Ranjit Singh impugned this order by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a suitable direction to correct the above mode of execution mainly praying that it be brought in consonance with Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ving only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in Sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the general rule enunciated in Sub-section (1) thereof is that without the court direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but, consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in Sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on Sub-section (1) if there be no express direction of the Court to this effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted in Sub-section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the court directs it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting Su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt in the case of K. Prabhakaran (supra). It is observed that in certain cases if the accused is habitual offender and is found guilty on various counts and it is suspected that he would be a menace to the society if let loose, then the term of consecutive sentences should be given. In Mani and Anr. v. State of Kerala, 1983 Cri.L.J. 1262, the Division Bench of the High Court was to observe that it can not positively directed as to the circumstances under which a Court should normally exercise the discretion to award the sentences concurrently since it is dependent on the facts of each case, the nature or character of the offences committed, the prior criminal record of the offender, his age and sex etc. 14. These considerations may provide some relevant and valid grounds to order execution of sentence one way or the other. Of course, such consideration can be illustrative only and can not be to exhaustively enumerated. Each case is to be decided depending upon its facts. The nature and gravity of the offence would certainly be a relevant factor and so too the record of the offender including his age, sex etc. Some of the Courts declined to make the sentences to run concurrently ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... i) 240 (P&H). This course was even adopted by this Court in the case of Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 1986 (2) RCR (Cri) 566 (P&H). This judgment was subsequently followed by this Court in the case of Baljinder Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr. 2007 (2) RCR (Cri) 207: 2007 (2) LH (P&H) 921 and Criminal Misc. No. 80965-M of 2006 (Sri Kant Gore v. State of U.T., Chandigarh), decided on 3.4.2007. In none of these cases, plea in regard to maintainability of the petition under Sections 482 or 427 Cr.P.C., as such, was raised. This issue may also arise in such cases. In fact, this has been so agitated before number of High Courts. Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sher Singh v. State of M.P., 1989 (1) RCR (Cri) 696 (M.P.) hold that High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure can direct running of the previous and subsequent sentences concurrently even if no order is passed by the sentencing Court in this regard and where the conviction has also become final. View taken is that the inherent power of the High Court is not in any way fettered by Section 427(1) Code of Criminal Procedure While so holding, the Full Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ised at any time and not necessarily while deciding the case on merits as the Court does not become functus officio. The Full Bench of Delhi High Court differed with the ratio of law laid down by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of A.S. Naidu (supra), by relying upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2/64 decided on 20.10.1964. The Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sher Singh (supra) concurred with this part of the judgment of Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass's case (supra), by observing that the criminal Court becomes functus officio after delivering its judgment or order and can not review its order and accordingly held that A.S. Naidu's case (supra) to this an extent had taken incorrect view. The Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, however, up-held the view of the Division Bench in the case of A.S. Naidu (supra) to the extent that powers could be invoked by the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction. Even the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of Mani (supra) has taken a similar view in regard to the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure by saying ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which it is held that inherent powers under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure can not be invoked for reviewing the earlier order as it is specifically prohibited under Section 362. Reference can also be made to State of Orissa v. Ram Chander, AIR 1979 SC 87, Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, 2000(4) RCR(Crl.) 650 (SC) and State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikandan Nair, 2001(2) RCR (Cri.) 657 (SC). This view taken by the Division Bench apparently is in some conflict with the case of Mani (supra). That was also a decision rendered by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court. Now not much further discussion may be needed on this aspect. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Kudva v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 (1) RCR (Cri) 868: 2007(1) RAJ 612: 2007 (1) AICLR 819 appears to have taken a view that where provisions of Section 427 Code of Criminal Procedure are never invoked and the appeals to High Court and S.L.P. etc. are dismissed, then an application under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and 427 Cr.P.C., praying for imposing these sentences concurrently is not maintainable. In this case, application under Section 427 Code of Criminal Procedure was filed befo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ny merit is dismissed 17. The view, as taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Kudva (supra) apparently would not leave any scope of further discussion with regard to invoking of inherent powers under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure in isolation to entertain the application for making the sentences to run concurrently. 18. The consensus of the judicial opinion, as may emerge from different judgments passed by various High Courts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, seems to be that normal rule, as per Section 427 Cr.P.C., is that, a person who is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment and is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to an imprisonment or an imprisonment for life, then such imprisonment or imprisonment of life shall commence after the expiration of the imprisonment, to which he has been previously sentenced. This, however, would not be so if the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence. Such direction to make the sentences to run concurrently, as per various decisions noted above, can be exercised by the trial Court or by the appellate Court or a revisional Court at the time of exercising appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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