2025 (3) TMI 474 - AAAR - GST

Condonation of delay in filing appeal - Section 100 of CGST Act 2017 - applicability of Doctrine of Merger in determining the start of the limitation period for filing an appeal - HELD THAT - The proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act 2017 begins with the phrase Provided that the Appellate Authority may and ends with the phrase allow it to be presented within a further period not exceeding thirty days. . These phrases clearly convey the fact that the Appellate Authority has a discretion i.e. they may or may not allow the appeal case to be presented within a further period not exceeding thirty days depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly it also becomes clear that even this discretionary power is restricted to a further period not exceeding thirty days beyond the normal time limit of initial 30 days from the date of communication of the order - As it is found that no sufficient cause for the delay beyond the normal time limit of 30 days was shown by the Appellant it is opined that the question of allowing the appeal to be presented even for the extended time limit of a another 30 days as prescribed in the statute does not arise in the instant case. The statue mandates manual filing of an application intimation reply etc. in respect of any process or procedure prescribed therein even in cases where a reference to electronic filing has been made. Accordingly the Appellant s claim that they were under the impression that an appeal could be filed online only and that there was no mechanism to file a physical copy of the appeal is of no avail to them and in general parlance ignorance of law cannot be cited as an excuse - It is also interesting to note here that the first e-mail in this regard has been admittedly sent by the Appellant on 17.10.2024 by which time not only the last date for the filing of appeal i.e. 30.08.2024 was over but the last date including the condonable period of another 30 days i.e. 29.09.2024 was over as well. The powers of the appellate authority to condone the delay in filing the appeal is statutorily prescribed. Notwithstanding the same we are of the considered opinion that it is not obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to exercise the power to condone the delay as claimed by the Appellant in their Grounds of Appeal . Rather it is to be seen as a discretionary power that lies with the appellate authority enabling it to consider the request for condonation provided it is satisfied that sufficient cause is shown for the delay within the statutorily prescribed time limit - Under the facts and circumstances of this case as the Appellant has not come up with sufficient cause for the delay the question of exercising the discretionary power of condonation does not arise even for the extended time limit prescribed statutorily under proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act 2017 leave alone the further period beyond the statutory time limit prescribed under proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act 2017. Accordingly since the filing of the appeal in the instant case falls beyond the scope of powers conferred under proviso to Section 100 (2) of the CGST Act 2017 it is held that the appeal cannot be allowed to proceed on account of time limitation and as a result the question of discussing the merits of the issue in this case in appeal does not arise as well. Conclusion - The Appellate Authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:

Whether the delay in filing the appeal by the Appellant, M/s Mitsubishi Electric India Private Limited, can be condoned beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 100(2) of the CGST Act, 2017.
The applicability of the Doctrine of Merger in determining the start of the limitation period for filing an appeal.
The interpretation of the powers of the Appellate Authority to condone delays beyond the statutory period and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in this context.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Delay in Filing the Appeal

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The appeal was filed under Section 100(1) of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 100(2) mandates that an appeal should be filed within 30 days from the date of communication of the order, with a provision for condoning a delay of up to 30 additional days if sufficient cause is shown. The Appellant cited the Doctrine of Merger and several High Court decisions to argue for condonation of delay.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal emphasized that the statutory power to condone delays is limited to 30 days beyond the initial 30-day period. The Tribunal noted that the Doctrine of Merger implies that the limitation period starts from the date of the rectification order (31.07.2024), making the last permissible date for filing the appeal 29.09.2024. The appeal was filed on 26.11.2024, resulting in an 88-day delay beyond the statutory period, which is not condonable.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal found that the Appellant's argument regarding technical difficulties and misunderstanding about filing procedures did not constitute sufficient cause for delay. The Tribunal also noted that the Appellant's reliance on High Court decisions was misplaced, as these decisions were not binding on the Appellate Authority, which is a statutory body with limited powers.
Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal applied the statutory provisions strictly, highlighting that the language of Section 100(2) clearly limits the Appellate Authority's power to condone delays to a maximum of 30 days beyond the initial period.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Tribunal dismissed the Appellant's arguments based on the Doctrine of Merger and technical difficulties, stating that these did not provide sufficient cause for the delay. The Tribunal also rejected the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as the Supreme Court had clarified that such provisions do not apply to statutory bodies like the Appellate Authority.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that it lacked the authority to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period and dismissed the appeal on grounds of time limitation without addressing the merits of the case.

SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The Appellate Authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal."
Core Principles Established: The judgment reaffirms the principle that statutory bodies like the Appellate Authority are bound by the limitations set forth in the statute and cannot extend their powers beyond what is expressly provided. The decision also underscores the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and the limited scope for condoning delays.
Final Determinations on Each Issue: The Tribunal determined that the appeal was not admissible due to the delay in filing beyond the statutory period, and as such, did not consider the merits of the case.

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