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TMI Blog2025 (3) TMI 474X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rder - As it is found that no sufficient cause for the delay beyond the normal time limit of 30 days was shown by the Appellant, it is opined that the question of allowing the appeal to be presented, even for the extended time limit of a another 30 days as prescribed in the statute, does not arise in the instant case. The statue mandates manual filing of an application, intimation, reply, etc., in respect of any process or procedure prescribed therein, even in cases where a reference to electronic filing has been made. Accordingly, the Appellant's claim that they were under the impression that an appeal could be filed online only and that there was no mechanism to file a physical copy of the appeal, is of no avail to them, and in general parlance, ignorance of law cannot be cited as an excuse - It is also interesting to note here that the first e-mail in this regard has been admittedly sent by the Appellant on 17.10.2024, by which time, not only the last date for the filing of appeal i.e., 30.08.2024 was over, but the last date including the condonable period of another 30 days, i.e., 29.09.2024, was over as well. The powers of the appellate authority to condone the delay in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... x liability or reducing the amount of admissible input tax credit shall be made, unless the Appellant has been given an opportunity of being heard. 2. Under Section 103(1) of the Act, this Advance ruling pronounced by the Appellate Authority under Chapter XVII of the Act shall be binding only (a) on the applicant who had sought it in respect of any matter referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 97 for advance ruling; (b) on the concerned officer or the jurisdictional officer in respect of the applicant. 3. Under Section 103 (2) of the Act, this advance ruling shall be binding unless the law, facts or circumstances supporting the said advance ruling have changed. 4. Under Section 104(1) of the Act, where the Appellate Authority finds that advance ruling pronounced by it under sub-section (1) of Section 101 has been obtained by the Appellant by fraud or suppression of material facts or misrepresentation of facts, it may, by order, declare such ruling to be void ab-initio and thereupon all the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall apply to the Appellant as if such advance ruling has never been made. At the outset, we would like to make it clear that the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wo queries does not arise. 2.3. The Appellant then filed an application dated 15.03.2024 for Rectification of Mistakes (ROM), for not answering the other two queries, and pointing out certain legal infirmities in relation to the main query on ITC eligibility. The AAR in its Order for rectification of mistake dated 24.07.2024, held that no rectification is required to be made to its original ruling dated 22.11.2023 as it had come up with a well-reasoned speaking order and accordingly held that the application for rectification of mistake is liable for rejection, as there was no apparent error or mistake on the face of the record in the Advance Ruling No. 116/AAR/2023 dated 22.11.2023. 3.1. Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant filed this appeal on 26.11.2024 against both the Advance Ruling No. 116/AAR/2023 dated 22.11.2023, and the Order dated 24.07.2024 for rectification of mistakes, passed by the AAR. In the 'Grounds of Appeal' filed by them, it is seen that in paras A to D of 'Exhibit-II - Appeal' filed, under the head "DELAY. OUGHT TO BE CONDONED AND THE APPEAL MUST BE DECIDED ON MERITS", the Appellant has sought condonation of delay of 20 days, as reporte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... delay in preferring the appeal beyond the limitation period specified in Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017. Accordingly, the Appellant has contended that once it is held that the appellate authority has the power to condone the delay in preferring the appeal beyond the limitation period specified in Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017, in the instant case also, the Appellate Authority has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal, as the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 is not excluded under Section 100 of the CGST Act. Accordingly, the Appellant stated that in the present case also, the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned and that they may be granted liberty to present their case on merits. 3.3. We observe that in this case, apart from the merits of the case, the Appellant had also filed a petition for condonation of delay. Since the filing of appeal by the Appellant in the instant case is admittedly beyond the prescribed time limit of 30 days from the passing of Order dated 24.07.2024, we are of the opinion that the aspect as to whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned or not, needs to be ascertained first, before proceeding to discuss the m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cation. Before getting into the discussion of the issue in the appeal, we find that there is a delay in filing the appeal. Hence the same is required to be examined first before proceeding to consider the merits of the issue raised in the Appeal. Accordingly, the petition for condonation of delay as in paras A to D of 'Exhibit-II' (Ground of Appeal) filed by the Appellant, is taken up for consideration. 5.2 In this regard, the provisions of Section 100 of CGST Act, 2017, which is relevant to the instant case, is reproduced below for reference :- "100. Appeal to Appellate Authority.