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TMI Blog1969 (2) TMI 197X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ey was received as bonus not by the employee to whom it had to be disbursed but by someone else. The company reported the matter to the police which conducted an investigation but did not find the case fit for being sent to Court on account of some technical flaw of law. The police however expressed the opinion that there was some evidence indicating the connivance of the appellant in the wrong disbursement. On 7 September 1957 the company terminated the service of the appellant purporting to act under Clause 7 of the service agreement. That gave rise to an industrial dispute and led to a reference by the State Government to the labour court at Gorakhpur. The labour court held that the notice of termination of service was not in accordance with the terms of service agreement and it made an award for the reinstatement of the appellant with full wages. A fresh notice of termination of service was then served upon the appellant which again purported to be under Clause 7 of the service agreement between the appellant and the company, and the appellant was paid one month's salary In lieu of a notice for that period. The dispute was again referred to the labour court, Gorakhpur, whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... greement. The writ petition filed by the company, however, leaves no room for doubt that the reason for the termination was that the company had lost confidence in the appellant. Paragraphs 4 to 7 of the petition narrate the facts connected with the disbursement of a certain amount of bonus to a wrong person and the conclusion reached by the police as a result of its investigation. Paragraph 8 states that the appellant ceased to enjoy the confidence of the company. Paragraphs 9 to 14 deal with the first termination of the appellant's service and his reinstatement under the first award of the labour court. Then comes Para. 15 which Bets forth in clear and unequivocal terms that because of the aforesaid circumstances as the petitioner concern had lost all confidence in S.P. Srivastava and continued to have misgiving about his reliability and character it was necessary to terminate his service. and then goes on to say that the notice dated 27 November 1958 was accordingly served upon the appellant. Therefore despite the silence of the notice as to the reason for, the termination of service, we have before us the reason given by the company itself in the plainest language. It is we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... only have been provided for in the service agreement between the company and the employee and there may farther be some special conditions applicable to a particular employee under his service agreement in addition to the general conditions applicable to all employees, but it does not provide and cannot be constructed as providing that a term of the service agreement would operate in supersession of the conditions of standing orders. The word also occurring in standing Order 35 makes it clear that the standing orders leave scope only for agreements in regard to matters outside the field covered by the standing orders and for special conditions of service supplementing those that have been mentioned therein, but they do not contemplate agreements in derogation of what they have specifically provided. To construe a general provision in standing orders as leaving the employer and the employee free to enter into agreements opposed to their specific provisions is to frustrate the very object of framing standing orders. A construction which results in making a general provision of standing orders nullify a special provision and in depriving an employee of the rights and benefits which t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erefore, adequate reasons for holding that the termination of the appellant's service was unjustified and it had the jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of the appellant on that account as well. We are fortified in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in U.B. Dutt Co. (Private), Ltd. v. its workmen ( Kozhikode Taluk Earcha Mill Thozhilali Union) (1962) 1 L.L.J. 374. In that case the employer sought to justify an order of termination of service on the basis of Rule 18(a) of its standing orders which empowered the employer to dispense with the service of any employee at any time by giving fourteen days' notice or paying twelve days' wages. Dealing with that claim of the employer, who was the appellant before the Supreme Court, their lordships observed at p. 376: We are of opinion that this claim of the appellant cannot be accepted, and it is too late in the day for an employer to raise such a claim, for it amounts to a claim ' to hire and fire' an employee as the employer pleases and thus completely negatives security of service which has been secured to industrial employees through industrial adjudication for over a long period of time now. As far back ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o satisfy the tribunal when the matter came before it for adjudication that the exercise of the power in this case was bona fide and was not colourable. It could have easily done so by producing satisfactory evidence; but it seems to have rested upon its right that no such justification was required and therefore, having failed to justify its action, must suffer the consequences?. Even If, therefore, It assumed that the power of the company under Clause 7 of the service agreement is unaffected by the standing order, the position does not charge. The existence of a power to terminate the service of a workman does not make the termination immune from an enquiry by the labour court into its propriety or fairness. If the labour court finds that the power of termination has not been exercised in good faith or fairly, or that it has been resorted to from improper motive or capriciously or arbitrarily, or that the termination operates very harshly and unjustly, it would be justified in interfering with the termination. We may draw attention in this connection to the following observation of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Assam Oil Company, Ltd. v. its workmen (vide supra): Theref ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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