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TMI Blog2011 (8) TMI 1381X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ail, telex, swift for further advising to the exporters. Upon receipt of such LCs, the SBI verifies the genuineness of the instruments and enter the details of each LC in its books. Then, it attaches a forwarding letter with the details of the LC and levy thereupon charges to the LC and hand it over to the courier for delivery to the exporters. From the customers, the bank recovers charges by debiting their account with the Bank and the courier recovers charges from the non-customers before the delivery of the LC to the exporters. Similar procedure is adopted for advising any amendment to the LC. 2. The complainant had also given the scale of quantum of charges which are levied in this regard for different services provided by the Bank. It was alleged that the present petitioner, Rajesh Chetwal, R/o B-1/149, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi, who has worked on the desk of LC Advising as Deputy Manager from November 1992 to May 1996, while advising some LCs/amendments, executed transfers without entering in the books of the Bank and pocketed the commission collected in cash from some exporters. It was further alleged that in order to give it the shape of a genuine transaction and to gain the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the learned Single Judge of our own Court in Inder Mohan Others versus The State, 1972 Cri LJ 1569 and Enforcement Directorate versus Ajay Bakliwal, 101 (2002) DLT 92, wherein it has been held that Article 131 of the Limitation Act /provisions of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC. 4 It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that although the charge sheet in respect of the FIR in question was filed in the year 1999 but the present petition was filed only after framing of charges on account of the fact that the petitioner was quite hopeful that he will be discharged at the stage of framing of charges. He also contended that a petition for quashing of FIR ought not be filed prior to framing of charge. Reliance in this regard is placed on Sewak Ram Sobhani Vs. R.K. Karanjiya AIR 1981 SC 1514. 5 The third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if the question of delay or laches is considered, the right to file the present petition accrued to the petitioner only after framing of charge, which admittedly in the instant case was do ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d not be applied like theorem. Similarly, in Sushil Suri Vs. CBI Anr AIR 2011 SC 1713, it has been observed by the Apex Court that difference of one material fact can result in a change of circumstances as a consequence of which ratio of one judgment may not be applicable in the facts of the other case. Meaning thereby, before applying the law laid down by the Apex Court one has to bear in mind the facts of each and every case as to whether the law which is sought to be applied would be applicable or not. 9. Keeping in view, these broad parameters so far as the judgment of Apex Court in State of Haryana versus Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335, Pepsi Foods Ltd. versus Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, Janta Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary Ors. 1992 (4) SCC 305 and Hiralal Ors. Vs. State of UP 2009 (11) SCC 89 are concerned, they laid down the broad principle of law with regard the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or the powers thereof for quashing of the FIR or the criminal complaint. In Pepsi Foods case (Supra) it has also been observed since the order of summoning impairs the personal liberty of a person, therefore, it should not be passed as a matter of course. There is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is not applicable and to this extent the judgment of the Single Judge in Enforcement Directorate Vs. Ajay Bakliwal (supra) Inder Mohan Others Vs The State (supra)is not in dispute. But the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner is barred by principle of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in invoking the powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.PC. 11. There is no dispute that Section 482 Cr.PC starts with a non-obstante clause and that being unfettered by any provision of law contained in Cr.PC, the High Court is conferred with the powers to pass orders to prevent the abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of justice. There is also no dispute about the fact that no period of limitation has been prescribed by the Limitation Act within which a petition under Section 482 Cr.PC ought to be filed. But the contention which the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to address convincingly is that the principle of laches or inordinate delay is not applicable to a petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. In this regard, I disagree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle of laches ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt that if a revision against an order of summoning could be filed within a period of 90 days then ordinarily a period of 90 days should have been sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC. Admittedly, this has not been done and if the period is calculated from 1999, the present petition has been filed after more than 11 years and, therefore, there was inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner for which not even an iota of explanation is forthcoming in the petition. 15. Even if, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the cause of action for filing the petition accrued to the petitioner only after 09.052009 when the charges against him under Section 409 and 420 IPC were framed, is taken to be correct even then from the date of framing of the charge, there has been a lapse of almost two years in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. As I have observed hereinabove that a revision against an order ought to be filed within a period of 90 days and the said period has been held by Orissa High Court Court to be reasonable and sufficient to invoke the revisionary power of a Court, then ordinarily the said period c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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