- (1) The concerned officer, the jurisdictional officer or an applicant aggrieved by any advance ruling pronounced under sub-section (4) of section 98, may appeal to the Appellate Authority. (2) Every appeal under this section shall be filed within a period of thirty days from the date on which the ruling sought to be appealed against is communicated to the concerned officer, the jurisdictional officer and the applicant: Provided that the Appellate Authority may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by a sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the said period of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would be 29.09.2024. We observe that the Appellant has claimed during the personal hearing that there was a delay of 17 days in filing the appeal beyond the extended time limit of 60 days, whereas the said delay was reported to be 20 days in para C of the Exhibit II (Grounds of Appeal), filed by them. However, we notice that since the actual date of filing the appeal application by the Appellant was 26.11.2024, it is evident that there has been a delay of 88 days (30.08.2024 to 26.11.2024) from the last date for filing the appeal under Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act, 2017. 5.4. As per the statute, the Appellate Authority can only condone a delay of 30 days beyond the normal period of thirty days given for filing the appeal, provided sufficient cause is shown by the Appellant for such delay. In the present case, there is a delay of 88 days from the last date for filing the appeal, i.e., 30.08.2024 which is way beyond the power vested with the Appellate authority to condone, let alone examining as to whether sufficient cause for the delay was shown by the Appellant or not. Further, we also note that the Appellant has not put forth any valid reason/cause for the delay on their part, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment or electronic issuance of a notice, order or certificate on the common portal shall, in respect of that process or procedure, include manual filing of the said application, intimation, reply, declaration, statement or issuance of the said notice, order or certificate in such Forms as appended to these rules." From the above, it could be seen that the statue mandates manual filing of an application, intimation, reply, etc., in respect of any process or procedure prescribed therein, even in cases where a reference to electronic filing has been made. Accordingly, the Appellant's claim that they were under the impression that an appeal could be filed online only and that there was no mechanism to file a physical copy of the appeal, is of no avail to them, and in general parlance, ignorance of law cannot be cited as an excuse. The Appellant had further stated during the personal hearing that as a result of such technical difficulties, the filing of appeal was delayed. We find that this plea was not forming part of the 'Grounds of Appeal' furnished by the Appellant, and it was made only during the personal hearing held on 28.01.2025. It is also interesting to note here ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al. On the other hand, this Appellate Authority being a creation of the statute is empowered to condone the delay of only a period of 30 days after the expiry of the initial period for filing appeal. As far as the language of section 100 of the CGST Act, 2017 is concerned, the crucial words are 'not exceeding thirty days' used in the proviso to sub-section (2). Further, we are of the opinion that to hold that this Appellate Authority could entertain this appeal beyond the extended period under the proviso would render the phrase 'not exceeding thirty days' wholly redundant, and no principle of interpretation would justify such a result. 5.9. Further on perusal of the three case laws referred by the Appellant as above, we come to understand that the first two judgments of the Hon'ble High Court of Madras, condone the delay in filing the appeal and directs the appellate authority to take the appeal on record. Whereas the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Shri Arvind Gupta goes on to state that Section 107 of the CGST Act does not expressly or impliedly exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s statutorily prescribed. Notwithstanding the same, we are of the considered opinion that it is not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to exercise the power to condone the delay, as claimed by the Appellant in their 'Grounds of Appeal'. Rather, it is to be seen as a discretionary power that lies with the appellate authority, enabling it to consider the request for condonation, provided it is satisfied that sufficient cause is shown for the delay, within the statutorily prescribed time limit, as discussed in detail in para 5.5 supra. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, as the Appellant has not come up with sufficient cause for the delay, the question of exercising the discretionary power of condonation does not arise, even for the extended time limit prescribed statutorily under proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act, 2017, leave alone the further period beyond the statutory time limit prescribed under proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act, 2017. 5.11 Accordingly, since the filing of the appeal in the instant case, falls beyond the scope of powers conferred under proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act, 2017, we hold that the appeal ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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